MAGAZINE

RAZVEDCHIK

We search for knowledge not for glory's sake — But to learn the truth for the good of our State!

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A CENTURY
OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN RUSSIA

ALEXEY LIKHACHEV: "NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IS A TOOL FOR BUILDING THE FUTURE"

S. Y. CHEREPANOV: "NOT EVERYONE IS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO LIVE ANOTHER VERSION OF ONE"S OWN LIFE"

LEGENDARY INTELLIGENCE OF THE COMINTERN. 130TH ANNIVERSARY OF RICHARD SORGE

I THINK THAT WITHIN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT WE NEED TO CREATE A UNIT TO GATHER INFORMATION ON FOREIGN TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS

F.E.DZERZHINSKY,
CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU AND VSNKh.
OCTOBER 26, 1925

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“The task of foreign intelligence is to provide the Russian leadership with information about the real state of affairs abroad and about the true intentions of foreign authorities”

S.Y. Naryshkin

A Century of Scientific and Technical Intelligence in Russia

The history of Russian Scientific and Technical Intelligence (STI) is inextricably linked to the history of the country. Throughout all stages of the state’s development, intelligence officers have successfully solved the tasks assigned to them, the relevance of which was dictated by the challenges of the time. On the occasion of its centennial anniversary, I would like to recall the most notable chapters in the history of STI and debunk some common myths.

Text by Sergey Yevgenievich Naryshkin,
Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia

Formation and Activities in the Pre-War Years

The decision to establish an independent division within the Foreign Department (INO) of the OGPU, responsible for acquiring scientific and technical information, was made by the leadership of Soviet Russia, represented by the Head of the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the USSR, Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky, under challenging circumstances. By 1925, after the Red Army’s victory in the Civil War and the expulsion of foreign interventionists, the West had launched a policy of total isolation towards our country, which, of course, extended to the realm of science and technology.

History teaches us that prolonged isolation can have a detrimental effect on the pace of economic development, leading to stagnation and a decline in scientific thought, as well as stagnation and disappearance of entire research fields. At the same time, the Russian scientific school has always been rightfully considered one of the strongest in the world. A.A. Markov, D.I. Mendeleyev, I.P. Pavlov, I.M. Sechenov, K.A. Timiryazev — these are just a few among a whole galaxy of outstanding scientists who lived and worked in our country in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Ensuring access for their successors to foreign scientific discoveries and to the results of promising research became a matter of particular concern for the Soviet authorities.

Based on these considerations, on October 26, 1925, F.E. Dzerzhinsky sent a memorandum to the INO proposing the establishment of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence. I should note that at that time, the task of searching for advanced scientific and technical information abroad was assigned to almost all specialized institutions and departments of the USSR. However, it was the foreign intelligence, given its competence, the availability of trained personnel, and its agent network, that was tasked with obtaining the most valuable data that was carefully hidden from the global scientific community. I will immediately clarify that this was not about industrial espionage. This is a purely superficial view of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence that fails to consider the political climate of the time, as well as the role and place of foreign intelligence within the state system.

D.A. Bystrolyotov
G.B. Ovakimyan

On March 5, 1926, the leadership of the Military-Industrial Directorate of the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy approved the "List of Questions for Foreign Information", specially developed for the Foreign Department (INO), as the first assignment for obtaining technical documentation and samples of foreign technology, instructing them to send it through their *"agents in a completely confidential manner <...> directly abroad"*.

It should be noted that during those years, intelligence officers did not have narrow specializations; each of them worked in multiple areas simultaneously. In this regard, an episode from the biography of the outstanding intelligence officer Dmitry Alexandrovich Bystrolyotov comes to mind. He was tasked by Moscow with transporting a sample of a new machine gun, obtained by his comrades, to the USSR. And he brilliantly accomplished this by transporting it through several European borders in a golf bag!

> The flow of foreign information entering the USSR in the 1930s was quite impressive. In 1939 alone, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence (STI) managed to acquire 31,000 sheets of technical documentation, 1055 sets of blueprints, and 163 samples of new equipment.

On January 30, 1930, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) instructed foreign intelligence to intensify its work in technically advanced Western countries such as Great Britain, Germany, France, and Japan. In particular, for the first time, the task was explicitly set to *"...obtain for our industry information about inventions, design and production drawings and diagrams, and technical innovations that cannot be obtained through ordinary means"*. From that moment on, foreign illegal stations began working to acquire agents specifically oriented towards obtaining materials on scientific and technical issues.

One of the most successful intelligence officers of those years, considered the founder of the scientific and technical intelligence division in the Foreign Department (INO) of the OGPU, was Gaik Badalovich Ovakimyan. A graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University and a postgraduate student at the Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology, he was recruited into intelligence in 1931 and sent on a mission to Berlin in the same year, where he recruited several valuable sources. From them, information was obtained, in particular, on aircraft altimeters, chemical warfare agents, chemical protection equipment, radio equipment for tanks, and other innovations of German military-technical thought.

The flow of foreign information entering the USSR in the 1930s was quite impressive. In 1939 alone, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence (STI) managed to acquire 31,000 sheets of technical documentation, 1055 sets of blueprints, and 163 samples of new equipment. All of this not only helped preserve domestic scientific and technical schools but also created opportunities for the advancement of Soviet science. Relying on intelligence data, Soviet scientists proposed a whole range of their own original solutions.

On the Invisible Fronts of the Great Patriotic War

With the outbreak of the war, the State Defense Committee (GKO) tasked intelligence with obtaining information on the latest foreign military equipment and advanced military production technologies, as well as on promising theoretical and experimental research, which are now commonly referred to as dual-use technologies.

STI employees worked literally day and night, managing to obtain and deliver to end-users over 1,000 complete sets of secret materials (schematics, blueprints, instructions, descriptions, finished samples) in important military-technical areas such as jet aviation, high-precision artillery, armored vehicles, special chemistry, and many others. Problems of radar technology were covered in detail, which significantly expanded the combat capabilities of all branches of the armed forces. In particular, it was possible to obtain not only information on the theory of radar devices but also specific schematic solutions, as well as instructions for setting up radar systems for air defense systems, aviation, and the navy.

However, scientific and technical intelligence in those years wasn't just about weaponry. The legendary Soviet intelligence officer Semyon Markovich Semyonov, working in the US under the cover of an engineer for "Amtorg", obtained and transferred several samples of purified American penicillin strains to the USSR on assignment from Moscow. This allowed the country to launch mass production of the first domestic penicillin drug, called "Krustozin", as early as 1943. Moreover, its effectiveness proved to be higher than that of foreign analogues. As a result of its widespread use, mortality among the wounded and sick in the Red Army decreased by 80%, and doctors managed to reduce the number of amputations by a quarter.

The Atomic Project

The operation "Enormoz" to obtain information about atomic weapons in the US and England, which began even before the Great Patriotic War and continued successfully throughout the war years, was a true triumph of Scientific and Technical Intelligence. And although much has been said and written about this, in the year of the centenary of Scientific and Technical Intelligence and the 80th anniversary of Victory, I consider it necessary to pay tribute to its participants. First of all, these are the well-known

direct speech

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Ampoules of domestic penicillin – Krustozin. 1943

Heroes of Russia Vladimir Borisovich Barkovsky, Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov, Alexander Semenovich Feklisov, Anatoly Antonovich Yatskov, Morris and Leontina Cohen. But there were others whose names we have no right to reveal even today!

As for the operation itself, it fully lived up to its name — "Enormoz". It was indeed colossal, both in terms of the number of countries involved, the amount of forces and resources deployed, and the volume of materials obtained. It is enough to say that the corresponding case file comprises six volumes, each with more than 300 pages. And this is just the operational correspondence. The total number of secret documents sent to the Center exceeds five thousand! The majority still remain classified,

> The effectiveness of STI's work is evidenced by the fact that just 12 days after the assembly of the first American bomb, its complete technical description lay on our scientists' desks.

although this year, in connection with the 80th anniversary of the domestic nuclear industry, we declassified some of them and handed them over to our friends at "Rosatom" *(see Documents 3-5 in the "Declassified Archives" section — Ed. note)*. These are purely technical papers that demonstrate the extent of intelligence involvement in the core of the issue.

The effectiveness of STI's work is evidenced by the fact that just 12 days after the assembly of the first American bomb, its complete technical description lay on our scientists' desks. As a result, the Soviet Union successfully tested its nuclear device a mere four years after the USA — on August 29, 1949. It is generally accepted that the efforts of intelligence reduced the time it took for our country to acquire a nuclear shield by at least five to six years. This not only shattered the American monopoly in this field and laid the foundation for global strategic stability for decades, but also gave a powerful impetus to the development of the civilian nuclear industry in the USSR. We remain a recognized world leader in this area to this day.

Model of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 at the exhibition dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the STI, SVR of Russia headquarters. Moscow. Yasenevo

The operation "Enormoz" is also surrounded by myths. One of them is that Soviet intelligence supposedly stole atomic secrets from the West. This is not entirely true. Western scientists themselves shared information with our intelligence officers, and they did so selflessly. They were well-versed not only in nuclear physics but also in the realities of life and quickly realized the danger of monopolizing atomic weapons.

Albert Einstein himself, whose letter to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in August 1939 essentially initiated the American atomic program, said after the war: *"If I had known that the Germans would not succeed in creating the bomb, I would not have lifted a finger"*. And the scientific director of the Manhattan Project, Robert Oppenheimer, shocked by the results of applying his brainchild in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was convinced that humanity would forever curse the very name "Los Alamos".

The Cold War Years

During this period, the efforts of foreign intelligence, especially Scientific and Technical Intelligence (STI), were aimed at maintaining global stability based on missile-nuclear parity with the United States, as well as ensuring advanced development in the USSR of all types of weapons and military equipment. Such significant goals required extraordinary exertion from intelligence officers and well-coordinated interaction with the consumers of the obtained information. The country's leadership understood this and took steps to further strengthen and develop scientific and technical intelligence.

In 1956, the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued resolution to organizationally strengthen STI. This allowed for a significant enhancement of its personnel potential both at the Center and in its foreign apparatuses. In 1959, a special department of the Military-Industrial Commission was formed within the government. This department was tasked with preparing assignments for scientific and technical intelligence and conducting operational assessments of the information obtained. In 1971, another resolution of the Council of Ministers tasked intelligence officers to identify foreign R&D that could lead to the emergence of fundamentally new types of weapons.

At the same time, the STI made a significant contribution to the development of a number of high-tech sectors of domestic industry, ranging from civil aviation, metallurgy, engine and instrument manufacturing to petrochemicals, including the production of high-quality fuels and lubricants, synthetic rubbers, and other materials. The intelligence gathered allowed our science to save time and resources in overcoming the lag behind leading countries, and in several sectors, to reach leading positions. For example, in electronics, particularly in the military sphere, production in the USSR surpassed that of the USA and Japan in terms of the number of mastered technologies, the range of products, and the technical parameters of the produced component base.

I would also like to specifically highlight the role of intelligence in advancing medical developments, especially since, in my time as an employee of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence, I myself had some involvement in this. In the 1980s, when the threat of the "plague of the 20th century" — AIDS — emerged, the US and its allies, exploiting the unusual nature of the disease, attempted to mislead not only the general public but also the international medical community by hinting at alleged bacteriological developments underway in the USSR. At that time, the country's leadership tasked the STI with obtaining information on major global research in this field as quickly as possible. I recall the request from Moscow that arrived then, including to us in Brussels. As a result of a series of operations, reliable information was obtained about the scientific research being conducted in the West, particularly regarding methodologies and preparations for diagnosing this dangerous disease. Consequently, our state rose to the forefront of the global fight against AIDS.

Physicists Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard are writing a letter to U.S. President F. Roosevelt (a still from a documentary film of 1946)

As I have already mentioned, healthcare has always been and will be one of the priority areas of STI's activities. Even in our current times, STI employees have provided assistance in the development of domestic means for the prevention and treatment of coronavirus infection.

STI in the Modern Era

Despite the difficulties of the transition period — and I would like to remind you that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the demands of the US administration was no less than dissolution of the scientific-technical and illegal intelligence departments within the special services of the Russian Federation — STI

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Handing over declassified documents on the atomic project from the SVR of Russia archive to Rosatom head A.Y.Likhachev. Moscow. October 31, 2025

managed to preserve its personnel potential, operational capabilities, and the system of interaction with the consumers of the obtained information. Today, it is one of the leading areas of activity for the SVR of Russia.

In line with the glorious traditions laid down by generations of professional intelligence officers, STI continues to solve multi-vector tasks to ensure state security in the scientific-technical and technical spheres. The intensification of confrontation with the collective West and the imposition of illegal restrictions against our country, which limit, among other things, access to high-tech products, pose new large-scale challenges. Perhaps the main ones are preventing Russia from critically lagging behind leading nations and facilitating the rapid transition of the domestic economy to the next, sixth, technical paradigm.

Here, I would also like to debunk a very common myth: that intelligence agencies supposedly seek to infiltrate the state apparatus, political, and public institutions of Western countries to identify their weaknesses and prepare plans for their subversion in order to eliminate strong competitors. This, of course, is not the case. Russia does not interfere in the internal affairs of other states and, unlike the West, does not engage in regime change. The task of foreign intelligence is to provide the Russian leadership with information about the real state of affairs abroad in a particular sphere and about the true intentions of foreign authorities. This allows for avoiding spontaneous and ill-considered decisions that carry unpredictable consequences, up to the threat of military conflicts.

At the same time, it is no secret that in the context of intensifying global competition, industrially developed countries view science and technology as the main factors for maintaining economic and military superiority. Promising civilian developments, let alone dual-use technologies, are no longer the subject of open international expert discourse but are conducted in secrecy. In parallel, the concentration of high-tech potential in the West continues. The United States, Japan, and a number of European countries are striving to enhance their military capabilities through scientific and technical breakthroughs. The development of synthetic biology, robotics, and AI-based control systems is provoking a new round of the arms race, associated with a fundamental change in the forms and methods of warfare.

Russian Scientific and Technical Intelligence, guided by the Strategies for Ensuring the National Security of the Russian Federation and its Scientific and Technical Development, as well as the priorities of the Decade of Science and Technology (2022–2031) announced by the President, aims to further strengthen domestic potential in science and technology. The information received through scientific and technical intelligence allows for informed decisions in shaping state scientific and technical policy, selecting optimal directions for concentrating scientific potential, material, and financial resources, and effectively managing the risks of investing in scientific research.

Furthermore, Scientific and Technical Intelligence counteracts external threats to Russia's traditional leading positions in such foundational and high-tech industrial sectors as aviation, space, special metallurgy, engine and shipbuilding, and nuclear energy. It supports the work of our specialists and scientists in other promising areas. The results of these efforts are reflected not only in facilitating the technical re-equipment of the Russian army and navy but also in a range of civilian industries. According to assessments received by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVR), the economic effect from the implementation of scientific and technical materials and samples obtained through intelligence amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

The main factor in the successful operation of STI at all historical stages, and undoubtedly its most valuable asset, is its people. Those whose intelligence, the highest level of training, and expertise allow them to communicate as equals with the vanguard of humanity — the creators of global scientific and technical progress. Those whose daily painstaking work, invisible to the outside observer, allows Russia to confidently move forward, step by step, maintaining a fragile balance of power on the planet. To a great extent, the future of our country depends on the professional intelligence officers, who will determine what will happen tomorrow and how our descendants will see our homeland in another 100 years. Congratulations, dear readers! Happy centenary of STI!

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Esteemed colleagues! Dear friends!

Admiral Igor Olegovich Kostyukov,
Deputy Chief of the General Staff –
Head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Hero of Russia

I am pleased to address you on the eve of the 105th anniversary of founding of the national foreign intelligence and in the year marking the 100th anniversary of such an important division of the SVR of Russia as the scientific and technical intelligence. It is gratifying to note that our comrades-in-arms at the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation have arrived at this anniversary in excellent form. This is evidenced by the fact that, for example, some of the information they obtain, primarily concerning West's aggressive intentions towards Russia and its allies, is regularly published in the media, thus thwarting the most odious plans.

It is heartening to see that the cooperation between our services has been very close and exceptionally effective over the years. And how else could it be? After all, in essence, we are doing the same thing: providing the President of Russia and other supreme bodies of state power with the intelligence information they need to make decisions. Moreover, we share similar principles and approaches to work, comparable professional training, and a common history that stretches back several centuries.

Historians of special services still haven't reached a consensus on when the first intelligence service appeared in Russia. Some refer to the era of Ivan the Terrible and the Posolsky Prikaz, others to the Prikaz of Secret Affairs established in 1654, and still others to the Napoleonic Wars, when the Expedition for Secret Affairs was founded on Barclay de Tolly's initiative. The official timeline of the SVR of Russia begins on December 12, 1920, when F.E. Dzerzhinsky signed order No. 169 creating the Foreign Department (INO) within the Cheka structure. The founding date of military intelligence is considered to be November 5, 1918, when, by order No. 197/27, the Registration Agency — the predecessor of the famous GRU — was established at the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council (Revvoyensoviet) of the RSFSR.

The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Russian Federation. Moscow

Thus the formal chronicle of our shared history, by itself, spans more than a century! And often, the significant successes of our country were the result of collaborative work between employees of two services. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, Yan Chernyak, Sándor Radó, Richard Sorge together with Aleksander Korotkov, Pavel Fitin, and other heroic intelligence officers forged the Great Victory. Pavel Angelov and Ursula Kuczynski, alongside Leonid Kvasnikov and Vladimir Barkovsky, did everything possible to create Russia's nuclear shield. Among more recent examples is Operation Storm-333 in Afghanistan, when special forces from the PGU KGB and GRU General Staff stood united to defend the interests of our Motherland.

Today, as our country wages, virtually alone, a relentless struggle against the collective West, bent on achieving our strategic defeat, we continue to fight shoulder to shoulder on fronts both visible and invisible. I am confident that our cooperation, which has repeatedly proven its high effectiveness, will once again, as in the most difficult times for the Motherland, serve the common cause and accelerate the approach of a new victory. Our Victory!

4 October 1895

Richard Sorge, an outstanding intelligence officer and Hero of the Soviet Union, was born in the village of Sabunchi, Baku province. Participant in World War I (on the German side). From 1917, he was an activist in the German revolutionary movement. In 1919, he was admitted into the Communist Party of Germany. In 1924, at the invitation of the Comintern, he came to Moscow, soon joined the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks/VKP (b)), and acquired Soviet citizenship. In 1929, he was enrolled in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army (Razvedupr RKKA). In 1930, he was sent as a deep cover intelligence officer ("Ramsay") to Shanghai, where he obtained German encryption codes and exposed the German-Chinese conspiracy regarding chemical weapons. From 1933 to 1941, he worked in Japan under the guise of a correspondent for German newspapers, reporting on Hitler's plans to attack the USSR. In July-October 1941, he transmitted a series of reports on Tokyo's unpreparedness for war with the Soviet Union, which allowed the Red Army to redeploy Far Eastern divisions to Moscow.

26 October 1925

Felix E. Dzerzhinsky, the Chairman of the OGPU and the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the USSR, signed an internal memo in which he pointed out the need to conduct scientific and technical intelligence work: *"...I think we need to create a unit within the INO to gather information on foreign technological achievements. This unit would provide directives for obtaining secrets, models, etc."* This date is considered the day of foundation of scientific and technical intelligence as one of the leading directions of INO — PGU — SVR.

9 November 1895

Albert Ioakhimovich Syrkin, a Soviet deep cover intelligence officer, was born in Vilno. In 1926, he was admitted into the OGPU as an authorized representative of the Foreign Department, and a year later, under the alias Bernardy, he was sent on a mission abroad. From 1928 to 1936, he and his wife, Vera Yakovlevna, operated from illegal positions in Germany, Italy, China, and France. From September 1937, he served as assistant to the head of the Special Purpose Group of the GUGB NKVD Y.I. Serebryansky. He was awarded two "Honorary Employee of the Cheka-GPU" badges and a personal weapon.

14 November 1900

Mikhail Andreyevich Allakhverdov, a Soviet intelligence officer, Major General, was born in Shusha (Stepanakert). He joined the Red Army in 1918 and the Cheka (VChK) in 1919. In 1925, he graduated via correspondence from the Eastern Faculty of the Frunze Red Army Military Academy and, in the same year, headed the station in Iran. From 1933, he operated illegally in Europe, working in Austria, France, Switzerland, and other countries. From 1934 to 1938, he served as chief of station in Afghanistan and Turkey. After short stint in the Center, he returned to Afghanistan as chief of station. In 1944, he headed the Information Department of the First Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR. From 1947 until his retirement in 1955, he served as Deputy Head of the Higher Intelligence School — School No. 101 of the KGB of the USSR, responsible for academic and research affairs. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Badge of Honor, the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, and numerous medals.

20 November 1990

On the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service, "USSR Post" for the first time issued a stamp block "Soviet Intelligence Officers" featuring five postage stamps. The stamps, designed by artist Boris Semyonovich Ilyukhin, depicted portraits of Heroes of the Soviet Union Ivan Danilovich Kudrya and Stanislav Alekseevich Vaupshasov, as well as deep cover intelligence officers Rudolf Ivanovich Abel (William Fisher), Konon Trofimovich Molody, and Kim Philby.

30 November 2010

On the eve of the 90th anniversary of the foundation of Soviet foreign intelligence, a memorial plaque was solemnly unveiled in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Region, on building No. 9 on Krasnaya Gorka Street, in memory of the legendary "atomic" intelligence officer, Hero of Russia Vladimir Borisovich Barkovsky, who lived there in the 1930s — 1950s.

9 December 2010

In Moscow, Ostozhenka Street, a memorial plaque was solemnly unveiled on the building of the SVR Press Bureau in honor of the legendary intelligence officer and anti-fascist Kim Philby, who made a significant contribution to ensuring the security of the USSR. The bronze plaque, adorned with a double bas-relief of Philby created by sculptor Igor Nikolaevich Novikov, features the words of the outstanding intelligence officer: *"I look at my life as serving a cause which I truly and passionately believe in."*

18 December 1980

At the headquarters of the USSR's First Main Directorate of KGB in Yasenevo, on the eve of the 60th anniversary of Soviet foreign intelligence, a stele "To the Intelligence Officers of the Cheka Who Gave Their Lives for the Motherland" was unveiled, commemorating colleagues who paid the highest price for the security of the Motherland — their lives. The stele was created to a design by intelligence veteran and honored worker of culture of the RSFSR Sergei Ivanovich Chukanov. Forty-five years later, on the eve of the 80th Victory anniversary, an Eternal Flame was lit at the stele, from a part of the Flame burning at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the walls of the Moscow Kremlin.

20 December 1995

By decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1280 "On the Establishment of the Day of the Security Agencies Workers of the Russian Federation," the date of the establishment of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) in 1917 and the Foreign Department (INO) of the Cheka in 1920 became a common professional holiday for all employees of national security agencies, including those in foreign intelligence.

29 December 1915

Soviet deep cover intelligence officer Shamil Abdullazyanovich Khamzin was born in Arkhangelsk. He graduated from the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute named after V.I. Lenin with a degree in electrical engineering. During the war he worked at a Moscow factory. In 1943 he was offered to serve in the NKGB. After graduating from the special intelligence school, he went to the Middle East. In 1955, as a deep-cover agent (code-name "Khalef"), he was sent to Japan where he successfully worked for over 17 years with his wife Irina Alimova ("Bir"). Later he went to the United States and other countries. He was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, and many medals.

A century on guard for the technological sovereignity of the Fatherland

S. Y. Naryshkin awards the SVR of Russia Medal "For Cooperation" to the president of the National Research Centre "Kurchatov Institute" M.V. Kovalychuk

On October 29, 2025, celebrations were held at the headquarters of the SVR of the Russian Federation in Yasenevo to commemorate the centenary of scientific and technical intelligence. It is worth recalling that 100 years ago, in October 1925, a special unit was created within the Foreign Department by a decision of the OGPU. This unit served as an information body on foreign technical achievements and laid the foundation for the modern Directorate "T" of the SVR of Russia. It is from this moment that the history of domestic scientific and technical intelligence (STI) is conventionally counted.

Addressing the gathered employees and veterans of Directorate "T", as well as numerous distinguished guests, including representatives of the consumers of the scientific and technical information obtained by the SVR, the Director of the Service Sergey Yevgenievich Naryshkin said: *"We are celebrating the centenary of an event, that, I am not afraid to say, holds historical significance. It has, without exaggeration, influenced not only the course of domestic history but also, to some extent, the balance of power on the world stage. The industrial leap of the young Soviet Republic, the establishment of a powerful scientific and production base in an extremely short period, which enabled the Red Army and the entire Soviet people to achieve victory over the Nazi Germany, the attainment of strategic parity during the Cold War, the achievement of leadership in a number of advanced fields... This is by no means a complete list of strategically important tasks that our state tackled with the active support of scientific and technical intelligence. Information obtained abroad has repeatedly helped to make the right decisions for the development of key industries, avoid mistakes, and save time and resources. The century-long experience of our respected jubilarians clearly demonstrates that the greatest asset of foreign intelligence is its human potential".*



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

26 октября 20 25 г. № Пр-2409

Москва, Кремль

Коллективу и ветеранам управления "Т"
Службы внешней разведки Российской Федерации

Уважаемые товарищи!

Поздравляю вас со знаменательным юбилеем – 100-летием управления "Т" СВР России.

Научно-техническая разведка всегда играла значимую роль в обеспечении национальной безопасности нашей страны. Мы по праву гордимся высочайшим профессионализмом и мужеством многих поколений её сотрудников, которые достойно решали сложнейшие разноплановые задачи и способствовали наращиванию промышленного, военного и научного потенциала Отечества. Внесли неоценимый вклад в разгром нацизма, создание новых отраслей экономики, достижение ядерного паритета.

Сегодня к вашей работе предъявляются особые требования. В условиях прорывного развития технологий и современных вызовов вы должны максимально использовать свои знания и опыт, аналитические ресурсы для повышения обороноспособности России, укрепления её технологического суверенитета, модернизации Вооружённых Сил.

Убеждён, что вы и впредь будете верно служить на благо Родины и нашего народа.

Желаю сотрудникам и ветеранам управления "Т" СВР России – доброго здоровья и успехов.

В.Путин

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Continuing his speech, Sergey Yevgenievich, who had also worked abroad in the field of scientific and technical intelligence (STI) in his time, noted the high professionalism of the current generation of employees of Directorate "T" and the special place that STI occupies within the Service: *"In addition to operational skill, a solid foundation of basic engineering and technical knowledge is essential here, as is the ability to navigate specialized issues and find common ground with the bearers of the special information we are interested in."*

During the ceremony, Vladimir Borisovich Osipov, the head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation for State Decorations, read a congratulatory letter from President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Following this there was a ceremony awarding state honors to employees and veterans of the "T" Department, as well as representatives of partner Russian structures and agencies, with whom the Service often shares not only business but also fraternal relations — the departmental "For Cooperation" medals. Among the laureates were Mikhail Valentinovich Kovalychuk, the President of the National Research Center "Kurchatov Institute"; Valentin Efimovich Kostyukov, the Director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center — All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics; Boris Viktorovich Obnosov, the General Director of JSC "Tactical Missile Corporation (KTRV)", and many others.

The Director of the SVR thanked the representatives of the clients for many years of fruitful cooperation, and emphasized: *"It is precisely such close interaction that gives meaning to intelligence activities, ensures their focus, and places them on a systematic basis. We have a challenging joint task ahead of us. The pressing issue on the agenda of ensuring Russia's technological sovereignty is a key matter of national security and the foundation for the country's further progressive development."*

At the exhibition dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the STI. SVR of Russia headquarters. Moscow. Yasenevo

At the conclusion of the official part of the event, a festive concert was held, after which employees and veterans of the Service, as well as esteemed guests, familiarized themselves with the exhibits of the thematic exhibition dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the STI, which had opened the day before at the SVR headquarters.

> It is necessary to create the most favorable conditions possible to bring Russia to a leading position in breakthrough fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, medical, and nature-inspired technologies. It is our strong desire that in about 100 years, on the day of celebrating another anniversary of the STI, our descendants will recognize the results we have achieved alongside the accomplishments of our outstanding predecessors.
>
> Director of the SVR of Russia S.Y.Naryshkin

The Academy of Foreign Intelligence got a Banner

On October 10, 2025, a significant event took place in the Order of Zhukov Red Banner Academy of Foreign Intelligence named after Yu. V. Andropov (AVR): the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russian Federation (SVR) Sergey Yevgenyevich Naryshkin handed the Academy Banner — established in accordance with his order — to the AVR staff, the Banner becoming an integral element of the symbols of the SVR of Russia.

The event was held in a special, solemn atmosphere with the participation of the Service's management, teachers of the Academy, its veterans and current students, who will soon have to solve the most difficult and responsible tasks to ensure the security of the country.

Opening the ceremony, the Director of the SVR of Russia pointed out: *"At all times, battle banners have been the epitome of military prowess, honor, and glory. They have reminded of the sacred duty of serving the Fatherland. With banners in hands, our soldiers have gone into battle and to the parade. The Academy of Foreign Intelligence is an integral part of the well-coordinated mechanism of the SVR of Russia. Over its almost 90-year history, it has come a long way and has become a real and effective forge of personnel. The acquisition of its own Banner testifies to the recognition of its high authority and significant merits, emphasizes the importance of the set tasks, responsibility for their timely and high-quality implementation."*

A special moment was the nailing the Banner to the flagstaff. By tradition, ten employees of the Foreign Intelligence Service of various age

groups and ranks took part in this ceremony — from graduates of the AVR of different years to its current students, from general of the army to lieutenant. Thus, the Banner symbolically united all members of the military team.

After that, the Banner of the Academy, crowned with two order bows and ribbons, rose solemnly into the sky. A moment later, the Director handed it over to the head of the AVR, Lieutenant General Andrey Viktorovich Artamonov, and then presented him with a special certificate congratulating the entire Academy staff on the acquisition of the sacred relic.

In response, A.V. Artamonov thanked the Director for the honour, assuring that the Academy staff would do their best to ensure that the training and education of young intelligence officers meet the requirements of the time. *"Today, a new page has opened in the history of our unique educational institution. The words Knowledge, Patriotism, and Traditions are inscribed on the Academy's Banner. They will remind us of our honorable mission — to train our employees in intelligence skills, instill in them a sense of patriotism, loyalty to the traditions laid down by previous generations of intelligence officers."*

In conclusion, the Director of the SVR of Russia congratulated the audience and stressed the high creative power of the sacred symbol, which inherits the traditions of the ancestors: *"I am sure that the Banner will be in strong and reliable hands. Preserve and cherish this relic which is precious for all of us. Let the proud Banner inspire you to solve the difficult and responsible tasks facing the Foreign Intelligence Service. Let it inspire you to new achievements for the benefit of our great Fatherland, for the benefit of our beloved Russia!"*

"The significance of this event cannot be overestimated. The presentation of the Banner to the Academy is a historic event, and I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in it. It has been almost 30 years since I left the walls of my native Academy, and I am overwhelmed by the same feelings that I experienced here as a student: a sense of belonging to a real, great cause worthy of a real man, an awareness of responsibility for the honour of touching the glorious history of foreign intelligence and the immortal exploits of our predecessors, the desire to be worthy of their memory and infinite pride for the Fatherland."

Mikhail Fedorovich Zlobin,
First Deputy Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service.
General of the Army, graduate of the Academy of Foreign Intelligence

"I'm a third-generation officer. My grandfather devoted his whole life to the intelligence service, and my parents met at the Red Banner Institute of the KGB of the USSR. This is probably why taking the oath of office and being awarded the first and subsequent military ranks have always been significant and exciting events for me. When I received an invitation to take part in such an important military ritual as nailing the Banner to the flagstaff, I didn't even believe it right away! I felt a real thrill at the ceremony itself. But not out of fear, but on the contrary, alive, inspiring thrill. It's amazing how such different lofty feelings as the professional honour, loyalty to family traditions and unfading romance intertwine inside you at such moments!"

Anna Nikolaevna,
language teacher in the Academy
of Foreign Intelligence, captain

According to the decision of the SVR of Russia, in commemoration of the presentation of the sacred relic October 10 will be celebrated annually at the Academy as the Day of the presentation of the Banner. It will be included in the calendar of memorable dates of the AVR along with the Day of formation of the Special Purpose School (October 3), the birthday of Yu.V. Andropov (June 15) and the Day of the Security Agencies Workers' of the Russian Federation (December 20).

"It is a great honour and an incredible responsibility for me, a young student, to be in the same ranks with the best graduates of the Academy of different years. I am well aware that I have received an advance, which I have yet to work out. I have to prove in practice that they were not wrong about me when they selected me from thousands of young men to serve in the intelligence service. And I am sure that I will not let down my mentors, who have given me valuable knowledge and put their whole soul into me. I know there will be difficulties ahead, but that doesn't scare me. This is the only way real intelligence officers are born — through asperities to the stars. I have the honor!

Ivan Sergeyevich,
second-year student of the Academy
of Foreign Intelligence, lieutenant

The Academy of Foreign Intelligence begins recruiting students for the 2026 academic year. The duration of study ranges from one to three years, depending on the foreign languages studied and the profile of future activities. After receiving special training, graduates of the Academy become officers of the intelligence service and start serving at the Center and abroad. Detailed information about joining the service is posted on the official website of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia in the "How to become an intelligence officer" section.

svr.gov.ru

A future without control?

The expiration of the New START Treaty

Text: Fyodor Genrikhovich Voitolovsky,
Director of the IMEMO RAS, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences

In February 2026, the New START Treaty, one of the last cornerstones of the global security architecture that has been consistently eroded by successive US Republican administrations, expires.

For more than 50 years, military-strategic relations between the USSR/Russia and the United States were built on bilateral agreements that ensured control over strategic offensive and defensive arms. The first step on this path was the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) in 1972. The only document on strategic defensive arms, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, was also concluded at that time. In the following decades, a number of other agreements limiting strategic offensive potentials were adopted between the leading nuclear powers: SALT II (1979), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I, 1991), START II (1993), the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, 2002), and the New START Treaty (2010).

Each document regulated the quantitative parameters of the parties' possessions — the number of strategic launch vehicles and warheads. The only treaty whose conclusion led to the elimination of an entire class of missiles, albeit sub-strategic (according to Russian classification), was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), concluded in 1987.

> Arms control treaties served as a kind of safeguard, a means of maintaining strategic stability.

The verification system did not ensure the superpowers' refusal to participate in the nuclear missile race, but it did allow for its dynamics and, to some extent, its scale to be regulated. A balance of power was maintained at certain levels, allowing each side to launch a second or retaliatory strike in the event of an attack by the other. Arms control treaties served as a kind of safeguard, a means of maintaining strategic stability. The mechanism was based on quantitative and qualitative parity in strategic offensive weapons, ensuring that one side's potential did not exceed the other's. This allowed the two leading nuclear powers not to strive to constantly be ahead of the curve, but to maintain sufficient means to launch a retaliatory strike capable of causing unacceptable damage.

Signing of the SALT Treaty by L.I. Brezhnev and R. Nixon. Moscow. 1972

Strategic offensive arms control ensured effectiveness of nuclear deterrence due to guaranteeing equal vulnerability — a key condition for the military and political tension to be more or less controlled, predictable in military-strategic and political-psychological terms. On this basis, communication mechanisms were developed that reduced the risk of misinterpretation of intentions and actions, and at the advanced stages of nuclear deterrence (START I and START II), enabled regular information exchanges that provided an objective assessment of the enemy's nuclear deterrent forces. Although these instruments drew criticism from both sides as leading to excessive openness (when combined with space-based surveillance), due to their reciprocity, they allowed Russia and the United States to have a fairly comprehensive picture of each other's capabilities in terms of delivery systems.

A solid legal framework and ongoing negotiations on ways to further limit and reduce the most destructive — strategic offensive — weapons allowed for the development of stable channels of communication between the USSR/Russia and the United States. Thanks to regular dialogue on arms control and strategic stability, a long-standing political and diplomatic practice of interaction between the two superpowers was established at the level of representatives of foreign policy and defense ministries, and even heads of state. A unique culture of strategic dialogue emerged, comprising negotiations and expert consultations between military and civilian professionals from both countries, and confidence-building measures and emergency response systems were developed.

This dialogue between Moscow and Washington sent an important signal to other nuclear powers not participating in nuclear arms limitation and reduction regimes. The most powerful players, despite the existence of mutual deterrence between them, demonstrated a willingness to build

Russian President V.V. Putin is delivering his annual address to the Federal Assembly. March 1, 2018

relations based on principles of mutual respect, a balance of power, and interests for the sake of maintaining peace. Arms control regimes between the USSR/Russia and the United States established a kind of coordinate system within which other leading powers developed their nuclear missile programs and defined security guarantees for non-nuclear states.

Until recently, this mechanism contributed to the preservation of military-political conditions for the stability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed in 1968 and enshrining an informal global hierarchy of members of the "nuclear club." The NPT also regulated the obligations of nuclear weapons possessors and security guarantees for non-nuclear states.

Since the early 2000s, the United States has embarked on a course of systematically dismantling the entire arms control system. Moreover, each new step along this path was taken under Republican rule. Such demonstrative rejection of the arms control system is largely due to the right-wing Republican Party's focus on supporting the interests of the national military-industrial complex, as well as the purely ideological notion that America should not be bound by any external restrictions or obligations in the security field.

Washington's actions to dismantle the arms control system are driven by a combination of factors — military-technological, economic, and foreign policy. Ideological considerations also play a significant role. Since Ronald Reagan era, the idea of the technical achievability of absolute US invulnerability to external threats and the need to ensure total military superiority as a prerequisite for peace and stability indefinitely has become entrenched in Republican thinking. Advocates of the invulnerability theory consider the concept of equal vulnerability as a means of ensuring mutual deterrence to be flawed and contrary to their understanding of national security.

With the advent of each Republican administration, these illusions have been revived, fueling the ambitions of established interest groups that still remain not only in the Pentagon, but also in the management of corporations working on government defense contracts, and in the large community of researchers, engineers, and developers interested in funding new R&D. These groups are also joined by those who lobby for increased military spending in the US Congress and preach the concept of invulnerability among scientific experts. Also included are consultants serving the military-industrial complex, public relations specialists, and individual media representatives.

> Since Ronald Reagan era, the idea of the technical achievability of absolute US invulnerability to external threats and the need to ensure total military superiority as a prerequisite for peace and stability indefinitely has become entrenched in Republican thinking.

Each new technological breakthrough created the illusion among these groups that complete superiority over the enemy was within reach. Their activity cycles correlate not only with the dynamics of technological development used in the creation of the latest offensive and defensive systems and the need for their periodic modernization, but also, first and foremost, with the budget process — the fight to increase defense spending, which unfolds time and again in the US Congress at the instigation of Republicans. Although, since the early 2010s, as during the Cold War, Democrats have also not denied themselves the "pleasure" of feeding the American military-industrial complex, including the developers of strategic offensive and defensive systems, their willingness to increase budgetary infusions has been much more modest.

Republicans' belief in the feasibility of creating a missile defense system capable of ensuring the entire US territory's invulnerability to missile threats, coupled with the development of defensive R&D during Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, nearly led to the collapse of the ABM Treaty. The US finally withdrew from it under George W. Bush in 2001. As under Reagan, the key factor was the Republicans' desire to invest significant budgetary resources in modernizing the ABM system, which was intended to increase the survivability of strategic nuclear missiles and their second-strike capability.

The next step came in 2019, during Donald Trump's first term as president: after several years of Russian-American political and diplomatic disputes over compliance with the INF Treaty, he announced the US's complete withdrawal from it. The real reason was not the violations Washington attempted to accuse Moscow of, but the need to use land-based intermediate-range missiles as an additional pressure tool within the White House's "dual containment" strategy against Russia and China. Given China's growing nuclear missile potential, which relied on deploying land-based intermediate-range missiles to strengthen its regional nuclear deterrent, US authorities decided to supplement their strategic offensive missile systems, as well as

> The real reason was not the violations Washington attempted to accuse Moscow of, but the need to use land-based intermediate-range missiles as an additional pressure tool.

Russian President V.V.Putin is delivering his annual address to the Federal Assembly. March 1, 2018

With the expiration of the New START Treaty, there are no guarantees that strategic nuclear potentials will remain at their previous levels.

their sea- and air-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems, with land-based cruise and ballistic missiles of this class.

Another factor contributing to this decision was the development of land-based hypersonic systems, which could carry nuclear warheads. It's hardly surprising that, having announced the imminent development and deployment of land-based intermediate-range missiles, Trump announced his intention to deploy them in Europe and Northeast Asia — against Russia and China.

In 2020, Washington dismantled another key agreement — the Open Skies Treaty (OST, 1992), which provided for confidence-building measures and the exchange of information on military aircraft flights, including strategic ones. Russia was forced to take reciprocal measures, since without the participation of the United States — a key military power in NATO — maintaining the OST became meaningless.

And now, during Donald Trump's second presidential term, the final chord of the arms control "symphony" is set to sound — the New START Treaty, signed by Presidents Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev and Barack Obama on April 8, 2010, and which entered into force on February 5, 2011, expires on February 5, 2026. The treaty was concluded for ten years with the possibility of a five-year extension. During his first term as president, Donald Trump showed no interest in extending it, and his administration essentially sabotaged the negotiation process. Ultimately, the New START Treaty was only extended in January 2021, after the Democrats came to power, despite all their grievances against Russia.

The ceremony of launching the Khabarovsk nuclear submarine, carrier of the Poseidon nuclear underwater system, from its slipway. November 1, 2025

In 2023, amid the acute stage of the conflict in Ukraine, Russian authorities were forced to "freeze" a number of Treaty requirements, completely ceasing mutual inspections and information exchanges. However, neither Moscow nor Washington violated the quantitative restrictions, adhering to the agreed-upon ceilings for both strategic delivery vehicles (700 units) and warheads (1,550 units). However, with the expiration of the New START Treaty, there are no guarantees that strategic nuclear potentials will remain at their previous levels. Proposal by Russian President Vladimir Putin for US leadership to commit to mutually adhering to the New START restrictions for at least a year after its termination has met with a vague response from the Trump administration. The Russian Foreign Ministry's proposals on strategic stability, pursuant to the presidential initiative, have not yet received a response from the US State Department.

Washington's position is deeply unconstructive, but unfortunately, entirely logical. On the one hand, the rejection of any restrictions on its military capabilities is consistent with the Republican right's understanding of national security strategy. On the other hand, the US faces the long-term objective of continuing a foreign policy built on the principles of "dual deterrence," a principle outlined quite directly and candidly in the strategic documents of both the Republican and Democratic administrations.

This will also be reflected in the new version of the US National Security Strategy and related documents, which will soon be adopted by Donald Trump. They continue prioritizing to counter simultaneously Russia, firstly, whose nuclear arsenal is comparable to the US's and will remain so for a long time. And China, secondly, whose strategic offensive weapons potential, while still substantially smaller than Russia's, is compensated for by a significant number of intermediate-range missiles, both nuclear and conventional, and, due to its significant military, economic, and technical resources, has the capacity for a rapid buildup .

Furthermore, American military and foreign policy strategists, regardless of party affiliation, see another imperative: countering other militarily significant states — the de facto nuclear North Korea, as well as non-nuclear but "threshold" Iran, which also possesses a regionally significant missile arsenal.

The Chinese leadership is reluctant to engage in a nuclear arms race with the US, recognizing how risky and costly it could be. Having not achieved quantitative indicators comparable to those of the United States, Beijing is justifiably unwilling to bind itself to any restrictions. Furthermore, there is no direct dialogue between Beijing and Washington on arms control issues between their military and foreign policy ministries, with only occasional expert discussions taking place.

The Americans likely expect that a modest increase in their nuclear potential through the deployment of land-based intermediate-range missiles, coupled with their modernization and the development of long-range, high-precision conventional weapons over the next three to five years, will be sufficient to effectively deter both Russia and China simultaneously. However, the US's clearly unfriendly actions and its increasing military pressure in Asia, backed by its allies, could force China to accelerate its strategic buildup by the end of this decade.

In developing its nuclear missile potential, Russia's leadership is guided by the principles of reasonable sufficiency, high survivability, and the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent forces. Significant technological advances have been achieved in this area in recent years: new systems have been tested and are being fielded, and the entire strategic triad is being modernized. In the coming years, amid ongoing military and political tensions with NATO, Russia's nuclear deterrent forces will be able to equally effectively ensure the sovereignty and security of the state.

The current balance of power and strategic stability between Russia and the United States can be maintained for some time without arms control mechanisms. However, two questions remain open for the future.

First. Will the United States, even with reliance on European and Asian allies, be able to provide military-technical and financial deterrence against the other two leading global powers? Republicans will sooner or later be replaced by Democrats, who have different government spending priorities, and the task of reducing the budget deficit and national debt is common to all administrations, regardless of party affiliation. Then, it's possible that Washington itself will begin to seek new agreements with its opponents.

Second. What will be the global consequences of US adventurism in arms control? It will most likely lead to an erosion of strategic stability, create risks in relations with both Russia and China due to the parties re-estimating each other's capabilities and intentions, and complicate dialogue on other regional and international security issues.

Furthermore, rabid US militarism, unsupported by a willingness to engage in dialogue on military-strategic issues, especially in light of the recent Israeli and American attacks on Iran, will create serious risks for the preservation of the NPT regime by encouraging an increasing number of "threshold" powers to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

To summarize, it can be concluded that a post-New START world, that is, one without arms control, will definitely not be safer for anyone. But how soon Washington will understand this, and whether dialogue with Moscow on strategic stability and measures to strengthen it will resume, depends largely on the US ability to negotiate. The Russian leadership is willing to demonstrate pragmatism, but is not inclined to rely on the goodwill of the other side, which has repeatedly proved itself untrustworthy.

In developing its nuclear missile potential, Russia's leadership is guided by the principles of reasonable sufficiency, high survivability, and the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent forces. Significant technological advances have been achieved in this area in recent years.

Trump's tariff policy

A lack of foresight or a calculated strategy?

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Customs tariffs as an instrument of protecting the national market from foreign competition are one of the pillars of US President Donald Trump's policy. Even during his first term in the White House, he actively used them in the trade war with the PRC, and continued this tactic as soon as he re-entered office as head of state.

The presidential decree issued on February 4, 2025, imposed a 10% tariff on all goods entering the United States from China. A month later, on March 4, it was raised to 20%. Despite the functioning free trade zone between the US, Canada and Mexico, import tariffs on products from Canada and Mexico were set at 25% in February by the will of D. Trump. Starting from March 12th, Washington imposed a 25% tariff on imported aluminum and steel from all countries. Finally, in April, the head of the White House announced the introduction of a 10% general tariff on almost all imports, as well as those "retaliatory" or "reciprocal" tariffs that puzzled the global community, on goods from specific countries.

Donald Trump's so-called retaliatory tariffs contradict the fundamental principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which have been defining the rules of the game in regulating international trade for the recent decades.

Firstly, customs duties introduced by WTO member states (including the US) are bound tariffs according to their membership obligations, meaning they cannot go above the so-called bound level.

Secondly, duties that impose different tariff rates for different countries are a direct violation of the WTO's fundamental principle of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment. According to this principle, it is impossible for an individual state to create more favorable trade conditions for one country than for all other MFN members. In other words, under MFN, duties on goods from one country cannot be higher that the rates applied to a similar group of goods from another country, with the exception of lower tariffs for developing and least developed countries, and participants in economic integration processes.

Donald Trump's so-called retaliatory tariffs contradict the fundamental principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which have been defining the rules of the game in regulating international trade for the recent decades.

Amidst a complete disregard for the rules of the World Trade Organization, independent experts have voiced strong criticism of the White House's proposed methodology for calculating retaliatory tariffs. It was presumed that the US administration employed a simple formula for calculating the rates dividing half of the US trade deficit with a given country by that country's export volume to the United States. This particular formula produced the initial retaliatory duty imposed on the PRC, which, I would like to remind you, was 34%. Consequently, the tariffs, initially presented as a countermeasure to elevated tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting American products in certain markets, were in essence not retaliatory at all. They are not directly related to foreign trade regulatory measures in specific countries, but are dictated solely by considerations of reducing the negative US trade balance, in the best traditions of mercantilism.

For the sake of fairness, it's worth pointing out that the exact

methodology the White House used to calculate the initial retaliatory rates didn't matter, as the tariffs introduced were simply a launchpad for bilateral talks and were later adjusted repeatedly, both up and down, by incorporating specific additional tariffs into the retaliatory measures.

The US administration managed to conclude agreements with several countries, including a provisional one-year agreement with China, that institutionalized new trade tariffs *(see Fig. 1)*. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the introduction of retaliatory tariffs by D. Trump marked a new era in the functioning of the multilateral trading system, the most important characteristic of which is now the absence of rules, i. e. a return to the law of the jungle.

Deviating from established trade regulation approaches, D. Trump, to a certain extent, bypassed U. S. legal provisions, as well, that grant Congress the exclusive authority over customs tariff changes, which the President cannot unilaterally alter.

Fig. 1



Certainly, both the current head of state and his administration are cognizant of this situation. That's precisely why, during D. Trump's first term, his foreign trade ideologue, Peter Navarro, lobbied heavily for a new "Reciprocal Trade Act". This law would have given the US President the power to raise tariffs on goods from countries that increased or refused to lower barriers to American products.

The bill, proposed for consideration in 2019 but never passed by Congress, stipulated that if the head of state determines that a tariff imposed by a foreign country on any good significantly exceeds the customs duty applied by the United States, or if a foreign country establishes significantly higher non-tariff barriers, then the US President has the right to *"negotiate and seek an agreement"* that *"obligates the country to reduce tariffs, diminish or eliminate non-tariff barriers"*. If negotiations are unsuccessful, the President can *"impose retaliatory tariffs to offset or repulse that country's protectionist advantage"*.

Therefore, the concept of "retaliatory" duties originated in 2019. Unlike his previous attempt to gain congressional approval for their implementation, Donald Trump decided to take a different approach this time. He is using a U. S. law that allows tariffs to be imposed through a presidential decree, citing "*national security reasons"*. Thus, tariffs on imports of steel, aluminum and automobiles were imposed under the "Trade Expansion Act" allowing the president to alter import structures if the Secretary of Commerce carries out an investigation and reaches a reasoned conclusion that imports threaten national security (the White House, of course, initiated the relevant investigation). Additionally, D. Trump utilized the broad powers granted by the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (he latter had already been used for sanctions but it does not mention tariffs), having declared several national emergencies related to border security, energy and trade deficits.

However, the opposition has challenged these decisions by D. Trump as illegal. Since November 2025, the issue has been under consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court, with two lower courts already deeming the imposition of new tariffs as an overreach of presidential authority. Thus, the fate of the new duties remains uncertain and will largely depend on the domestic political balance of power.

Due to the fragile legal basis for adopting new tariffs, D. Trump is attempting to use them as leverage in what are referred to as "deals" — essentially approving customs rules through bilateral trade agreements, which would be in full compliance with the American law and would not contradict WTO norms.

So, what motivates the American leader's actions? Is it blind faith in the power of the strong, a disregard for basic economic laws, or does Trump has some hidden cards up his sleeve? Can such a tactic be considered effective, especially in terms of the successful development of the American economy?

Donald Trump's tariff policy, known for its strong protectionist stance, may seem chaotic and unpredictable. However, the truth is that the perceived chaos and unpredictability are actually part of a deliberate negotiation strategy and have a theoretical foundation.

A common belief in modern macroeconomic theory is the idea that customs duties have a negative impact on a country's overall welfare. This belief has been a key factor in the gradual liberalization of foreign trade since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947. The harmful effects of duties allegedly come from the increase in domestic prices of imported goods, leading to a decrease in consumption and in increase in consumer costs. Yet the way prices rise due to increased customs tariffs differs significantly between small and large economies. In terms of foreign trade policy, small and large economies are those whose demand and/or supply levels affect world prices.

In small economies, an increase in customs duties leads to a proportional rise in the cost of imported goods, because the additional costs of paying duties are fully passed on to the consumer, resulting in a reduction in aggregate welfare. In large economies, prices typically increase by an amount less than the size of the additional customs duties. This is because price increases in the domestic markets of such countries, and the corresponding decrease in demand, lead to a fall in world prices.

The perceived chaos and unpredictability of D. Trump's tariff policy are actually part of a deliberate negotiation strategy and have a theoretical foundation.

Large economies also have more flexibility in pursuing protectionist policies, as the import restrictions they impose do not necessarily result in a corresponding rise in domestic prices.

Consequently, domestic prices ultimately rise by a smaller amount than the rate of additional customs duties. In this way, part of the costs associated with increased import duties is transferred from the consumer to the supplier of the goods. Understanding this logic compels foreign importers to lower prices for their goods already when facing tariff increases in order to prevent a decline in their market share within a large economy.

Based on this, large economies also have more flexibility in pursuing protectionist policies, as the import restrictions they impose do not necessarily result in a corresponding rise in domestic prices. This circumstance puts the authorities of these economies in a stronger negotiating position with supplier countries allowing them to use aggressive negotiation strategies, such as the "Escalation Dominance" strategy actively used by D. Trump.

It was proposed by American economist and military strategist Herman Kahn in 1965 in the context of nuclear deterrence, and D. Trump adopted it for trade negotiations. The strategy involves credible threats of escalating the situation in a way that is guaranteed to worsen the opponent's position. It is precisely the implementation of this strategy that explains many of D. Trump's actions, which may appear chaotic and illogical from the outside, such as the threats to raise tariffs on Chinese goods to 125%.

It should be clarified, however, that only the party in a conflict with an advantage at every step of the escalation ladder can practice such dominance. In foreign trade, this can only be afforded by large economies, and even then, only in cases of complete superiority. Thus, the answer to the question of the effectiveness of its use by the US in modern conditions depends on the actual scale of American political and economic influence in the world, which has been declining in recent years, particularly in relation to countries like China and India.

According to the World Bank, the United States remains one of the largest consumer markets, absorbing 14.2% of the value of global imports *(see Fig. 2)*. However, China and India, if combined, surpass the United States in this regard, accounting for 14.5%. In terms of nominal GDP,

Fig. 2



China still lags significantly behind the US, but in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP GDP), it is ahead by 30%. Cumulatively, the PPP GDP of China and India is almost double that of the US — 27.54 versus 14.78%.

According to China's General Administration of Customs, in 2024, the volume of exports to the United States constituted 14.7% of total exports. The share of the United States in Indian exports for the same period was 19.8% (data from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India). In turn, the US dependence on Chinese and Indian sales markets is significantly lower: in 2024, China accounted for 6.9% of total merchandise exports, and India for 2% (data from the U.S. Department of Commerce). At the same time, China is a critically important supplier of a number of commodity items, such as rare-earth metals and permanent magnets produced with their application. The US is also highly dependent on electronic products manufactured in China and India, which is confirmed by the decision of the Trump administration to exempt a whole range of goods necessary for the American economy from increased tariffs. These include electronic devices and their components, such as semiconductors, solar panels, flat-panel television displays, flash drives and memory cards, which, according to various estimates, account for up to 20% of China's imports to the US.

Therefore, it is not surprising that at the height of the escalating trade confrontation with Washington, Beijing used the restriction on rare earth metal exports as an argument, among other things. As a result, D. Trump had to significantly soften his demands, and by the end of October, the parties effectively agreed to suspend the trade war for a year. From November 1, 2025, the US administration reduced the so-called

fentanyl surcharge on tariffs for Chinese goods from 20% to 10%, while the overall tariff rate for China was 20%. In response, Beijing lifted restrictions on the export of rare-earth metals and agreed to resume purchasing American soybeans. The parties also agreed to suspend mutual port fees for a year.

So does Washington possess enough superiority over its trading partners today for the escalation dominance strategy to be effective? Clearly, the answer depends on who the US is dealing with. In the case of China, the world's largest exporter, total superiority that would allow the US to dictate its terms is no longer evident. Other countries are inherently in weaker negotiating positions.

It is important to note that D. Trump's application of the escalation dominance strategy is based, in part, on the use of the so-called Prisoner's Dilemma — a fundamental paradox in game theory, according to which, rational players in a crisis situation typically prioritize their own self-preservation, even though a more advantageous tactic would be to coordinate positions.

However, it appears that the leadership of China, India, and other BRICS member countries are well aware that unilaterally accepting US demands will not lead them to a victory in the trade war. They are demonstrating willingness for coordinated resistance to American pressure. Regardless of the final outcome of this struggle, the mere fact of its commencement has had a significant destructive impact on the entire system of international trade regulation and will undoubtedly have negative consequences for the development of cross-border exchanges.

The leadership of China, India, and other BRICS member countries are well aware that unilaterally accepting US demands will not lead them to a victory in the trade war. They are demonstrating willingness for coordinated resistance to American pressure.

close-up

Director General of Rosatom State Corporation Alexey Likhachev:

“Nuclear industry is a tool for building the future”

In 2025, Russia's nuclear industry celebrated its 80th anniversary. Rosatom State Corporation is the successor to the Special Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy and the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, established in August 1945. "Razvedchik" met with its CEO, Alexey Yevgenievich Likhachev, to ask about its traditions, achievements, and new plans.

Alexey Yevgenievich, the celebratory events were held under the motto "Pride. Inspiration. Dream." What does this mean? What significant projects did Rosatom implement in its anniversary year?

80 years is not just an anniversary; it's an epoch. And the motto "Pride. Inspiration. Dream" perfectly captures our journey. The pride in achievements that would have been impossible without the dedicated work of several generations of nuclear scientists. The inspiration we draw from these achievements to move forward. And, of course, the dream of a future in which nuclear energy serves the benefit of humanity.

Rosatom is today the undisputed world champion in nuclear power plant construction. Of the 27 export-grade nuclear power units currently under construction, 24 are being built by Russian specialists. The geography of our projects is incredibly broad: from Egypt to China, from Hungary to Bangladesh. Russia is number one in the world not only in the scale of nuclear construction but also in uranium enrichment.

Alexey Evgenievich Likhachev

Was born on December 23, 1962, in Arzamas-75 (now Sarov). A graduate of Gorky State University (specializing in radiophysics), he graduated from the Faculty of Economics at Nizhny Novgorod State University in 1998. He holds a Doctor of Economics degree (2006). He began his career at the Gorky Institute of Instrument Engineering. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, he worked in the Komsomol. From 1992 to 2000, he was the manager of the Nizhny Novgorod insurance company Aval. From 2000 to 2007, he was member of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. In 2007, he transferred to the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. From 2010 to 2015, he was Deputy Minister, and since February 2015, First Deputy Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. Since October 5, 2016, he has been CEO of Rosatom State Corporation. He has been awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, IV Class, the Order of Honor, and the Order of Friendship.

IAEA Director General R. Grossi and Rosatom head A.Y. Likhachev before meeting the President of Russia. September 25, 2025

And in terms of uranium production, fuel fabrication, and mineral resource base, we are among the top three.

In terms of specific projects, the anniversary year has been rich in events, each of which, to varying degrees, reflects the three components of our slogan. In March, we poured the first concrete at Unit 8 of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant. This is a major milestone in the life of any nuclear power plant, marking the start of the main construction of the new power unit. In Zheleznogorsk, the Mining and Chemical Combine launched the second stage of the Experimental and Demonstration Center for Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing. This is where the most crucial element of the nuclear energy of the future — the so-called 4th generation — is being developed. We are effectively realizing the dream of a clean and virtually unlimited energy future.

The new nuclear icebreaker Yakutia was commissioned. This giant has already traveled nearly 15,000 nautical miles through the ice and guided 56 vessels through the harshest weather conditions. The first two RITM-400 reactors have been manufactured for the lead nuclear icebreaker Rossiya of the Leader project, which is being built at a shipyard in the Far East. These are the most powerful small reactors in Rosatom's product line for the world's most powerful nuclear-powered icebreaker, which will join Russia's fleet of nuclear-powered vessels in the early 2030s and ensure year-round navigation in extreme conditions along the entire Northern Sea Route.

How is international cooperation progressing?

Despite the challenging international situation, we are actively working abroad. In Uzbekistan, excavation work has begun for a small nuclear power plant with RITM-200 reactors. This project is unique for two reasons. First, it is the world's first export contract for the construction of a small nuclear power plant. Second, the customer has decided to build two additional large-capacity power units on the same site. The combination of large and small power units restructures the project's economics, allowing the plant to operate more flexibly in the face of seasonal and daily fluctuations in power demand. Who knows, perhaps such combined projects will become a new trend in the coming years.

An agreement has been reached with Kazakhstan to build two large-capacity VVER-1200 units. The first work began in the village of Ulken in August, and engineering surveys are currently underway at the site. The goal is to conclude a contract by the end of 2025.

We are developing relations with Belarus. President Alexander Lukashenko has clearly stated his desire to expand the capacity of the existing NPP, built according to our design by our own specialists. Moreover, cooperation is advancing not only in the nuclear sector, but also in areas such as additive manufacturing, nuclear medicine, electric propulsion, the implementation of advanced digital products, and many others.

With Vietnam, we've revisited the issue of constructing not only a large nuclear power plant but also a nuclear technology center with a research reactor. And, of course, we continue to implement large-scale projects that are in the active phase. In Egypt, four units of the El Dabaa NPP are currently under construction simultaneously. In Hungary, despite all the difficulties, we are preparing to begin the main construction of Unit 1 of the Paks II NPP. In Bangladesh, the testing program is nearing completion at Unit 1 of the Rooppur NPP. In Turkey, work is underway on all four power units of the Akkuyu NPP. We continue construction in India and China.

All of these aren't just construction projects — they are a contribution to our partners' energy security, new jobs, and the development of science and technology. And they are the realization of the dream of a sustainable and secure future for all humanity.

At the end of September, the World Atomic Week 2025 international forum was held in Moscow. What were its results?

The results are quite practical. World Atomic Week opened with the Global Atomic Forum, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin. This was, in fact, the first event of its kind. Heads of state and government gathered to discuss approaches to developing the nuclear industry and ways to overcome the challenges hampering the development of peaceful nuclear energy. Among those in attendance were the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Myanmar, and Ethiopia, representatives of Egypt, Iran, Niger, and Uzbekistan, as well as IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi.

The main result, in my opinion, is the confirmation that nuclear energy is a key element in the sustainable development of humanity. Given the growing demand for energy and the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear energy is undoubtedly one of the most effective and reliable solutions. More and more countries around the world understand this.

At the World Atomic Forum held within the framework of the World Atomic Week Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin formulated the basic ideology and principles of our work abroad:
— rejection of the practice of “technological colonialism” — we do not use our technologies

“All of these aren't just construction projects — they are a contribution to our partners' energy security, new jobs, and the development of science and technology. And they are the realization of the dream of a sustainable and secure future for all humanity.

The solemn ceremony of starting the construction of the Akkuyu NPP. Turkey. July 21, 2022

Rosatom

The State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom combines assets in energy, mechanical engineering, construction, and other industries. It comprises more than 450 enterprises and organizations (employing over 420,000 people). It is the national leader in electricity generation in the Russian Federation (up to 20% of total output). It ranks first in the world in terms of the largest backlog of nuclear power plant construction orders, with 39 power units (including six small-capacity units) under construction in 10 countries. It also manufactures innovative non-nuclear products, handles logistics, and develops the Northern Sea Route.

World Atomic Week opening ceremony at VDNKh. Moscow. September 25, 2025

and decisions as an instrument of influence, but offer our partners technologies that help them to develop;
— open and nondiscriminatory access to advanced nuclear technologies, clean and reliable energy, modern medical and scientific achievements;
— building of truly partner relationships among states based on respect and mutual advantage.

> Given the growing demand for energy and the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear energy is undoubtedly one of the most effective and reliable solutions. More and more countries around the world understand this.

The forum also addressed the pressing issue of the looming uranium shortage, expected as early as the second half of this century. Russian nuclear scientists have a response to this threat, as our President also mentioned in his report. This involves fourth-generation nuclear energy and closed nuclear fuel cycle technology. The world's first next-generation power complex is already under construction in the city of Seversk in the Tomsk region. We expect to complete the work by the end of this decade. This technology will not only meet the global nuclear energy industry's future fuel needs for thousands of years to come, but also address the issue of accumulation of radioactive waste.

The World Atomic Week forum itself, without exaggeration, has become one of the most significant events in the global nuclear energy industry. And it's not just the scale — over 40,000 participants from 118 countries, an all-time record. It's the atmosphere and the spirit that permeated the event.

Many cutting-edge developments in nuclear energy were presented, including small modular reactors and closed nuclear fuel cycle technologies. Achievements in related fields included the latest composite materials and additive manufacturing, smart city solutions, quantum computers, and know-how in medicine and human life extension.

World Atomic Week became an excellent platform for strengthening cooperation with our long-standing partners and establishing new contacts. Countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have shown interest in collaborating with Rosatom. They see us as a reliable and competent partner, whose technologies are modern and safe.

Finally, the forum's youth program is particularly noteworthy. Young scientists and engineers from around the world actively participated in the discussions and shared experiences. This is crucial, as they will be the ones building the nuclear energy of the future. And we are doing everything possible to support them and inspire them to new achievements.

> World Atomic Week became an excellent platform for strengthening cooperation with our long-standing partners and establishing new contacts.

What is the status of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) under construction in France? In your opinion, is Russia's participation in this project still relevant?

ITER is truly a unique international project, uniting the efforts of scientists and engineers from around the world to create the world's first experimental fusion reactor. Russia is one of its key participants, making a significant contribution to the project's implementation.

Installation of the reactor vessel of the first power unit of the Egyptian NPP El Dabaa November 19, 2025

> Participation in ITER is crucial for the development of our national fusion program. The project serves as a technological platform for the development of a next-generation domestic tokamak.

Interview by
Vladislav Ilyin

It's worth remembering that the very idea of the tokamak — a toroidal chamber with magnetic coils, which forms the basis of the ITER design — belongs to Soviet scientists Andrei Sakharov and Igor Tamm. The initiative to unite international efforts to create such a facility also came from our country, namely from Academician Yevgeny Velikhov. As part of the project, Russian specialists are producing 25 unique systems without which the reactor's launch is fundamentally impossible. These include in-chamber components, a superconducting system, vacuum chamber pipes, and many other components. More than 50 leading scientific and technical institutions, enterprises, and complexes in many cities across our country are involved in the process.

At the "Technological ecosystem of the future" session of St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. June 7, 2024

Participation in ITER is crucial for the development of our national fusion program. The project serves as a technological platform for the development of a next-generation domestic tokamak. Therefore, in answer to your question, I can unequivocally say: Russia's participation in the ITER project is not only a contribution to global science but also a crucial factor in the development of our own nuclear industry. ITER is an example of unprecedented international cooperation in science and technology. The combined population of the countries participating in the project exceeds half the world's population. We believe this project will be a significant step toward creating a source of environmentally friendly and virtually inexhaustible energy.

At the same time, we need to develop our own thermonuclear technologies. A bright example is the project of a tokamak with reactor technologies (TRT) developed in collaboration with the National Research Centre "Kurchatov Institute" and the Russian Academy of Sciences as a large-scale national prototype of a future thermonuclear reactor or a source of neutrons. It is designed to study plasma behavior, fuel supply and much more. The development is conducted as part of the federal project "Thermonuclear energy technologies" within the national project of technological leadership "New atomic and energy technologies".

This year, the theatrical performance "The Age of Dreamers" was a national sensation. We saw it, too, and were delighted. What Rosatom dreams about is clear. And you — what do you dream of? And what would you wish for our young readers who are just beginning their journey to achieving their dreams?

I believe that those who will come after us will be cleverer, better, more free in their choice. Our task is to hand over the world to them with wider opportunities, fewer diseases, fewer ecologic and energy problems than we once got.

President of Russia V.V.Putin and Prime-Minister of India N.Modi visiting the Atom pavilion at VDNKh. Moscow. July 9, 2024

As any human, I dream of rather simple things: for our parents, health; for our children, a longer and happier life than ours; for our grandchildren, a longer and happier life than our children's. To make this seemingly simple dream come true, we need to engage in breakthrough science right now, to solve challenging ecologic problems, to develop medical and energy technologies.

The atomic field in this dream is not just a source of energy. It's a tool for building the future. We speak about pure energy, about electric cars, about nuclear medicine and expansion of lifespan, about deep space exploration, we create new materials and a reserve for thermonuclear synthesis — an inexhaustible source of energy. And in the name of implementing this dream, in the name of health and happiness of our children and grandchildren it is genuinely worthwhile engaging in all this!

My wish for the young readers — dream bigger than us. Don't worry that your desires could seem unrealistic. We now work to give you tools to realize everything you have conceived. With that, you're sure to make the world better for those who will follow you. This is the great relay race of humanity.

> My wish for the young readers — dream bigger than us. Don't worry that your desires could seem unrealistic. We now work to give you tools to realize everything you have conceived.

Deep-cover agent S.Y. Cherepanov:

“Not everyone is given the opportunity to live another version of one’s own life”

In the summer of 2025, on the eve of the 103rd anniversary of the illegal intelligence, Sergey Yevgenyevich Naryshkin, Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, revealed the identity of Sergey Yuryevich Cherepanov, a deep-cover agent. The magazine's editors had a unique chance to have an extensive interview with him.

Sergei Yuryevich, you joined the illegal intelligence in 1981. Do you remember how you felt the day you received the offer? Did you have any doubts that you couldn't handle it?

I dreamt of serving in counterintelligence as an operational officer from a young age. When I was a student, I came to KGB admission centre in Moscow to express my motivation and desire to serve. I was told that to join the security forces I needed to finish the KGB Higher School (Ed. now the FSB Academy of Russia). But I could only be admitted there after completing compulsory military service. Of course, they dissuaded me from dropping out and joining the army. Quite the reverse, they told me to graduate from the university, preferably with honours, and to engage in social activity. Then, they said, we could return to our conversation.

After university, I was drafted into the army. As my military service neared its end, my recruiters approached me and offered me to serve in intelligence. Frankly speaking, it was a real shock for me! And when they clarified that it wasn't just intelligence, but illegal intelligence, it seemed completely out of reach. “Illegals” were something beyond my belief.

By then, I was already married with a newborn son. I vividly imagined that I would be separated from my family for a long time but my motivation was strong and I agreed instantly. When they promised to take my family situation into account, it was a huge relief. And soon, special training began. It’s impossible to become an “illegal” right away, you know.

What was the most difficult during the training?

Language classes, of course. I started to learn the language (two languages, to be precise) when I was 27. The first language, traditionally, was to become my native language. As for the second, I had to speak fluently, extract information and so on.

Another tricky part was to get theoretically acquainted with the country I was to go to. Back then, there was no Internet. We learned about the situation abroad mostly from foreign films, newspapers, maps, and travel guides. So, some work-related and even day-to-day issues we found out from senior colleagues, the ones who had actually been there.

My interaction with Gevork Andreyevich Vartanyan was extremely helpful in this regard. I met him during my training. He had just completed his field mission and returned to Moscow. The great intelligence officer gave me two valuable bits of advice and I made them work, and work well. Sorry, I’m afraid I cannot share them with you.

I'd like to emphasize that deep-cover agent's training is a completely individual process. Candidates are not allowed to communicate

Sergei Yuryevich Cherepanov

Was born on January 21, 1955, in Kostino, Moscow Region (now part of Korolev). He graduated from the Moscow Power Engineering Institute in 1976 with a degree in electrical engineering. He worked for a year in a specialized department at the university, then was drafted into the army. He joined foreign intelligence in 1981. After of special training, he successfully operated in “special conditions” for over 20 years, worked in 43 countries, including conflict zones. He was awarded the Order of Courage, the badge “For Service in Intelligence”, the Order “For Military Merit”, and many medals. In 2009, he was awarded the honorary title of the “Honored Worker of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.”

> I am sure that “illegals” must dive deeply into the role. We're always on stage, literally 24/7... When I moulded a foreigner of myself, I found Stanislavsky’s techniques very useful.

with each other, let alone see each other until they retire. And sometimes they are even not allowed to meet afterward. That’s the way it is.

The profession of an intelligence officer is often compared to acting. And there is a grain of truth in that. You, of course, remember K.S. Stanislavsky. He divided actors into two categories: the ones who perceive a role as an external task, and the ones who live the character’s life. The first ones performed a play and switched off, moving to new tasks the next day. The others dive deeply into the character and reinvent themselves, they literally live on stage, as, for exmaple I.M. Smoktunovsky did it in Hamlet.

I am sure that “illegals” must dive deeply into the role. We're always on stage, literally 24/7... When I moulded a foreigner of myself, I found Stanislavsky’s techniques very useful.



Second year student of the Moscow Power Engineering Institute. 1973

Did your spouse know about your intentions to join the intelligence?

Almost from the very beginning, and supported me right away. We studied at university together, then she started working in her field and I went to serve in the army. When Afghanistan war began, my fellow soldiers and I wanted to fight. My wife supported me, even though I didn’t end up going to Afghanistan.

Olga is a unique woman. When I was abroad — as my work involved short-term deployments up to a year — she had a tough time. In total, we were apart for almost 18 years. All this time, she ran the household and raised our son alone. This was during the “roaring nineties”, a difficult time. Yet, she managed to build both a career and a home!

When people ask me, “Is it easier to work alone or in a pair?” I answer that it doesn't matter. Even if you’re alone “in the field”, you’re not lonely. Though far away, the family is present invisibly. Our wives protect the home front, take care of our lives back in the Motherland. Thanks to Olga, I was able to keep my friends even when I was abroad. As part of the cover story, she maintained contact with everyone. I am immensely grateful to her for everything!

It’s a well-known fact that “illegals" use various professions as their deep cover. What was yours?

I started as a photographer, it’s the easiest way. At first, I mostly went to countries where hostilities were under way, it was quite logical for a photojournalist to be there. I even got a specialized education for it. Later, when I, as they say, got stronger and stood on my own two feet, I engaged in consulting and set up my own firm.

Did you face any everyday difficulties?

It's inevitable, especially at the beginning. Just knowing the language isn't enough to convincingly pretend that you're a foreigner. You must understand how people interact in that country, how they identify one another. It's not just about what you say, but also about your body language and how you react in everyday situations. Everything is important: the way you look, the way you hold your head...

For example, you go into a bar somewhere in Madrid and order a beer. It's quite a ritual. They'll put down a tiny glass, more like a wine glass.

If you start drinking immediately, it means you're a foreigner. Because a local will first say: *“I can't just drink this on an empty stomach!”*. And just like he is an old friend they'll immediately serve him a small appetizer.

Or perhaps you see someone walking, and their gait immediately tells you — they're Russian. And not just Russian — a Muscovite! Because we Muscovites have a special way of walking: we're always rushing, waving our arms. In St. Petersburg, by contrast, no one rushes, they take their time. Furthermore, our mother tongue leaves its imprint, changing our articulation and even facial features. Basically, there are lots of nuances, and you can't put them all into words.

Were there any difficulties in reverting to your previous linguistic state when you returned home?

Naturally, just like anyone else: the question “how do I put this in Russian?” *(laughs)*. But the problems that arose after a break when leaving again were much more concerning. For instance, my speaking pace would significantly slow down, whereas in Spanish-speaking countries, for example, they tend to talk a mile a minute.

Usually, a week or two would pass and everything would be back to normal. But there were also times when friends would ask if everything was okay. One day, they even insisted that I see a doctor. *“Come on,”* they said, *“the doctor will check your hearing.”* He checked and laughed: *“He can hear everything all right, he just doesn't want to listen to you.”*

Or consider this: The popular TV series "Seventeen Moments of Spring," and its famous scene with radio operator Kat, left many with the impression that a female deep-cover agent might betray herself during childbirth. However, in modern circumstances, such risks are minimal. Today, women, especially in the West, often choose childbirth with the partner, meaning their husbands are present, and they seldom lose consciousness.

With future wife. Moscow. 1976

At the same time, there are far more risky situations that our agents abroad can find themselves in. For example, in one country, I had to undergo a medical examination under general anesthesia. What’s more, a good acquaintance of mine, one of the locals, who was concerned about me, brought me to the procedure as a way to show his care. Well, the doctor started giving me anesthesia in his presence and talked to me, monitoring my reaction, until I lost my senses. After the procedure, he brought me back to consciousness in the same way — through questions. Naturally, I was worried about saying something I shouldn't, but it all turned out fine.

> Just knowing the language isn't enough to convincingly pretend that you're a foreigner. You must understand how people interact in that country, how they identify one another. It's not just about what you say, but also about your body language and how you react in everyday situations.

First trip abroad. Amsterdam. 1986

Could you tell us, how to build connections and make people feel comfortable enough to be open and share information?

First and foremost, you need to love people. Personally, I have always adhered to three principles for attracting people to collaborative work: do not force anyone, do not seduce or buy anyone (although I could pay money), and do not push anyone to betrayal. I only offered to help acquaintances solve their problems on a mutually beneficial basis. And how to help is always different. It's not necessarily with money; you can also offer moral support or participate in something.

> Personally, I have always adhered to three principles for attracting people to collaborative work: do not force anyone, do not seduce or buy anyone (although I could pay money), and do not push anyone to betrayal.

And one more thing about money. When I was just starting out, I tried to give someone money for a service. They threw it back in my face. After that, I came to this approach: love people and treat them like friends, live their problems, help them, be together. We love our sources and protect them carefully, like doctors protect medical confidentiality.

Some time after the British attempted to recruit me and after my emergency departure to my homeland *(which I've already spoken about in an interview on NTV channel)*, a series of publications appeared in the Western media, which also mentioned some of my acquaintances. Journalists approached them for comments. No one said anything bad about me! One person was told who I was and what I did, and he replied: *"He didn't do anything bad to us."* That was such a relief! I had been so concerned about their fate, but fortunately, no one suffered any harm. They all kept working, and some even built a brilliant career.

As we see it, the 2010 recruitment approach was a result of betrayal. But were there any tense situations before that?

In my case, the main risks arose on the route to the country of stay and on the return journey. There were indeed a couple of adventures there. Once, I needed to get from one European country to another. In Moscow, they decided: *"You'll travel overnight in a first-class compartment."* The reasoning was that this would allow you to avoid personal interaction at passport control, as your passport is handed over immediately upon boarding. So I did: I bought a ticket and got on the train. My fellow passenger turned out to be an Englishman — distinguished, elderly. You could tell he traveled a lot; he even had his own slippers.

At three a. m., we approached the border, and border guards entered the train car. Suddenly, I heard them call out my name! They came up to my compartment and started knocking. I opened the door. *"Mr. so-and-so? — Yes. — Where are your belongings?"* I took out my suitcase, and inside were some incriminating items. If they had been discovered, it would have been a complete failure! Then the Englishman woke up, grabbed a slipper, and lunged at the inspectors: *"What are you doing?! Did you read the yellow press, thinking people transport millions in their suitcases?! Get out of here, now!"* And he started hitting them with the slipper. They were taken aback and quickly retreated. I was lucky!

It's interesting how fate brings you together with the British… But how did you manage to avoid arrest in 2010?

Firstly, the British were not acting on their own territory. The approach made towards me, which coincided with the arrest of our 'ten' *(Ed. ten deep-cover agents)* in the US, took place in another country where MI6 did not have free rein. Secondly, I had calculated everything. Knowing how the decision-making system worked there — a request from the British needed to be coordinated with the Ministry of Defense, and a decision on the arrest required the Prime Minister's sanction — I understood that I had about 48 hours. Therefore, I quickly packed my belongings, destroyed equipment and other evidence, and left for the airport early in the morning.

> I feel I have achieved success in both operational and informational areas. In my professional life, there were happy moments when I saw the implementation – at the highest level – of the information I had obtained.

Of course, there was a risk that I would be detained there. But I decided to try to slip through, and it worked. Perhaps the fact that the local special services had nothing on me played a role; formally, they had nothing to charge me with. Despite the pressure that the British representative exerted on me throughout the entire conversation, I did not give in to him. I refused to take the papers and look at the photographs

Videoversion of the interview

Easter Island. 2001

> A deep-cover agent represents an intellectual challenge and a completely different level of self-realization.

Interviewed by Vladislav Ilyin

Moscow. Yasenevo. 2022

he was pushing, and I didn't let him enter the house, even though he asked persistently. I managed to break MI6's game and take the initiative into my own hands, which ultimately allowed me to return home on my own.

Do you regret anything? Do you feel like you've done everything you wanted, fully realized yourself?

No regrets, certainly! I feel I have achieved success in both operational and informational areas. In my professional life, there were happy moments when I saw the implementation — at the highest level — of the information I had obtained. Moreover, those for whom this information was intended appreciated the recommendations we offered. It was very pleasant! In general, as Vysotsky sang: *"I have already proven everything to myself."*

You know, when they say that “illegals” are people who have laid down their lives on the altar of the Fatherland, I certainly agree with that. All of this is true, especially when a married couple with children goes for long-term settlement. But there is also an advantage: the opportunity to live another version of your own life. A version — I mean it. That is, to live in an image you invented, to get to know another culture from the inside, to communicate with decent, intelligent, and influential people. That's wonderful! There is no other profession that can offer you that.

A deep-cover agent represents an intellectual challenge and a completely different level of self-realization. What, for example, is self-realization for a businessman? — First and foremost, it's money, income. If you haven't earned money, then you're not successful. For a politician, it's influence and power, as well as public recognition. What kind of politician are you if nobody knows you? And for an intelligence officer, self-realization is patriotism. But not ostentatious, without pathos. You simply need to be loyal to your oath, fulfill your military duty to the end, and be honest with your superiors and comrades.

In this regard, I resonate with the phrase from the Code of the Russian Army Officer, written before the revolution, seemingly in the 19th century: *“Soul to God, heart to woman, duty to the Fatherland, honour to no one.”* I believe these words are fully applicable today. They are especially important for our youth to remember, those who are just preparing to go abroad. Abroad, they will face colossal pressure — moral, psychological, and political. And they must stand firm — in any operational and life situations. I have no doubt that our guys will stand firm!

THE SVR OF RUSSIA IS AUTHORIZED TO DECLARE

СВР РОССИИ
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО

СЕКРЕТНО
ЭКЗ. № 1

ШИФРТЕЛЕГРАММА № 09/311

26.09.2025 07:10

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О ВОЗМОЖНЫХ НОВЫХ ДИВЕРСИЯХ КИЕВА

ПО ПОСТУПАЮЩЕЙ ИНФОРМАЦИИ, КИЕВСКИЙ РЕЖИМ ПОСЛЕ ОРГАНИЗОВАННЫХ ИМ ПРОВОКАЦИЙ С БПЛА В ВОЗДУШНОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ ПОЛЬШИ И РУМЫНИИ ГОТОВИТ НОВЫЕ ПОПЫТКИ ПО ВТЯГИВАНИЮ ЕВРОПЕЙСКИХ СТРАН НАТО В ВООРУЖЕННОЕ ПРОТИВОСТОЯНИЕ С МОСКВОЙ.

ГЛАВНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ РАЗВЕДКИ МО УКРАИНЫ СОВМЕСТНО С ПОЛЬСКИМИ СПЕЦСЛУЖБАМИ РАЗРАБАТЫВАЕТ ОПЕРАЦИЮ ПО ЗАБРОСКЕ НА ТЕРРИТОРИЮ ПОЛЬШИ ДИВЕРСИОННО-РАЗВЕДЫВАТЕЛЬНОЙ ГРУППЫ (ДРГ), ЯКОБЫ СОСТОЯЩЕЙ ИЗ ВОЕННОСЛУЖАЩИХ СПЕЦПОДРАЗДЕЛЕНИЙ РОССИИ И БЕЛОРУССИИ. КАНДИДАТЫ ДЛЯ УЧАСТИЯ В ИНСЦЕНИРОВКЕ ПОДОБРАНЫ ИЗ ЧИСЛА ВОЮЮЩИХ НА СТОРОНЕ ВСУ БОЕВИКОВ "ЛЕГИОНА "СВОБОДА РОССИИ" И БЕЛОРУССКОГО "ПОЛКА ИМ. К. КАЛИНОВСКОГО".

ПРЕДПОЛАГАЕТСЯ, ЧТО ПОСЛЕ "ВЫЯВЛЕНИЯ И НЕЙТРАЛИЗАЦИИ" ДРГ ПОЛЬСКИМИ СИЛОВИКАМИ ЧЛЕНЫ ГРУППЫ ВЫСТУПЯТ ПЕРЕД ЗАПАДНЫМИ СМИ И ДАДУТ "ПРИЗНАТЕЛЬНЫЕ" ПОКАЗАНИЯ, ИЗОБЛИЧАЮЩИЕ РОССИЮ И БЕЛОРУССИЮ В ПОПЫТКЕ ДЕСТАБИЛИЗАЦИИ ОБСТАНОВКИ В ПОЛЬШЕ.

НР 421 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР СТОУН 25.09.25 22.45

СВР РОССИИ
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО

СЕКРЕТНО
ЭКЗ. № 1

ШИФРТЕЛЕГРАММА № 10/15

02.10.2025 06:50

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О ПОДГОТОВКЕ ЛОНДОНОМ НОВОЙ ПРОВОКАЦИИ НА МОРЕ

ПО ПОСТУПАЮЩЕЙ ИНФОРМАЦИИ, БРИТАНСКИЕ СПЕЦСЛУЖБЫ ГОТОВЯТ ОЧЕРЕДНУЮ ПРОВОКАЦИЮ НА МОРЕ, ПРИЗВАННУЮ ОБОСНОВАТЬ НЕОБХОДИМОСТЬ ДАЛЬНЕЙШЕГО НАРАЩИВАНИЯ ВОЕННОЙ ПОМОЩИ УКРАИНЕ И МИЛИТАРИЗАЦИИ ЕВРОПЫ ДЛЯ БОРЬБЫ С "РОССИЙСКОЙ АГРЕССИЕЙ".

СОГЛАСНО ОДОБРЕННОМУ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВОМ К.СТАРМЕРА СЦЕНАРИЮ, ГРУППА ВОЮЮЩИХ НА СТОРОНЕ ВСУ ПРЕДАТЕЛЕЙ ИЗ ЧИСЛА РОССИЯН ДОЛЖНА ОСУЩЕСТВИТЬ АТАКУ НА КОРАБЛЬ ВМС УКРАИНЫ ИЛИ ГРАЖДАНСКОЕ СУДНО ИНОСТРАННОГО ГОСУДАРСТВА В ОДНОМ ИЗ ЕВРОПЕЙСКИХ ПОРТОВ, А ПОСЛЕ "ОБНАРУЖЕНИЯ" ОБЪЯВИТЬ, ЧТО ДЕЙСТВОВАЛА "ПО ЗАДАНИЮ МОСКВЫ".

ИСТОЧНИКИ, БЛИЗКИЕ К ОКРУЖЕНИЮ БРИТАНСКОГО ПРЕМЬЕРА, СООБЩАЮТ, ЧТО УЧАСТНИКИ ГРУППЫ УЖЕ ПРИБЫЛИ В ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИЮ ДЛЯ ОБУЧЕНИЯ ДИВЕРСИОННОМУ ДЕЛУ. В ЦЕЛЯХ УСИЛЕНИЯ ПРОПАГАНДИСТСКОГО ЭФФЕКТА БОЕВИКОВ ВСУ ПЛАНИРУЕТСЯ СНАБДИТЬ ВОДОЛАЗНЫМ СНАРЯЖЕНИЕМ КИТАЙСКОГО ПРОИЗВОДСТВА. ЭТО ПОЗВОЛИТ ВЫСТАВИТЬ ИЗЪЯТОЕ В ХОДЕ "РАССЛЕДОВАНИЯ" ОБОРУДОВАНИЕ В КАЧЕСТВЕ "ДОКАЗАТЕЛЬСТВА" ПОДДЕРЖКИ КИТАЕМ "РОССИЙСКОЙ АГРЕССИИ" НА УКРАИНЕ.

НР 408 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР ФЕЛИКС 01.10.25 20.55

authorized to declare

СВР РОССИИ
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО

СЕКРЕТНО
ЭКЗ. № 1

ШИФРТЕЛЕГРАММА № 10/263

23.10.2025 07:20

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О ГОТОВЯЩЕЙСЯ ФРАНЦУЗСКОЙ ИНТЕРВЕНЦИИ НА УКРАИНУ

КАК СООБЩАЮТ ИСТОЧНИКИ ИЗ ОКРУЖЕНИЯ ФРАНЦУЗСКОГО ПРЕЗИДЕТА Э.МАКРОНА, ГЕНШТАБ ФРАНЦИИ ПОЛУЧИЛ УКАЗАНИЕ ЕЛИСЕЙСКОГО ДВОРЦА ГОТОВИТЬ К РАЗВЕРТЫВАНИЮ НА УКРАИНЕ ВОИНСКИЙ КОНТИНГЕНТ ЧИСЛЕННОСТЬЮ ДО ДВУХ ТЫСЯЧ СОЛДАТ И ОФИЦЕРОВ.

ПРЕДПОЛАГАЕТСЯ, ЧТО КОСТЯК ФОРМИРОВАНИЯ СОСТАВЯТ ШТУРМОВИКИ ФРАНЦУЗСКОГО ИНОСТРАННОГО ЛЕГИОНА, ПРЕИМУЩЕСТВЕННО ВЫХОДЦЫ ИЗ СТРАН ЛАТИНСКОЙ АМЕРИКИ. ПО ИМЕЮЩИМСЯ СВЕДЕНИЯМ, ЧАСТЬ ЛЕГИОНЕРОВ УЖЕ РАЗМЕЩЕНЫ В ПРИГРАНИЧНЫХ С УКРАИНОЙ РАЙОНАХ ПОЛЬШИ И ПРОХОДЯТ ИНТЕНСИВНОЕ БОЕВОЕ СЛАЖИВАНИЕ, ПОЛУЧАЮТ ВООРУЖЕНИЕ И ВОЕННУЮ ТЕХНИКУ. ИХ ПЕРЕБРОСКА В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЕ ОБЛАСТИ УКРАИНЫ ПЛАНИРУЕТСЯ В БЛИЖАЙШЕЕ ВРЕМЯ.

ИСТОЧНИК ПОДЧЕРКИВАЕТ, ЧТО В СЛУЧАЕ УТЕЧКИ ИНФОРМАЦИИ О ПОДГОТОВКЕ ИНТЕРВЕНЦИИ ПАРИЖ НАМЕРЕН ЗАЯВИТЬ, ЧТО РЕЧЬ ИДЕТ О "НЕБОЛЬШОЙ ГРУППЕ ИНСТРУКТОРОВ", КОТОРАЯ ПРИБЫВАЕТ НА УКРАИНУ ДЛЯ ОБУЧЕНИЯ МОБИЛИЗОВАННЫХ ВСУ. ПРИ ЭТОМ ВО ФРАНЦИИ УСКОРЕННЫМИ ТЕМПАМИ ВЕДЕТСЯ ОБОРУДОВАНИЕ ДОПОЛНИТЕЛЬНЫХ КОЙКО-МЕСТ В ГОСПИТАЛЯХ ДЛЯ ПРИЕМА РАНЕНЫХ, А ВРАЧИ ПРОХОДЯТ СПЕЦИАЛЬНУЮ ПОДГОТОВКУ ДЛЯ РАБОТЫ В ПОЛЕВЫХ УСЛОВИЯХ.

НР 408 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР ФРЭНК 22.10.25 21.15

СВР РОССИИ
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО

СЕКРЕТНО
ЭКЗ. № 1

Ш И Ф Р Т Е Л Е Г Р А М М А № 11/21

03.11.2025 05:15

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О ВОЗМОЖНОЙ ДИВЕРСИИ НА ЗАПОРОЖСКОЙ АЭС

ПО ИМЕЮЩИИМСЯ ДАННЫМ, ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛИ СПЕЦСЛУЖБ СТРАН НАТО ПОБУЖДАЮТ КИЕВСКИЙ РЕЖИМ НАЙТИ ВОЗМОЖНОСТЬ ДЛЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ КРУПНОЙ ДИВЕРСИИ НА ЗАПОРОЖСКОЙ АЭС, КОТОРАЯ ПОВЛЕЧЕТ ЗА СОБОЙ ЖЕРТВЫ СРЕДИ УКРАИНЦЕВ И ЖИТЕЛЕЙ ЕВРОСОЮЗА. КАК РАССЧИТЫВАЮТ ЕВРОПЕЙЦЫ, РАЗВЕРТЫВАНИЕ ШИРОКОЙ ИНФОРМАЦИОННОЙ КАМПАНИИ ВОКРУГ ПОДОБНОЙ КАТАСТРОФЫ ПО АНАЛОГИИ С КРУШЕНИЕМ МАЛАЙЗИЙСКОГО БОИНГА В 2014 ГОДУ ПОЗВОЛИТ ОТВЛЕЧЬ ВНИМАНИЕ ОТ НЕУДАЧ КИЕВА НА ФРОНТЕ И УСИЛИТЬ АНТИРОССИЙСКИЕ НАСТРОЕНИЯ В ЕВРОПЕ.

В БРИТАНСКОМ НПО СНАТНАМ HOUSE ПРОВЕЛИ КОМПЬЮТЕРНОЕ МОДЕЛИРОВАНИЕ ВЕРОЯТНОЙ АВАРИИ С РАСПЛАВЛЕНИЕМ АКТИВНОЙ ЗОНЫ ЯДЕРНЫХ РЕАКТОРОВ АЭС. ПО ИХ ОЦЕНКЕ, С УЧЕТОМ РОЗЫ ВЕТРОВ В ОБЛАСТИ РАДИОАКТИВНОГО ЗАРАЖЕНИЯ ОКАЖУТСЯ ЖИТЕЛИ ПОДКОНТРОЛЬНЫХ КИЕВУ РАЙОНОВ И ГРАЖДАНЕ СТРАН ЕС ВБЛИЗИ ЗАПАДНОЙ ГРАНИЦЫ УКРАИНЫ.

СПЕЦИАЛИСТЫ БРИТАНСКИХ СПЕЦСЛУЖБ ИЗЫСКИВАЮТ ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ ВОЗЛОЖИТЬ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬ ЗА ПРЕДПОЛАГАЕМУЮ КАТАСТРОФУ НА РОССИЮ И ЗАБЛАГОВРЕМЕННО ПОДГОТОВЛИВАЮТ АРГУМЕНТАЦИЮ НА СЛУЧАЙ "ЛЮБОГО СЦЕНАРИЯ РАЗВИТИЯ СОБЫТИЙ". КРОМЕ ТОГО, ПЛАНИРУЕТСЯ ОБЕСПЕЧИТЬ ОСВЕЩЕНИЕ СИТУАЦИИ В СМИ ТАКИМ ОБРАЗОМ, ЧТОБЫ ЗАПАДНАЯ ОБЩЕСТВЕННОСТЬ ПО ВОПРОСУ ОБ ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИИ ВИНОВНОГО В СЛУЧИВШЕМСЯ "ОДНОЗНАЧНО ЗАНЯЛА СТОРОНУ КИЕВА".

НР 492 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР СТОУН 02.11.25 23.35

authorized to declare

СВР РОССИИ
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО

СЕКРЕТНО
ЭКЗ. № 1

Ш И Ф Р Т Е Л Е Г Р А М М А № 11/376

16.11.2025 07:25

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О РЕАКЦИИ ЕВРОПЕЙЦЕВ НА КОРРУПЦИОННЫЙ СКАНДАЛ В КИЕВЕ

СОГЛАСНО ИМЕЮЩИМСЯ СВЕДЕНИЯМ, ЭКСПЕРТЫ ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ И ВОЕННЫХ ВЕДОМСТВ ВЕДУЩИХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ЕВРОПЫ ПРЯМО ПРЕДУПРЕЖДАЮТ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА О НЕИЗБЕЖНОСТИ ВОЕННОГО ПОРАЖЕНИЯ КИЕВСКОГО РЕЖИМА. В ПОСЛЕДНИХ ПОДГОТОВЛЕННЫХ ДЛЯ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО РУКОВОДСТВА ДОКЛАДАХ ВСЕ БОЛЬШЕЕ ВНИМАНИЕ УДЕЛЯЕТСЯ ПРОБЛЕМЕ КОРРУПЦИИ НА УКРАИНЕ, ПРИНЯВШЕЙ УГРОЖАЮЩИЙ МАСШТАБ.

В ЕС ОБЕСПОКОЕНЫ ТЕМ, ЧТО НЕДАВНЯЯ ПУБЛИКАЦИЯ МАТЕРИАЛОВ О "ДЕЛЕ МИНДИЧА", СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВУЮЩИХ О ПРИЧАСТНОСТИ К КОРРУПЦИОННЫМ СХЕМАМ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЕЙ ВЫСШИХ ЭШЕЛОНОВ УКРАИНСКОЙ ВЛАСТИ, САМЫМ НЕГАТИВНЫМ ОБРАЗОМ СКАЗАЛАСЬ НА НАСТРОЕНИЯХ РЯДОВЫХ ГРАЖДАН. МОТИВАЦИЯ УКРАИНЦЕВ К ПРОДОЛЖЕНИЮ БОРЬБЫ НА ФОНЕ И БЕЗ ТОГО СИЛЬНОЙ УСТАЛОСТИ ОТ ЗАТЯЖНОГО КОНФЛИКТА СНИЗИЛАСЬ. ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЕ ДИПЛОМАТЫ И РАЗВЕДЧИКИ ОТМЕЧАЮТ, ЧТО БОЛЬШИНСТВО НАСЕЛЕНИЯ "ЧУВСТВУЮТ СЕБЯ ПРЕДАННЫМИ", ВСЕ МЕНЬШЕ ВОСПРИНИМАЮТ ЗАПАДНЫХ ПАРТНЕРОВ КАК НАДЕЖНОГО ГАРАНТА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И ПОЧТИ НЕ ВЕРЯТ, ЧТО В ОБОЗРИМОМ БУДУЩЕМ УКРАИНУ ПРИМУТ В ЕС.

ОПАСЕНИЯ БРЮССЕЛЯ ТАКЖЕ ВЫЗЫВАЕТ РОСТ ЧИСЛЕННОСТИ ПРОТИВНИКОВ ВЫДЕЛЕНИЯ ЗНАЧИТЕЛЬНЫХ СРЕДСТВ НА НУЖДЫ КИЕВА. ПОМИМО ВЕНГРИИ И СЛОВАКИИ, К ТАКОЙ ПОЗИЦИИ НАЧИНАЮТ СКЛОНЯТЬСЯ ЧЕХИЯ И РУМЫНИЯ. ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ АВТОРИТЕТ САМОЙ УКРАИНЫ В ЕВРОПЕ, НАПРОТИВ, БЫСТРО СНИЖАЕТСЯ.

НР 544 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР МАРАТ 15.11.25 19.50

special section

AI in intelligence

Almost all technologies familiar to us in the civilian sphere initially were implemented in the military and specialized industries. A spectacular example is the global internet, which originated within the walls of the Pentagon and then infiltrated in everyday life. Nuclear energy for the first time was also used in lethal weapons and only later was converted to peaceful purposes.

New, breakthrough technologies give their possessors a strategic advantage over their rivals. Humanity pins the next expectations of this kind on artificial intelligence (AI), and the race to develop it has already begun. AI has been widely used in everyday life for the past few years, meaning that similar developments have been in use in the military and intelligence sectors for quite a long time.

Indeed, the first attempts to create and apply AI in intelligence date back to the late 1970s, when a private company, IRIS (International Reporting Information Systems), emerged in the United States, positioning itself as no less than a CIA information center. Its founders claimed that their analytical system could process daily approximately 15,000 political and economic events worldwide, and do so in eight languages simultaneously. The company's story ended tragically: it turned out to be nothing more than an investment bubble.

The Americans took this issue more seriously in the 2000s after the September 11th terrorist attacks. Then, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched the Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) project, aimed to identify potential terrorists by analyzing large volumes of unrelated open-source information. TIA became the foundation for many subsequent developments in this field. Since 2021, it has been converted to an AI platform, and in addition to the Pentagon, US intelligence agencies have gained access to its capabilities.

Domestic scientists and intelligence officers haven't been idle either. In the 1980s, the analytical system "Splav" was born within the walls of the First Main Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) of the KGB. Its creators trained the machine to detect signs of intelligence activity in information flows. In the early 2000s, the system "Trend" emerged in Russia's private intelligence sector. Its operating principle was based on comparing current events with benchmark values. These developments started a new era of using computer technology to work with large volumes of data in intelligence sphere.

A quarter of a century has passed since then. And what do we see today? Has AI revolutionized intelligence, particularly in the area of analysis and processing information? Is it effective at performing routine and labor-intensive tasks that are boring for humans and often bring about errors? The answer is not so clear-cut.

It's not a secret that nowadays, almost every self-respecting state has a set of AI-powered tools in its military and intelligence arsenal. However, details are generally kept under wraps, and little information is publicly available. For example, the Israeli military has developed algorithms that are successfully used to identify airstrikes targets. They analyze data from all available sources,



including satellite imagery, drone footage, photographs, and messaging, and generate target assignment. According to the IDF, some attacks are already being carried out automatically, without human oversight.

Indian developers have reported on a program called AI-Honey, which helps identify untrustworthy elements in the army. Disguised as a woman on WhatsApp, the chatbot interacts with male soldiers and identifies those who violate the military's regulations requiring them to block all messages from unknown numbers. South Korea, Japan, a number of European countries, and, of course, China and Russia have their own know-how and solutions in the field of AI.

The United States has made significant progress in this area. The American private sector, which regularly receives large government contracts, provides strong support to government agencies. For example, last summer it was announced that the Pentagon will pay Google, OpenAI, Anthropic, and xAI $200 million each for the introduction of AI into the military sphere.

In 2023, the private intelligence company Palantir Technologies publicly unveiled its latest Artificial Intelligence Platform (AIP) for US military intelligence. It is capable of collecting intelligence and monitoring battlefield situations in real time via social media, using geolocation. That same year, this technology was used in Ukraine against the Russian army.

CIA colleagues are keeping pace with the military intelligence. As early as 2023, the agency announced that its analysts intended to use the world famous ChatGPT program to collect and analyze open-source data. Today, the focus is on strengthening OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), given the exponential growth of information available online year after year, as well as the widespread integration of AI into intelligence work. These tasks are entrusted to the Open Source Enterprise (OSE), a structure established in 2015 within the CIA's Office of Digital Innovation.

Therefore, in all technologically advanced countries, there is a strong belief that AI is the future. Given that machines can already see, hear, and understand humans, and respond to them in multiple languages in real time, the intelligence community expects that agents and analysts will soon have intelligent robot assistants that combine encyclopedias and search engines. They will help compile business trip reports, edit official documents, monitor news feeds, remind people about meetings, and adjust their schedules.

Considering the colossal investments being made in AI development, such prospects seem entirely realistic. However, it's important to understand that in such a sensitive field as intelligence, AI can only perform purely auxiliary functions. While it's certainly possible to facilitate the analyst's collection of primary information, making decisions for the analyst is highly questionable.

Almost every issue that is the subject of intelligence analysis is characterized by incomplete data. Because of this uncertainty, analysts are forced to rely not only on facts but also try to understand the "gray zones" between truth and fiction. Generative AI is inapplicable in such situations, as it cannot separate truth from falsehood. While it can be used as a powerful tool for identifying correlations and hidden connections between individual events and can even generate new ideas, its use in intelligence analysis should be limited.

Imagine you're trying to assemble a jigsaw puzzle, but someone, unbeknownst to you, periodically removes pieces from the table, sometimes replacing them with pieces from a different set, making it difficult to put together the whole picture. This is roughly how an intelligence analyst works. No technical means can solve this problem. Any algorithm will inevitably fail due to the constant flow of new input data. But that's only half the problem. Already, information flows are packed with AI-generated content, greatly distorting the real picture. This problem will only worsen in the future: deception will become easier, and analysts will find it increasingly difficult to accurately assess the enemy's capabilities and intentions.

At the moment, no one can be completely sure what the future holds for AI technologies and how they will impact our world. Even programmers and engineers aren't aware of all the potential limitations and hidden flaws of what they create. It's clearly that AI poses both new opportunities and serious risks. It's crucial for intelligence agencies and other agencies responsible for national security to be cautious about delegating authority to machines. Handing over decisions that affect the fate of living people, and sometimes entire nations, to mindless hardware is not just dangerous — it's a crime.

How to cope with anxiety

Text by Andrey Orlov, Candidate of Psychological Sciences

Worry does not eliminate tomorrow's problems, but takes away today's peace.

Buddhist wisdom

To begin with, it's worth understanding what anxiety is. It's *a general feeling of unease that arises in the body*. It serves as a tool for predicting danger. Anxiety is characterized by the following train of thoughts: a person remembers/learns about something unfavorable from the past, then projects this experience onto future events.

Anxiety is not something evolutionary new, that emerged in the era of globalization or digitalization; it has always been with us. In the past, people worried about falling prey to a predator, and now they fear dismissal from work, difficult financial situations, or loneliness. Anxiety is a normal, natural human feeling. It serves as a mechanism for adaptation and prediction. It's bad when it becomes excessive.

It's reasonable to start worrying **if anxiety: (1) prevents one from living a full life; (2) affects different areas of life; (3) appears when everything is going well; (4) is accompanied by vegetative reactions (blood pressure rise, breath shortness, etc.). In such cases, it would be better to consult a specialist.**



It's noteworthy that health problems due to anxiety and stress are common not only among humans, but also among primates, for example. For instance, in baboons, a correlation has been found between rank in the troop and blood glucocorticoid levels. Subordinate individuals show elevated baseline levels of these hormones if dominant individuals, being in a bad mood, vent their anger on them, or if they themselves lack the ability to cope with stress. In turn, high-ranking males suffer from stress during periods of instability when their status is threatened. It resembles situations in some human groups, doesn't it?

So, how can we get rid of anxiety?

Stop “ruminating”.

Anxious thoughts usually "get stuck" in your head: we replay the same situations or phrases over and over again. First, you need to accept the simple truth: realizing negative consequences takes literally a few seconds; all the rest of the time we unproductively "chew" our thoughts. Don't try to chase them away – the fight will only exhaust you further. Simply let them be in your head – just like hundreds of other thoughts that come to mind during the day but that you don't focus on.

You can use the following technique. Imagine you are standing at a bus stop, and the passing cars are your thoughts. Your task is to observe them, but not to get into them. If you accidentally jump into a car, get out immediately.

Shift your focus of attention outward.

By dwelling on anxious thoughts, we turn our attention inward. It's useful to shift it outward. To do this, try to find ten objects around you of any single color of your choice. It is important to name these objects, preferably aloud. This will help to switch your attention to your surroundings.

It's good not only to shift your focus of attention away from anxious thoughts but also to "work" with them, that is, to change their content, but this requires a certain skill. As a rule, we recognize only emotions caused by negative thoughts, not the thoughts themselves.

If you manage to understand which thought is causing anxiety, you can try the following techniques:

See the thought through.

It often happens that when playing out different scenarios, the mental picture cuts off at the most unpleasant moment. Fantasize further and bring the matter to a successful conclusion.

Reflect on the consequences.

To do this, first imagine the most negative outcome of events, then the most favorable, and then the most realistic. If thoughts about the negative turn of events have only worsened your condition, try to "leap into the future". Imagine that a year, five years, 25 years have passed. What is happening? What emotions do you feel?

Give yourself advice from the third person.

If you've managed to "catch" and specify the thought that's causing your anxiety, imagine that a close friend or a family member has come to you with a similar problem. What advice would you give them?

Most important: Don't try to apply all techniques at once. Adopt one that suits you best and refine it for several days or weeks. But do it regularly!



Leonid Kvasnikov

From steam locomotive to atomic bomb

Text: Alexandra Khakimova

2025 marks two anniversaries: the 120th anniversary of the outstanding intelligence officer Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov and the 100th anniversary of the Russian scientific and technical intelligence — the field to which the hero of our story devoted his entire life.

The most important thing was the desire to achieve results himself

According to the birth certificate of the Tula Ecclesiastical Consistory, the future Hero of Russia was born on June 16 (June 3, old style), 1905, in Uzlovaya, Bogoroditsky District, Tula Governorate. As the intelligence officer recalled, at that time it was not a city, but *"a freight station for Tula, a kind of hub."* Leonid spent the first five years of his life in a small house two hundred meters from the railroad, where his entire family of working-class peasants worked. Kvasnikov's parents were barely literate (his father only attended three years of parochial school, and his mother had no education), but *"both had very good brains,"* so his father was quickly taken away from the railroad to work in a *"track maintenance office."* This "good brain" and natural attraction to everything new and interesting were inherited by his son.

One of Leonid Romanovich's first vivid childhood memories is of a technological marvel he glimpsed from behind the fence surrounding the Kvasnikovs' house — a majestic steam locomotive with enormous red wheels, over two meters in diameter. The driver's cab was also painted red, and the silver metal handrails and crossbars gleamed brightly against the red background. Leonid later discovered that this was the first passenger steam locomotive of the "N" series, which transported members of the imperial family. This magnificent machine impressed the four-year-old boy. From then on, he was irresistibly drawn to technology; he wanted to understand everything, grasp its principles, improve upon them, and perhaps even create something new, something unprecedented.

It's no surprise that after completing his seven-year education, Leonid flatly refused to fulfill his father's wish to pursue administrative service on the railroad. He enrolled in the Tula technical school of the railway traffic service, which trained engineers and depot specialists. Thus, Kvasnikov had the opportunity not only to work in transportation but also to observe how wood and metalworking machines functioned, and, having grasped the essence, to try them himself. The technical school had its own power plant, and the bright young man quickly became close with its workers. Every day brought Leonid new knowledge and nurtured his inquisitive mind.

Leonid Kvasnikov (13 years). 1918

L.R. Kvasnikov's father, Roman Romanovich (second right) with his railroad colleagues. Tula. 1911

He graduated with honours from the technical school, and the young specialist was immediately sent to Moscow through the People's Commissariat of Railways. While working as an assistant engineer and in the

repair planning department, Kvasnikov continually broadened his horizons. He attended the Railway Workers' Club, where he listened to lectures on technological developments, and served as secretary of the engineering and technical section at his office. His passion for learning and understanding various topics, especially technical ones, did not go unnoticed. In 1929, a prominent Komsomol member, Kvasnikov was recommended for higher education at the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers. However, his interests had already outgrown this field, and he secured admission to the Moscow Institute of Chemical Technology (now the Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology) in the chemical engineering department, from which Leonid also graduated with honours.



Bridge designers testing their model (L.R.Kvasnikov is second right). Moscow. 1928

Defend your thesis later

A diploma wasn't an end in itself for the future intelligence officer. He sought ways to apply his knowledge practically, so even before graduating, he went to work in Dzerzhinsk, at the M.I. Kalinin Chemical Plant. There, he experienced a number of technological processes firsthand, specifically reproducing parts that were quickly destroyed by chemical processes. Kvasnikov then worked at an automobile plant in Gorky, gaining further experience. Moscow awaited him again, and he was admitted into graduate school. Leonid Romanovich returned to the capital with his wife and small son.

As a graduate student, our hero received an invitation to join a working group inspecting defense plants for shell loading. A nomadic life of travel began: Kazan, Leningrad, several cities in Ukraine and the Moscow region — and this was in 1937 alone! The young engineer was tasked with automating production processes, and he accomplished it. In December of that same 1937, he and his colleagues presented a design for a rotary conveyor, which was submitted to the Karpov Research Institute. In March 1938, the installation was assembled following Kvasnikov's designs. But the tireless worker's main achievements were yet to come.

Around that same time, Leonid Romanovich was summoned to the Bolshevik Communist Party Central Committee, where his abilities were highly praised and a new, much-needed avenue for their application was proposed — in the state security agencies. Graduate student Kvasnikov was preparing to defend two dissertations at once. *"You can defend them later,"* he heard in response. He agreed without hesitation. After all, there are many doctors of science, but only few serve in intelligence.

At Lubyanka, Kvasnikov had a detailed conversation with the head of foreign intelligence, Zelman Isayevich Passov, and the head of the scientific and technical department. Leonid was noticeably nervous and frankly shaky at the beginning of the conversation, when the subject turned to geography, but when the conversation turned to technical matters, he came into his own. He was commissioned on September 1, 1938.

Leonid Romanovich was appointed deputy head of the scientific and technical intelligence (STI) department, which at that time consisted of only six people and had no director. *"It's impossible to work without people,"* the newly minted intelligence officer mused, but the personnel issue was extremely pressing in all

A meeting at a conference in London (L.R. Kvasnikov is second right). July 24, 1947

departments. Every capable employee was worth their weight in gold, and each one bore a colossal burden. It was under these difficult conditions that the history of extracting atomic secrets began.

Get any data you can

In 1940, Kvasnikov became head of the department of scientific and technical intelligence. While in graduate school, he had been interested in high-temperature physics, Robert Van de Graaff's generator, Frédéric Joliot-Curie's work on artificial radioactivity, and the research of Konstantin Antonovich Petrzhak and Georgy Nikolaevich Flerov. He also knew about two meetings on atomic energy held in 1940 by Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov. He later met the future head of Laboratory No. 2 and remained in contact with him until the academician's death.

Monitoring publications on uranium in foreign scientific journals, Kvasnikov noticed that works of leading Western physicists on this topic (Enrico Fermi, Otto Hahn, Fritz Strassmann, Leo Szilard, and others) had almost disappeared. He surmised that the results of research in this promising area had been classified, likely due to the successes they had already achieved. But this guess needed to be verified. At Leonid Romanovich's initiative, the head of foreign intelligence, Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin, instructed residencies in England, Germany, the United States, and France to seek out scientific centers where theoretical and practical research on uranium could be conducted. Verified information was needed, as the emergence of a new weapon of incredible destructive power in the context of the outbreak of World War II would have unimaginable consequences. *"Make every effort, obtain any data you can,"* Kvasnikov advised his colleagues abroad. The first information was not long in coming.

The first response came from Germany: the Germans were conducting secret work with "heavy water," which they intended to use to produce a weapon capable of carrying a charge of enormous explosive power. In February 1941, the New York station confirmed Leonid Romanovich's suspicion: *"Nuclear research in the United States is now being conducted secretly: scientists fear that their publications could help the Germans create their own atomic bomb."* How could we follow this lead and not lose the "atomic trail"?

In September 1941, as the Germans advanced on Moscow, valuable information arrived from London: a report from the British Uranium Committee to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, which pointed out not only the actual outlines of the creation of a super-powerful weapon but also a specific timeframe. Leonid Romanovich, who had evacuated his family in June, went to visit his relatives in Novosibirsk. He only just arrived in time to receive a telegram at the door demanding his immediate return to Moscow.

Having carefully studied the information received, Kvasnikov convinced Fitin to report it to People's Commissar Lavrenty Beria. Beria was skeptical of the intelligence materials, dismissing them as "disinformation" aimed at diverting human and other resources from meeting the needs of the front. Nevertheless, in March 1942, Joseph Stalin was informed of the progress of the Western atomic project. At a special meeting of the State Defense Committee, a decision was made to immediately begin developing a domestic atomic bomb. Leonid Romanovich became responsible for implementing the intelligence.

The head of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence now had more to do: not only did he organize the entire work, but he also studied the vast

With his wife Antonina

array of incoming data in the form of drawings, diagrams, and mathematical formulas. Kvasnikov personally reported this to the project director, Academician Kurchatov, who was pleasantly surprised that the intelligence officer was fluent in such complex scientific terms as "neuron capture cross-section," "uranium isotope separation by diffusion," "transuranic elements," and so on.

At the end of 1943, Leonid Romanovich was sent to New York to optimize the station's work on scientific and technological progress. The dry wording concealed a complex situation. As early as 1942, the Western atomic project had effectively "moved" from Great Britain to the United States, with the latter clearly laying claim to leadership in the race for the latest weapons. Clearly, the most active search for relevant information should have been conducted there, but the Center was receiving far too little. Scientific and technological intelligence officers Alexander Semyonovich Feklisov and Anatoly Antonovich Yatskov, who had arrived in New York the previous year, were primarily tasked to obtain political intelligence, as the station, then headed by the experienced intelligence officer Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin, considered political matters to be paramount.

Kvasnikov (codename "Anton") dared to raise the issue of reconsidering the priorities of the work with the New York chief of station. Moreover, he defended autonomous communications with the Center, that is the right to independently correspond with Moscow. He also insisted that the most productive employee of the foreign apparatus at the time, Semyon Markovich Semyonov, a Bachelor of Arts from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and heavily involved in political work, should focus on atomic issues. "Anton's" activities had a positive impact on the work of the entire station: from 1944 onward, Moscow started receiving significantly more in-demand scientific and technical information, and not just about the bomb. Electronics, chemistry, medicine, radar, the first data on high-speed aircraft such as the XP-59, XP-80, and P-81 — a complete list of this valuable technical information would take several pages.

In November, 1944, Leonid Romanovich was awarded the Order of the Red Star. *"Comrade Kvasnikov made a huge contribution to strengthening the defense capability of our state. The intelligence unit he headed saved the country hundreds of millions in state funds. He laid the foundation for obtaining documentary materials on the production of nuclear explosives and the design of the American atomic bomb, and acquired a great deal of valuable information on electronics, aerodynamics, and chemistry,"* the nomination for the state award stated.

Since the second half of the 1940s, intelligence work in the United States became significantly more complex: local intelligence agencies launched an active campaign against "Red espionage," and surveillance posts were established at the Soviet embassy, permanent mission to the UN, trade mission, and consulates general. Many employees of Soviet missions abroad were closely monitored: S.M. Semyonov was constantly followed, and A.S. Feklisov and L.R. Kvasnikov were also monitored from time to time. Soon, Semyonov was recalled to Moscow, and his agent network had to be mothballed.

Leonid Romanovich was worried and also requested to go to Moscow. He needed to ensure that the information he had so painstakingly obtained was being properly implemented. At their very first meeting, P.M. Fitin showed Kvasnikov an impressive folder containing Academician I.V. Kurchatov's assessments of intelligence work: *"...Review of the material showed that its acquisition was of enormous, invaluable significance for our state and science."* The intelligence reports *"force us to reconsider our views on many issues and point to the technical possibilities of solving the entire problem in a significantly shorter timeframe."*

Upon his arrival in February, 1946, Leonid Romanovich was appointed Deputy Chief of the 1st Department (Scientific and Technical Intelligence) of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR. His position allowed him to interact with high-ranking officials guiding scientific and technical progress in the Soviet Union — members of the Central Committee, ministers, and academicians. He participated in party plenary sessions and government meetings, and with his characteristic persistence and energy, he sought recognition of the role of the scientific and technological intelligence in supporting domestic research and development.

The information always proved accurate

But the bulk of intelligence efforts remained devoted to Project Enormous, the Soviet response to the Manhattan Project. After the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the USSR felt a pressing need to accelerate its developments. This was well understood by our intelligence officers abroad: the staff of the station in the United States did everything possible and impossible to ensure that the work of obtaining valuable information never stopped for a second. And L.R. Kvasnikov organized its immediate processing and implementation in Moscow: he maintained contact with the relevant ministries and was "on the phone" with Laboratory No. 2, where new intelligence data was highly valued and eagerly awaited. In 1947, he headed the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Department, which was later transformed into an independent directorate within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB.

I.V. Kurchatov's deputy for the atomic project, V.V. Goncharov noted: *"The contribution of intelligence is undeniable; we managed to avoid many dead ends and mistakes..."* Academician A.F. Ioffe agreed: *"The information we received always proved accurate and, for the most part, complete. Having such information reduces the workload by many months and facilitates the selection of directions, freeing us from lengthy searches. I have not yet encountered a single false indication."*

On August 29, 1949, the USSR successfully tested its own atomic bomb, ensuring global nuclear parity for decades to come. For his contribution to this achievement, Colonel L.R. Kvasnikov was awarded the Order of Lenin. By the time of his retirement, he also held two Orders of the Red Banner of Labour, two Orders of the Red Star, the "Honoured Employee of NKVD" badge, the "Honorary Employee of Foreign Intelligence" badge, and numerous medals.

Until 1963, Leonid Romanovich remained the permanent head of scientific and technical intelligence, having succeeded in expanding its staff at the Central Apparatus and abroad. He was strict and demanding, but had a reputation as a fair and competent leader. He knew how to overcome difficulties himself, and he demanded the same from his subordinates. The common cause was top priority, working to the limit under any circumstances. New generations of intelligence officers learned this approach, which invariably yielded results, from their leader.

The legendary "atomic" four: Heroes of Russia A.A.Yatskov, L.R.Kvasnikov, V.B.Barkovsky, A.S.Feklisov. The room of history of the foreign intelligence. Early 1990s

In the 1990s, when the media erupted in controversy over who deserved more credit for the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb — scientists or intelligence officers — he stated calmly: *"Intelligence data allowed I.V. Kurchatov to avoid wasting resources and time on exploring numerous additional avenues, testing dead-end or more labour-intensive options, which were difficult to implement at the time due to our insufficient experimental base... It should be kept in mind that, ultimately, it was not intelligence that built the bomb, but scientists and specialists, relying on the country's technological achievements and material resources. Any scientific and technical information is useful only when it falls on fertile ground, that is, when its need is understood and its implementation is possible. We should all cherish the sense of an honest and selfless duty fulfilled."*

On October 15, 1993, Leonid Romanovich passed away. On June 15, 1996, Kvasnikov was posthumously awarded the title Hero of Russia. This boy from the provinces, who once timidly gazed at the miracle locomotive, now stands alongside the greatest minds of the 20th century. His bust, erected in 2021 in the Square of Intelligence Officers in Uzlovaya, reminds us that anyone who is willing to work hard to achieve results can do something significant for the country and make history.

Klaus Fuchs' Awards

On the 100th anniversary of the scientific and technical intelligence

The museum collection of the Russian Intelligence Service contains exhibits related to the outstanding scientist, nuclear physicist Klaus Fuchs, who made a significant contribution to saving the world from atomic war. His help to our country became one of the catalysts for the creation of a domestic nuclear shield in the shortest possible time. Two awards are kept in memory of this. The first one is a high state award, the Order of Friendship. The second one is a wristwatch, a gift from friends that he wore all his life.

Text: Alexandra Khakimova



Exhibits from the Hall of history of the foreign intelligence

A young talented scientist, a staunch communist, Klaus Fuchs emigrated from Germany to Britain in 1933, fleeing from fascism. In 1941, he was involved in the British Tube Alloys project, the first Western nuclear weapons program. A year later, the project was transferred overseas, and Fuchs, at the invitation of the Manhattan Project's scientific director, David Oppenheimer, moved to the United States. There he gained access to the classified information of the Los Alamos laboratory and subsequently became a valuable volunteer assistant to the Soviet foreign intelligence service.

Fuchs quickly saw the scale of what was coming and realized that technologies of such destructive power should not belong only to the West: *"Balance, obviously, must exist."* He also was the first to conclude that Nazi Germany was unable to create nuclear weapons on its own. Against the background of the fierce resistance of the Soviet people to the Nazi invasion, Fuchs decided to inform, at all costs, the leadership of the USSR, the state that had born the brunt of war against the absolute evil of fascism, about the progress of the work. The wristwatch given to Klaus Fuchs by his associates reminded him all his life of the fact that he had become a true man of the world.

Like many outstanding communists in Europe, Fuchs was well known in the ranks of the Comintern, and it was through this line that he was recruited by Soviet special services in December 1941. The head of the group of German Communist emigrants in England, Jurgen Kuczynski, and his sister Ursula acted as a link with Moscow. The girl became one of the channels of interaction between the scientist and the station of the Soviet foreign intelligence in London. It was Ursula who presented Fuchs with a German brand Glashütte wristwatch as a memorable gift in appreciation for his selfless work for the benefit of a higher cause. The exact date and circumstances of handing over this gift are unknown. More important is the fact that Fuchs preserved this object for many difficult years, including during his stay in a British prison after his arrest on February 2, 1950.

After serving nine of the 14 years of his sentence behind bars, Fuchs returned to his homeland, the GDR, in 1959, where he continued to work in the nuclear physics. He married Grete Keilson, an employee of the Central Committee of the German Socialist Party, whom he had met in Paris in the 1930s. They lived happily together for the rest of their lives.

In 1988, Klaus Fuchs passed away. After his death, in 1989, the internatioinalist scientist and dedicated antifascist K. Fuchs was awarde d the Soviet Order of Friendship of Peoples. Now this decoration is placed for eternal storage in the Hall of History of Foreign Intelligence Service, together with the Glashütte wristwatch that his widow handed over to us in 1989. Today it reminds new generations of Russian intelligence officers of the difficult story of how the balance in the world was achieved — and how important it is to maintain it.

Legendary intelligence of the Comintern

In honor of the 130th anniversary of Richard Sorge

Text: Iosif Borisovich Linder, writer, secret services historian

The Comintern (Communist International) was founded on March 2, 1919, in Moscow. It was at the organization's Founding Congress, that its primary goal was formulated: the revolutionary, or rather, violent, establishment of communist power in other countries. Given that among the participants of the Congress were representatives from Austria, Hungary, Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the Balkan Social Democratic Federation, it was a question of spreading the dictatorship of the proletariat to almost all of Europe. At the same time, the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) was formed and an issue of establishing its own intelligence agency arose.

I. I. Brodsky "The opening ceremony of the Comintern 2nd Congress in the Uritsky palace in Leningrad" 1924. Canvas, oil. State Historical Museum

> Today, as Russia stands at the forefront of the global world order, there are very useful practical lessons that can be learned from the experience of the Communist International
>
> S.Y. Naryshkin

Born of revolution

It should be noted that in Russia, communists had significant experience in underground work. The Bolshevik leader V.I. Lenin, as early as 1898, after the First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), carried out reforms aimed at establishing special structures within the party that would protect it not only from persecution by the tsarist services but also from provocations and betrayals. By the Second Congress (July — August 1903), the RSDLP had already established secret departments and combat units. And after the end of World War I, its ranks were replenished with people with rich military experience.

It's no surprise that within weeks of the October Revolution, special agencies began to form in the country. The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage (VChK), established on December 20, 1917, under the Council of People's Commissars and headed by the experienced underground communist F.E. Dzerzhinsky, became the first nationwide special military-political structure of Soviet power.

In January 1918, the Operating Department, later renamed the Registration Directorate — the forerunner of today's Main Directorate of the General Staff (military intelligence) — was formed within the Extraordinary Headquarters of the Moscow Military District. In December of the same year, the Military Department was established within the VChK, taking over responsibility for counterintelligence work in the Armed Forces. And in January 1919, the Special Department of the VChK was established to combat counterrevolution and espionage in the army and navy.

Let me remind you that by 1919, the situation on the Civil War fronts had reached a critical point. In addition to the White Army, there were up to two million interventionists on the territory of Russia. Therefore, the issue of weakening the enemy, primarily the Entente countries, was considered paramount. The success of efforts to ignite revolutionary struggle in the enemy's rear, along with the intensification of subversive and intelligence activities, became the key to the survival of the young Soviet republic.

Triune Intelligence

Under these circumstances, the Executive Committee of the Communist International practically became the headquarters of the world revolution. Even the West recognized the Comintern's timely emergence, given that a wave of revolutionary processes soon swept across Europe, forcing foreign governments to hastily withdraw their troops from Russia. This had an immediate impact on the situation on the front lines, allowing the Soviet leadership to prevent the country from collapsing and being divided into occupation zones. At the

O. A. Pyatnitsky, A. K. Artuzov, Y. K. Berzin

same time the illegal methods of the party services were adopted by other law enforcement agencies.

In November 1920 the Secret Department, which had existed almost from the very first days of the Comintern's founding, was renamed the Conspiracy Department. In 1921, at the end of the Civil War, as contacts with Western governments began to be established, it was given the neutral name — the International Liaison Department of the Communist International (OMS). It was headed by the veteran Bolshevik Osip Pyatnitsky (Iosel Tarshis, aka Iosif Aronovich Freitag, "Friday"), who had a wealth of experience in illegal work. Before the Revolution, he was responsible for the secret smuggling of the Iskra newspaper into Russia, consolidating virtually all of the party's clandestine connections abroad under his control.

On December 20, 1920, a political intelligence unit known as the Foreign Department (INO) was established within the VChK. It quickly became one of the leading intelligence services, providing the country's leadership with crucial information. The INO immediately became the Comintern's partner in conducting illegal operations abroad. Notably, the Conspiracy Department of the ECCI was initially led by the head of military intelligence, Yan Karlovich Berzin, with secret service agent of VChK Artur Khristianovich Artuzov as his deputy. Thus, an "operational triumvirate" was formed, where political and military intelligence channels were closely interlinked with international party structures.

For example, intelligence work on Japan, China, Mongolia, and Korea was led by Meier Abramovich Trilisser, the deputy chief (later chief) of the INO VChK, who also headed the OMS for the Far East. Close coordination and convergence of intelligence structures yielded significant results, enabling information exchange and joint operational work.

The Comintern's cooperation with domestic intelligence services was regulated by an instruction dated August 8, 1921, which stated:

"1. A representative of the Comintern cannot simultaneously be an authorized agent of the Cheka and the Intelligence Directorate. Conversely, representatives of the Intelligence Directorate and the VChK cannot perform the functions of a Comintern representative in general or its departments.
2. Representatives of the Intelligence Directorate and the Cheka are under no circumstances authorized to finance parties or groups abroad. This right belongs exclusively to the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Representatives of the VChK and the Intelligence Directorate may not approach foreign parties and groups with proposals for their cooperation with the Intelligence Directorate and the VChK.
3. The Intelligence Directorate and the VChK may seek assistance from the Communist Parties only through a representative of the Comintern.
4. The representative of the Comintern is obliged to provide the VChK, the Intelligence Directorate and its representatives with all possible assistance."

In the 1920s, illegal OMS structures operated in parallel with the INO and the Intelligence Directorate residencies in many countries abroad. This provided a significant advantage to Soviet intelligence officers: they were trained by people with close connections abroad, who knew the customs of the country, and spoke local dialects. These people also helped their colleagues obtain foreign documents and develop a reliable cover story.

Subsequently, many talented intelligence officers who began their careers through the Comintern later joined the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army and the INO VChK. Many of them formed the elite of Soviet illegal intelligence in the 1920s and 1930s, a period known as the "Era of Great Illegal Agents". Among them was Arnold Deutsch, the founder of the "Cambridge Five". He began as a courier in the OMS, underwent rigorous training in intelligence, and was then recruited into the INO. From 1934 to 1937, he worked in England, where he recruited over 20 valuable agents. Most of their names remain classified.

In Germany, another prominent Comintern's "graduate" — the "Red Orchestra"'s enigmatic member Ilse Stöbe (operational pseudonym "Alta") — obtained information through the Intelligence Directorate. She was one of the first to inform Moscow about Hitler's impending attack on the Soviet Union. Over the years, such outstanding Soviet deep cover intelligence officers as Sandor Rado ("Dora"), Iosif Romualdovich Grigulevich ("Artur"), William Genrikhovich Fischer, better known as Rudolf Abel, and many others passed through the OMS. Among them is the legendary "Ramsay" — Richard Sorge, whose 130th anniversary is celebrated in 2025.



Дорогой товарищ БЕРИЯ,

Приехавший китайский товарищ Чжоу Эн-Лай привез с собой три вида шифра, которыми пользуется японская армия. Эти шифры были захвачены 8-й армией в боях с японцами.

Полагая, что указанные шифры могут представлять интерес для Вас, посылаю их Вам в приложении к этому письму.

С товарищеским приветом,

15.IX.39г.

/Г. ДИМИТРОВ./

Приложение: Три тетради с шифрами.



РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО

СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО

И К К И

товарищу ДИМИТРОВУ

Деньги "ПАУЛЮ" и "НИКОЛАЮ" переданы. "ПАУЛЬ" сообщил, что он недавно установил связь, хорошо слышит и все принимает.

(ФИТИН)

"30" декабря 1941г.

№ 2/1/22900

МОСКВА

Examples of operative correspondence between INO NKVD and Comintern. 1939-1941. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History

8-year-old Richard (in his father's lap, centre) among his family. Baku. June 1, 1904

Who are you, Mr Sorge?

To this day, there is no definitive answer to this question. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev saw the film by French director Yves Ciampi with that title (released in 1961), he was shocked. As a result, in 1964, Sorge was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. At the same time, a myth arose about the "all-knowing spy", whom Stalin didn't trust. In the 1990s, when archives began to be declassified, rumors arose that Sorge was no hero at all. So where does the truth lie?

Ika Richard Sorge was born on October 4, 1895, in a suburb of Baku. His father was a German oil engineer who had emigrated to Russia, and his mother was Russian. He was the eighth, and the youngest, child born in his family. A few years later, his family returned to Germany. At the outbreak of World War I, Sorge volunteered for the front. He was wounded several times. For his bravery and skillful actions, he was promoted to non-commissioned officer and awarded the Iron Cross.

He soon became an activist in the revolutionary movement in Germany, and from 1919, he was a member of the Communist Party. As a journalist, he contributed to party newspapers and carried out various assignments, including classified ones. While pursuing his revolutionary work, Richard was able to graduate from university and defend his dissertation, being awarded a Doctor of Law.

A unique feature of Soviet intelligence (both political and military) in those years was its active interaction with foreign communist parties through Comintern structures. After the defeat of the revolution in Germany, the leadership of the national intelligence services sought to get the most from this, selecting a number of talented and promising officers from among German party members.

In August 1924, Sorge was offered to move to the USSR to work for the Comintern. On December 15, he arrived in Moscow and began working for the ECCI. He was soon granted Soviet citizenship. Thanks to his abilities and energy, he was quickly noticed and invited to participate in meetings of the ECCI Secretariat and Presidium. Stalin attended several of these events.

In 1927, after joining the OMS, Sorge began traveling to European countries. He continued to stand out for his activity, initiative, and excessive independence, which was not always welcome in Moscow. Abroad, Richard met Konstantin Mikhailovich Basov, the head of the military intelligence station in Berlin, who recognized his abilities and reported to the head of the Intelligence Directorate, Yan Berzin, about the interesting young man.

On October 31, 1929, Sorge was relieved of his duties in the Comintern Executive Committee and assigned to the 4th (Intelligence) Directorate of the Red Army General Staff. Berzin, with whom Sorge had developed a warm relationship, also recognized his great potential and sent him to China, where, according to the leadership, a proletarian revolution was about to occur.

"Ramsay" goes on the hunt

Richard, who lacked special training, initially learned from the experienced Intelligence Directorate officer, Karl Martynovich Rimm, who worked undercover in Shanghai with his wife, Lyubov Ivanovna, as the owner of a chain of stores and a restaurant. On the Center's instructions, Sorge also interacted with a Comintern employee — American journalist, Agnes Smedley. She did him a valuable service by introducing him to Hotsumi Ozaki, a correspondent for the Osaka Asahi newspaper, who later became his primary source of information. By 1932, Sorge had a sufficiently effective and extensive network of assistants in Shanghai — around ten people. However, the Center began to suspect that he had fallen under the surveillance of Chinese intelligence services, and he had to return to Moscow.

In 1933, Sorge was sent to work in Japan. Arriving in Tokyo, the young, confident journalist, who represented several leading German publications, made a favorable impression on the German embassy leadership and local officials. Sorge and the members of his station, which, in addition to the aforementioned H. Ozaki, included the artist Yotoku Miyagi, the Yugoslav journalist Branko Vukelić, and the radio operator Max Clausen, quickly got to work. Ozaki obtained information that interested Moscow from Japanese political circles, Miyagi from the military, and Vukelić from contacts with local and foreign journalists. "Ramsay" himself focused his attention on the German embassy, where he became an informal press attaché and gained access to classified information.

As the work progressed, the "Ramsay" illegal intelligence station acquired new sources of information, including some particularly valuable ones. For example, Ozaki managed to infiltrate the inner circle of Prince Konoe, who soon was appointed Prime Minister of Japan. Sorge's close friend, Abwehr officer Eugen Ott, became a military attaché in February 1934 and, in April 1938, ambassador to Nazi Germany, allowing Richard to access classified documents firsthand. Moreover, the ambassador even trusted him with encrypting some messages sent from the diplomatic mission to Berlin. Moscow treated Sorge's reports with a degree of skepticism, but nevertheless continued to report them to both Stalin and the Comintern *(see Documents 1 and 2 in the "Declassified Archives" section).*

H. Ozaki, one of "Ramsay"'s most valuable sources

To transmit the gathered information to Moscow, "Ramsay" used three channels of communication: a radio transmitter, special couriers, and through the legal residency staff at the Soviet embassy. The latter was too risky, and Sorge tried to use it only as a last resort. The radio channel became his primary one. Radio operator M. Clausen spent hours at the key, sending several radiograms daily (the transmissions were sent to Vladivostok, which was designated "Wiesbaden" in work correspondence). Initially, Sorge encrypted the messages himself, but after a car accident, he entrusted this task also to Clausen, who literally worked himself to exhaustion.

Until 1939, documentary materials of greatest value to Moscow were sent via Shanghai. Even before leaving for Japan, Sorge had agreed with Berzin that none of the employees of the legal military intelligence station in Tokyo would know of his existence. All



Communist Party of Germany membership card in the name of R.Sorge

The legendary "Ramsay"

members of "Ramsay" 's group were used as couriers, including the radio operator and his wife, Anna Clausen, who carried microfilms hidden in her underwear. After the Soviet-Japanese conflict at Lake Khasan, it was no longer safe to travel to China, as Japanese counterintelligence began inspecting the arriving foreigners more thoroughly. To transfer documents, Sorge was forced to make use of instant meetings with his contact in Tokyo (particularly during visits to the Imperial Theater).

With the outbreak of World War II, "Ramsay" began to provide particularly valuable information about the plans of Japanese militaristic circles and the possible timing of the start of hostilities against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Sorge reported on Germany's preparations for an attack on the USSR, calling it inevitable. He also provided the composition of the fascist group deployed along our country's western borders, and suggested the second half of June 1941 as the probable date of aggression. However, Stalin didn't believe the intelligence reports until the very last moment, considering them to be disinformation from Berlin.

The Final Battle

On June 23, the Center requested information from "Ramsay" about Japan's plans in connection with Hitler's aggression. Soon, telegrams began to arrive from Sorge, stating that Tokyo was not prepared to immediately enter into war against the USSR. As the Nazi blitzkrieg dragged on, increasingly encouraging reports from Japan began to arrive in Moscow. On September 14, the intelligence officer reported that the Japanese had still not decided whether they would act against the USSR. In his final radiogram, sent to the Center on October 4, 1941, "Ramsay" gave his final conclusion: *"There will be no war (with the Soviet Union) this year"*.

On October 18, 1941, Richard Sorge was arrested by the Japanese police. That same day, most members of his group, which by then numbered over 30 people, were also detained. During the search, the text of a radiogram that radio operator Clausen had failed to send was discovered: *"Our mission in Japan is accomplished. War between Japan and the USSR has been averted. Return us to Moscow or send us to Germany. I would like to become a private soldier to fight for my Fatherland — the Soviet Union — or continue my intelligence work in Nazi Germany."*

R.Sorge's comrades-in-arms Max and Anna Klausen after receiving the GDR Patriotic Order of Merit. Berlin. May 15, 1969

***

The practical benefit of the "Ramsay" illegal intelligence station's work is usually measured in rifle and tank divisions, which, during the heaviest fighting of the autumn of 1941, were redeployed from the Far East and Transbaikalia to reinforce weakened units. But the most important thing is that the data obtained allowed our country's leadership to confidently plan and execute a counteroffensive near Moscow without regard for Japan. Of course, Sorge wasn't the only source of information, but he was certainly one of the most important, as the information he obtained came directly from the top decision-makers.

The Sorge investigation lasted nearly two years, with the Japanese accusing him specifically of being a Comintern's agent. In September 1943, he was sentenced to death, and executed on November 7, 1944, in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo. Thus ended the tragic fate of one of the most outstanding intelligence officers of the 20th century. To the question of who Mr. Sorge really was, he himself answered in his final encrypted message. He had brilliantly outmaneuvered German intelligence, but he paid for it with his own life.

The Comintern did not long outlive its distinguished representative. From the mid-1930s, when the prominent Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov headed this international organization, the excessive foreign activities of the ECCI became "inconvenient" for the Soviet leadership. The mass repressions that swept the country from 1937 to 1940 did not spare the Comintern's OMS, nor its foreign or military intelligence. Many experienced intelligence officers fell victim to the purges, including A.Kh. Artuzov, Y.K. Berzin, S.A. Messing, A.A. Slutsky, and M.A. Trilisser.

I.V. Stalin raised the issue of liquidating the entire Comintern structure as early as April 1941, but the war intervened. After its outbreak, several intelligence schools were established on the basis of the OMS, training personnel for the NKVD separate motorized rifle brigade of special purpose (OMSBON). Also a special department was established, where future saboteurs and underground organizers were trained in encryption, secret writing, microfilming, performing secret operations, and other specialized disciplines.

The last Comintern head G.Dimitrov

The final decision to dissolve the Comintern was made on May 15, 1943. In an interview with the British news agency Reuters, Joseph Vissarionovich stated: *"The dissolution of the Communist International is correct and timely, since it facilitates the organization of a common onslaught of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy — Hitlerism."*

Thus, the USSR formally removed the idea of a world-wide revolution, which had so irritated the West, from its agenda. Meanwhile, Moscow retained the Comintern's resources, experienced personnel who were reassigned to other government agencies, and foreign ties developed over many years, which remained beneficial. Both before the war and especially after our Victory, leftist ideas enjoyed great popularity in many countries. It is well known that many of those who actively contributed to the collapse of imperialism and the colonial system emerged from the Comintern. It is enough to mention such prominent figures as Josip Broz Tito, Walter Ulbricht, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi Minh. The list goes on and on. I am convinced that now, when the world is once again on the verge of large-scale, and without exaggeration, fateful changes, concrete lessons can indeed be drawn from the history of this legendary organization.



Сов.секретно.
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ЦК ВКП(б) тов.С Т А Л И Н У.

Представляю донесение нашего источника, близкого к немецким кругам в Токио. Источник не пользуется полным нашим доверием, однако, некоторые его данные заслуживают внимания.

- " 1. Военно-политическая обстановка в Японии, по личному мнению и по ряду данных, полученных в иностранных и местных кругах, позволяет придти к заключению, что выступление Японии против СССР может последовать в непродолжительном будущем, хотя общие затруднения Японии, весьма значительные уже в настоящее время в этом случае возрастут еще более.

Основаниями для такого заключения являлись:

а) Сообщение японского Генштаба германскому военному атташе полковнику Отт о том, что необходимо скорейшее окончание войны с Китаем и заключение мира на приемлемых условиях с тем, чтобы сосредоточенные на континенте военные силы Японии могли быть брошены против СССР. Генштаб предложил Отту совершить поездку в Шанхай с тем, чтобы он беспристрастно оценил военно-политическое положение на Шанхайском фронте, так как в этот момент не только правительство и флот, но и армия были обеспокоены большими потерями, затруднениями и медленностью японского наступления и перспективами всего предприятия. Возвратясь из поездки, Отт

2. Германский военный атташе имел возможность убедиться, что японский генштаб коренным образом перестроил стратегические планы ведения войны с СССР. Если до сих пор предусматривались преимущественно наступательные методы борьбы с Красной армией, то теперь предполагается на всех фронтах, кроме участка около Владивостока (где будет осуществлен наступательный удар) действовать по принципу "сдерживающего боя". Существует убеждение, что Красная армия ответит на японскую провокацию наступательными действиями со стороны Читы и Благовещенска. В этом случае ей дадут возможность постепенно проникнуть вглубь Маньчжурии, чтобы, когда она достаточно утомится и будет удалена от полосы собственных укреплений, решительно по ней ударить.

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В районе Хинганских гор японцы предполагают, видимо, пропустить Красную армию до гребня хребта, чтобы разбить ее при спуске в долину, где уже теперь осуществляются укрепления. Небольшая группа японских офицеров несколько месяцев тому назад послана в Германию, видимо, специально для изучения в Рейхсвере методов войны путем "сдерживающего боя". Когда же наступательные возможности частей Красной армии иссякнут, японцы перейдут в наступление, нанося удар в полосе Оупу, Мохэ.

Отт оценивает возможности японцев в скором времени перейти на этот метод ведения войны, как одну из основных форм борьбы, довольно скептически. Он критически отзывается о самурайском духе наступательных действий, приведших в Шанхае к исключительно большим и в большинстве случаев напрасным потерям офицерских кадров." -

СТ.МАЙОР ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
(Гендин)

" 14 " декабря 1937 г.
№ 20941сс.

See the full version of the document on the SVR of Russia website

Document 1.
Special message to J. Stalin based on R. Sorge's reports (collage). December 14, 1937. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RSASPH)

Document 1.
Special message to J. Stalin based on R. Sorge's reports (collage). December 14, 1937. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RSASPH)

9

Тов. Димитрову

СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО

РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО

Экз. №6

СПЕЦСООБЩЕНИЕ

№ 25/029 с.с.

„8" января 1940 г.

Содержание: " О правительственном кризисе в Японии".

Д о к л а д ы в а ю:

I. По агентурным данным, заслуживающим доверия, немецкий посол Отт телеграфировал Риббентропу оценку правительственного кризиса в Японии. Его оценка сводится к следующему: "Отставка кабинета Абэ неизбежна. Дворцовые круги готовятся к созданию нового кабинета с широким участием представителей партий. Угаки ожидает, что получит пост премьера, но это не будет означать крупных перемен ни во внутренней, ни во внешней политике японского правительства. В Японии растет убеждение, что создание правительства Ван Цзин-вея бессмысленно и, что нужны непосредственные переговоры с Чан Кай-ши, но военщина возражает против ведения подобных переговоров, по крайней мере в настоящее время, и настаивает на создании правительства Ван Цзин-вея.

В ближайшем будущем Япония не в состоянии внести что либо существенно новое в отношения с США, Германией и СССР. Осима (быв.японский посол в Германии) убежден, что понадобится еще смена нескольких кабинетов прежде чем Япония пойдет на сотрудничество с Германией и широкое соглашение с СССР".

2. По данным нашего источника кабинет Абэ вряд -ли

Document 2.
Special message to G. Dimitrov based on R. Sorge's reports. January 8, 1940. RSASPH

сможет удержаться, несмотря на то, что военные круги не желают его падения. Партийная оппозиция и широкие настроения против Абэ сильны, поэтому военщина опасается продолжать отстаивание кабинета Абэ, так как это грозит ей дальнейшей потерей авторитета.

Кандидатом на пост нового премьера является Угаки, но армия не поддерживает эту кандидатуру. Помимо того Угаки не пользуется поддержкой Коноэ. Из других кандидатов на пост премьера называют Коноэ, адмирала Осуми и адмирала Тэроути. Кандидатом на пост нового министра иностранных дел называют Кайсо. Падение кабинета Абэ ожидают 10.I.с.г.

Полагают, что первым шагом нового кабинета будут непосредственные переговоры с Чан Кай-ши в целях ликвидации японо-китайской войны.

3. По агентурным данным, заслуживающим доверия, японский генштаб сообщил немецкому военному атташе, что японцы будут заигрывать с американцами до тех пор пока американцы не заключат торгового договора, после чего японцы займут твердую линию по китайскому вопросу, которая также будет направлена и против американцев.

В ы в о д:

1. Падение кабинета Абэ, очевидно, произойдет в ближайшие дни. Основной причиной его падения является неспособность разрешить китайский вопрос и внешне-политические трудности Японии и в связи с этим обострение борьбы в правящих кругах Японии.

2. Следует ожидать дальнейшего обострения борьбы между военщиной и умеренными кругами в связи с попытками непосредственных переговоров с Чан Кай-ши.

3. Возможно, что попытки Японии вести непосредственные переговоры с Чан Кай-ши являются результатом давления со стороны Америки.

Проскуров

(Проскуров)

Document 2.
Special message to G. Dimitrov based on R. Sorge's reports. January 8, 1940. RSASPH

СОВ.СЕКРЕТНО
ОСОБАЯ ПАПКА

Раздел Д-7к2
№ 264
Дата 1943г.

Снятие копий и размножение воспрещается:

Хранить ... в шифре

ДИФФУЗИОННО-РАЗДЕЛИТЕЛЬНАЯ УСТАНОВКА
ДЛЯ ПОЛУЧЕНИЯ УРАНА-235.

УСТРОЙСТВО ЗАВОДА.

I. Схема технологического процесса.

	Фунт/сутки	концентрация
Подача	2I08	0,7I %
Отходы	208I	0,5 %
Продукт	I3	36,5 %
Потери	I4	

Потери составляют:

Реакция с водой - 2 г/сутки.

Потери при пуске машины и выключении - I% легкой фракции.

Остальное - вследствие реакции с материалами. 28% общего количества легкой компоненты, вводимой в установку, переходит в конечный продукт.

Концентрацию продукта можно регулировать изменением производительности, а именно:

Производительность	Концентрация продукции
I,I5 кг/сутки	36,6%
I,6	I0
I,95	5
0	76

Document 3.
STI report on the atomic project (collage).
October 31, 1945

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- I3 -

Ламинарный регулятор более предпочителен хотя, конечно, необходимо разработать эффективный клапан с ламинарным сопротивлением.

Другим выходом является "язычковый клапан". Отверстие клапана частично прикрыто гибким язычком, который с увеличением потока отгибается дальше от отверстия

Барьеры.

А - барьер. Никелевая сетка осаждается на медную фольгу /которая затем удаляется/ слоем /углекислая закись никеля в порошке; углерод восстановлен/.

В слое легко образуются трещины, эта тенденция может быть устранена путем предварительной обработки медной фольги.

K1 - барьер. Полоска из спекшегося никелевого порошка используется для слоя /А/ в качестве прокладки. В этом случае образование трещин менее серьезно, так как трещины будут частично прикрыты подкладкой.

При спекании используется какой-нибудь связующий материал, который затем удаляется.

Барьер из фтористого кальция.

Порошок фтористого кальция втирается в полоску из /спрессованного ?/ никелевого порошка. Обладает очень высокой разделительной способностью, но еще не испытан на способность засоряться. Этот вид барьера находится в ранней экспериментальной стадии.

Верно:
"31" октября 1945 г. /ВЕМСКОВ/

See the full version of the document on the SVR of Russia website

Document 3.
STI report on the atomic project (collage).
October 31, 1945

№ 1

Совершенно секретно.

ОСОБАЯ ПАПКА.

Снятие копий и размножение воспрещается.

Раздел Д-7к3

№ 263

Дата 1943 г.

Хранить навсегда с шифром

ДИФФУЗИОННО-РАЗДЕЛИТЕЛЬНАЯ УСТАНОВКА ДЛЯ ПОЛУЧЕНИЯ УРАНА - 235.

ОЧИСТИТЕЛЬНАЯ СИСТЕМА.

А. Примеси.

Все просачивающиеся примеси (за исключением охлаждающего вещества, которое тяжелее „процессного газа") уносятся в верхнюю часть завода.

Ожидается, что общее количество газа, подлежащее удалению, должно составить 2.200 стандартных кубических футов в сутки. В это количество входят:

I. Утечка через замазки - I.250 куб.ф/день, в случае замазок типа муфты; I.500 куб.ф/сутки в случае вязких замазок.

2. Вакуумные утечки через соединения и т.д. - 500 куб.ф/сутки что соответствует повышению давления на I,35 мм ртутного столба в сутки, из расчета общего об"ема по заводу в 282.000 куб.футов.

Нормы натекания воздуха в машинах и т.д. очень строгие и вышеуказанную цифру можно уменьшить.

Document 4.
STI report on the atomic project (collage).
November 1, 1945

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3. Просачивание N_2 при введении процессного газа в ступени, которые временно были выключены, I00 куб.ф/сутки (процессный газ вгоняется в ступень из холодной ловушки сухим N_2).

4. N_2, оставшийся в ступени до введения процессного газа - I00 куб.ф/сутки.

5. Утечка сквозь клапаны - 250 куб.фут/сутки (блокирующие клапаны - это двойные клапаны с затвором из N_2). Большую часть примеси составляет N_2 и небольшая доля O_2.

Б. Очистительные каскады.

Имеется 3 очистительных каскада: два работающих, третий запасный. Очистка производится разделением путем диффузии, при помощи параллельных плоских диффузоров (мембранные пары) с диффузионным смешиванием (ламинарный поток). Применяются поршневые насосы (еще не достаточно хорошо разработанные) производительностью 450 куб.футов в минуту. Барьеры - 3 дюйма ширины, 2 фута длины и расположены на расстоянии 3/32 дюйма друг от друга.

В каждом диффузоре около I20 каналов.

Давление на стороне с высоким давлением составляет 3 фунта на кв. дюйм. Полезная площадь барьера каждого диффузора около I00 кв.футов.

На каждую ступень приходится только один насос (а не 2, как в главном каскаде). В каскаде имеется около 42 ступеней; 4 ступени запасные.

Document 4.
STI report on the atomic project (collage).
November 1, 1945

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РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО
Служба внешней разведки РФ 10

Экз. № 1

Совершенно секретно.
/ОСОБАЯ ПАПКА/

Раздел
№ 446-Д
Дата окт. 1942 г.

Снятие копий и размножение воспрещается.

КРАТКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИ О ДИФФУЗИОННОЙ РАЗДЕЛИТЕЛЬНОЙ УСТАНОВКЕ.

I. Коррозия.

В течение первых десяти дней наблюдается начальное разрушение UF_6 на стали. Позже разрушение становится незначительным. Верхний предел для потери UF_6 в установке равняется I кг за день /соответственно I мг на кв.фут за день/.

Хотя данные не являются полными или окончательными нет основания предполагать, что при температурах в 75-80° сталь будет заметно разрушаться или вызовет разложение UF_6 в больших количествах.

2. Гидравлические затворы.

Фтороуглероды со смазывающими свойствами /масла/ будут подходящими для всех соединений включая соединения, находящиеся в контакте с UF_6. Предварительные испытания образца показали, что они являются стойкими. Еще неизвестно является ли упругость пара достаточно низкой.

Document 5.
STI report on the atomic project (collage).
August 8, 1946

3. Мембраны.

Эффективное разделение травленных мембран, производимых здесь таково, что оптимальное давление /при входе в мембранную пару/ равняется IO-I2 мм Hg. Предполагают довести давление до IO см Hg.

Новая техника была усовершенствована. Медная пластинка погружается в ванну, содержащую суспенсию тончайшего никелевого карбоната, которому предоставляется оседать на пластинку. Затем никель подвергается электролизу в промежутках между Ni -карбонатом. Мембрана травится и нагревается в водороде. Механическая обработка мембран является затруднительной, но не невозможной. Тонкие мембраны /менее 0,005"/ должны свариваться в опоки для поддержки неприкрепленных /свободных/ концов.

Прогиб мембран вследствие одностороннего давления окажется серьезным при высоких давлениях, имеющихся в виду, так как прогиб имеет такой же порядок величины, как промежуток между мембранами.

Предлагаются следующие новые усовершенствования. Устроить ее при помощи электролитического осадка на мембрану. Поместить мембрану под напряжение. Это является трудным, так как оно должно быть сделано в двух направлениях. Уменьшить расстояние на концах.

4. Проект машины.

Предварительный проект машины для более высоких давлений /IO см Hg /. Проект является по существу, таким же как для более низких давлений. Были сделаны два варианта, один для rabbit - машины /разделяющийся на 3 части/ и один с охлаждающими трубами перед входом газа в мембранные коробки.

Для более высокого давления потребуется вакуумный мотор на 250 H.P.

Document 5.
STI report on the atomic project (collage).
August 8, 1946

In the fall of 2025, the premiere of the film "Berlin Heat", dedicated to the 100th anniversary of Russian scientific and technical intelligence and the 80th anniversary of the Russian nuclear industry, took place. The film reinterprets historical events when Soviet intelligence officers and scientists forged the country's nuclear shield together. The "Razvedchik" talked with the main cast members Gela Meskhi (Hartman), Daniil Strakhov (Kurchatov) and Anna Peskova (Dori), as well as with the main producer of the project Dmitry Pristanskov, about how the filming took place and whether everything planned was realized.

Gela Raulevich, Hartman is an interesting character. Is his image close to you? After all, your character, like you, has double roots. He is half German, half Spanish, and you are half Russian, half Georgian with Spanish roots.

Yes, Hartman is close to me. Impersonating him, I based on my own character, so, yes, there is a lot of me in the main character. He initially chose justice and was ready to die for his new homeland, the Soviet Union, but he was forced to bluff, showing that he was working for British intelligence. He wore a mask for a long time, but when he met the love of his life, all the masks were thrown off. I'm sure that even if he hadn't met Dori, nothing would have changed in his dedication to the cause. Risking his life, he would continue to do everything in his power to protect the Soviet people, and he remained honest about it till the end.

How did you prepare for the role? Was there anything you had to learn specifically for the film?

The training was thorough: I read a lot of literature, learned terms and military ranks in German. Historical transport required special skills, although I have driving experience. As you may know, all the cars used on the set were real and moved by themselves. In particular, I had to master an old Audi with its control peculiarities. The car was without hydraulics, so it was necessary to make significant efforts to turn, to make a U-turn or to reverse *(laughs)*.

I tried to perform all the stunt scenes myself, if, of course, the conditions allowed. I especially remember the episode with Anna Peskova, when we were driving in a convertible through

A shot from the "Berlin Heat" series

the city center. There was dust and dirt around after explosions, also gunfire. It was all flying in our faces! Okay, I'm a man, I could put up with it, but there was a fragile woman next to



Gela Raulevich Meskhi

Was born on May 13, 1986 in Moscow. Graduated from the V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko Studio School at the Chekhov Moscow Art Theater. In 2009-2011, he worked at the Stanislavsky Moscow Drama Theatre. He has appeared in more than 40 films and TV series, among them "Hamlet. XXI century" (2010), "Physics or Chemistry" (2011), "Son of the Father of Nations" (2013), "Sobibor" (2018), "Donbass. The Outskirts" (2019), "Save Leningrad" (2019), "1941. Wings over Berlin" (2022).

> The emotional component in cinema is always important, regardless of the genre. The viewer should empathize with the hero, feel like a part of what is happening on the screen.
>
> Gela Meskhi

me, and I was very worried about her. But Anna proved to be a real fighter, she worked out all the takes neatly.

In an interview, you mentioned that you had difficulties in a number of episodes, because you are an emotional person, and an intelligence officer must always wear a mask. In your opinion, what other qualities does a real intelligence officer possess?

The emotional component in cinema is always important, regardless of the genre. The viewer should empathize with the hero, feel like a part of what is happening on the screen. I discussed with the director the need to show emotions in certain scenes, especially when the character is alone with himself or with friends. Spies are also human, they tend to have feelings, even if they don't show it publicly.

My character is a hotel manager, he should be friendly, but sometimes he can break down, give free rein to emotions. This gives him charm and deflects suspicion. Changing masks is an integral part of his job. It's the same in life: we behave differently with different people. With family and friends, we are gentle and tactile, with strangers it is better to talk less and to listen more.

And real intelligence officers are always cool-headed and don't show unnecessary emotions. Take, for example, our President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. No matter what happens, not a single muscle on his face will ever move. How does he do it?! It's inconceivable! One has to learn such self-control.

A shot from the "Berlin Heat" series

Daniil Alexandrovich, what attracted you in "Berlin Heat" and what were your thoughts after reading the script?

As for the "Berlin Heat", it was obvious at the scenario level that the "block with scientists" was, one might say, a "thing in itself". That is, the connection with the story line was very conditional and this was a serious drawback for the story. And, of course, for me, the small part of Kurchatov in the series was immediately clear. But one thing entails another. In order to attract more of the viewer's attention to such a topic, it had to be developed in a different way. More carefully, let's say.

Nevertheless, this circumstance was not an obstacle for me, but in a sense it became an advantage. Each appearance of Kurchatov is meaningful, each scene is specific, despite the complexity of the tasks. What are the tasks? How to play a thought? How to play its birth? How can a scientist's work be shown? Please note that the reference film about science "Nine Days in One Year" is rather a melodrama-drama with all the necessary attributes: a love triangle, betrayal, redemption and death. That is, first of all, "Nine Days in One Year" is a human story, not an anthem about thermonuclear fusion. Kurchatov's line in the "Berlin Heat" is virtually devoid of personal details. But it was all the more interesting for me to take up and try to create a living person, and not a monument with a beard. There was a chance.



A shot from the "Berlin Heat" series

Unlike Colonel Isayev, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov is a real historical figure. Is it difficult to play such a character? How did you prepare for the role, what facts of the scientist's biography did you remember best or what impressed you most?

Isayev-Stierlitz is more than a historical figure, he is almost an icon for our "TV consciousness", for those over 40. There were jokes about him, just like about Chapayev in his time. Isaev is a character that I played with great love and respect for the original source, let's just say. I mean Tikhonov, of course. But it was necessary to work on this picture with equal care as well, without putting a direct sign of equality between Vyacheslav Vasilyevich and me. The slogan "The Youth of Stierlitz" made the viewer attuned to a trick, a show, but they saw something completely different, something they were not at all ready for.

Look, 17 years have passed and now the homage to "Seventeen Moments of Spring" is perceived in a completely different way. Just a joke, a slight bow, why not. But the young viewer hasn't noticed it whatsoever. I'm already talking about the "Berlin Heat". And the scene in the Elephant cafe was greatly shot by camera



Daniil Alexandrovich Strakhov

Was born on March 2, 1976 in Moscow. Graduated from B.V. Shchukin Theatre Institute. Over the years, he played at the N.V. Gogol Moscow Drama Theater, the Theatre on Malaya Bronnaya, the Mossovet Theatre and others. He played in such films and TV series as "The Storm Gate" (2006), "Isayev" (2009), "Embracing the Sky" (2013), "The Healer" (2017), "God Complex" (2022), "Hypnosis" (2025). He was awarded the medal of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for his role in the film "The Storm Gate" (2006). Winner of the FSB of Russia award for the best acting in the film "Isayev".

D.A.Strakhov as I.V.Kurchatov in the “Berlin Heat” series

Let’s return to Kurchatov. Of course, I was taken aback by this suggestion. I must say this first of all. And after reading more about Igor Vasilyevich, I completely got scared. The significance of the person, in the first place. His strange appearance, in the second. I have already mentioned the small part of the character in the series and the lack of a full-fledged line in development. Nevertheless, there was no doubt. I had to agree, because in modern cinema such an offer is very rare. I had to take the risk.

Then the painstaking work began. Books, museums, makeup artists, wig-makers, clothing. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Irina Vasilyevna Fedoseyeva and Raisa Vasilyevna Kuznetsova, two "keepers" of Kurchatov's memory, for their help in our work. I can't help but thank the production director. The main tasks and questions that I set for myself and my colleagues were how to make Kurchatov a living person, and not a caricature with a glued beard? As for the pastiche, we have completed this task. And, most importantly, we have apparently succeeded to show a man who cares for the motherland. Without pathos, simply.

Kurchatov was not a simple man, by no means. There are no details in this story that could have come into focus had there been more screen time for it. But nevertheless, knowledge of these details and, most importantly, awareness — why is this so? — gave me strength and support for the role. And of course, the whole is more important than the details, it wasn't for them, that I took up the material. But nevertheless, I will say a few words about this.

Kurchatov, for example, loved the image of Mephistopheles. It accompanied him in various ways. Like the knob of the cane with a stiletto hidden inside. Kurchatov was quick-tempered and used to beat negligent employees with this cane. But at the same time, he adored the image of Don Quixote — this dreamer, and knight, and crank. But Don Quixote and Mephistopheles look the same, and all the three are united by a strange beard... The combination of these details gives if not the key, then the perception of the person. Through them, I see how he realized his burden of responsibility, his place in History, and the inevitability of what was happening.

operator Lena Ivanova through glass and reflections, in which the characters flow into each other, emphasizing the duality of what is happening to them and in them.

> Kurchatov's line in the "Berlin Heat" is virtually devoid of personal details. But it was all the more interesting for me to take up and try to create a living person, and not a monument with a beard.
>
> Daniil Strakhov

Anna Vladislavovna, how did the idea of the project come about?

The novel of the same name became the starting point, but we immediately realized that the spy line alone was not enough for a large-scale film production. Therefore, we had to completely revise the material. We wanted to tell the audience, especially the modern youth, about the creation of Laboratory N°2 and the young nuclear scientists, burning with an idea and motivated by a single goal.

To do this, we studied the archival documents that were provided to us by Rosatom and the National Research Center "Kurchatov Institute". One of the most difficult tasks was to find a balance between historical truth and fictional assumptions. The line of Soviet scientists required the study of a huge amount of not only historical material, but also scientific information. We tried to maintain respect for the real events and at the same time make the plot entertaining.

The images of the spies, and the whole atmosphere in the film, also turned out to be quite plausible. How did you manage to do this?

We tried to be as true to life as possible. For example, all the cars that were used in the filming were manufactured no later than 1943. The Audi Gela was talking about was manufactured in 1938. In addition, we managed to find the BMW in which Stierlitz drove Pastor Schlag to Switzerland in "Seventeen Moments of Spring." In 1945, the car came to the USSR as a trophy, and on the instructions of Yu.V. Andropov, it was restored and sent to film production. It was sold in the 1990s, and since then it has been in a private collection. And we managed to arrange for this car to be lent for our filming.

Although this was not economical, but for the authenticity of the image of the main characters, we sewed individual costumes for them. We wanted them to look perfect, to the nines. The costume designer had searched for an authentic quality fabric for a long time, but finally it was found only at one of the factories in Belarus.

> The line of Soviet scientists required the study of a huge amount of not only historical material, but also scientific information. We tried to maintain respect for the real events and at the same time make the plot entertaining.
>
> Anna Peskova

A shot from the “Berlin Heat” series

And the white silk stole that fluttered around my heroine's neck when she and Hartman drove in a convertible is a genuine accessory from the early 20th century, which was purchased at an auction in France specifically for the film. I also



Anna Vladislavovna Peskova

Was born on November 11, 1985 in Chelyabinsk. Graduated from the Chelyabinsk State Academy of Culture and Arts, and worked as a presenter on the STS TV channel. She is known for her roles in the TV series "Pregnancy Test" (2014), "Five Minutes of Silence" (2016), "The Pilot" (2021), "Tour with Ivanushki" (2024) and others. She worked as a producer on the comedy "Good Boy" (2016). The film was awarded the Grand Prix of the XXVII Kinotavr Open Russian Film Festival.

A shot from the “Berlin Heat” series

appeared in my great-grandmother's garnet earrings. She wore them exactly in the 1940s. So, I repeat, in our film, almost every detail is authentic to the epoch.

In general, for me as an actress, despite the fact that I have more than 60 roles in my track record, "Berlin Heat" is one of the most beloved and dear to my heart projects. Our entire soul is put into it. My husband and I have lived with this series 24/7 for almost three years.

Dmitry Vladimirovich Pristanskov

Was born on December 17, 1976 in Saratov. Graduated from the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg State University, Candidate of Legal Sciences. In 1999-2001, he worked in the prosecutor's office, then in commercial structures. In 2005, he joined the Federal Agency for State Property Management. In 2010-2014, he was Deputy Head, and in 2016, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation – Head of the Federal Agency for State Property Management. Since 2019, he has been the State Secretary and Vice President of MMC Norilsk Nickel. He was a member of the Board of the Federal Fund for Social and Economic Support of Russian Cinematography, the boards of directors of Roskino, the Sverdlovsk Film Studio, the Gorky Film Studio for Children and Youth Films, and other companies.

Dmitry Vladimirovich, what is the key to the success of a good film, in your opinion?

I will name three main components: a good script, financing and people. As Kurchatov used to say, the main thing is the people, the team. We had a large international team. For example, more than 50 people living in different parts of the world were responsible for the graphics: in India, Austria and even in New Zealand. But most of them, of course, are here in Russia.

Some of these guys have worked on films like "The Lord of the Rings" and "Avatar." In other words, these are people with tremendous experience. For example, they drew a plane so carefully — remember, at the beginning of the second episode it lands at the airport — that no one guessed that it was computer graphics. We were asked later: "Where did you get the German transport aircraft? They do not exist any more!"

Within a short period of time, these same specialists turned Vyborg, Gatchina, Lomonosov and St. Petersburg into Berlin, London and Stockholm in 1943 in such a way that the places became unrecognizable. St. Isaac's Square, where one of the gunfire scenes took place, was transformed so much that no one saw either the monument to Nicholas I or the building of the Legislative Assembly.

And where were the bright interiors of the office of the head of German intelligence Walter Schellenberg filmed?

Also on St. Isaac's Square, in the former German Embassy in the Russian Empire. The building is unique, it was built at the beginning of the XX century and is still preserved almost in its original form. Currently, the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region is located there. By the way, it was also filmed outside. This was the headquarters of the Gestapo, where the main character, Dori, entered at the end of the second episode.

It was not easy to arrange for the shooting: the film takes place in summer, and in St. Petersburg at this time it is the height of the tourist season. Thanks to the city authorities, who met us halfway and gave us permission to close off St. Isaac's Square. We started working in the dead of night — we prepared, rehearsed, and then recorded takes at first light, as public transport began moving in the morning.

Let’s go back to the movie locations. The Adlerhof Hotel, which is run by the main character, is the Astoria Hotel in St. Petersburg. However, only from the outside. All the interiors were shot at the Europa Grand Hotel, which is also located in St. Petersburg, but in a completely different place. That's how we decided to confuse the viewer a bit (laughs).

We also have an encrypted audio message in the film: when the radio operator transmits a cipher message, it is not a set of sounds, as often happens in movies, but a real text. Anyone who knows Morse code can decipher it. The message is: "Dedicated to the intelligence officers and scientists who forged the nuclear shield of the Motherland. Happy 80th anniversary of Victory!"

Do you think spy movies are in demand in Russia today?

Definitely. We can see this by the rating of the film on various Internet platforms, by the number of unique views, which has already exceeded ten million, and by the numerous positive reviews from viewers who are already wondering if there will be a sequel.

What can you say to that? Moreover, the film has an open ending....

Both the book and the first version of the script have a tragic ending: the main heroine dies in the last scene. We even filmed it. But when we looked at it, we decided to alter it: let the wounded Dori, whom Hartman carries in his arms, open her eyes. First of all, I didn't want my wife to die, but that's not the principal thing (laughs). We thought it would be more interesting to give the viewers an opportunity to decide the fate of the characters themselves. If the film is warmly received, then it will have a good ending, inspiring hope. And so it turned out.

Shots from the “Berlin Heat” series

Now, however, new filming is still far away. We are waiting for the premiere of our series on one of the federal TV channels, which, hopefully, will happen next year. But the groundwork for the second season has been done.

Interviewed by Anna Michurina

> “We have an encrypted audio message in the film: when the radio operator transmits a cipher message, it is a real text. Anyone who knows Morse code can decipher it.
>
> Dmitry Pristanskov

Postage stamps
honoring heroes of intelligence

Commemorating 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and 100th anniversary of creating Scientific and Technical intelligence in Russia new thematic art postage stamps have been issued.

On November 26, 2025 the ceremony of postage stamps cancellation featuring six soviet intelligence officers — the Great Patriotic War veterans — and the symbol of Scientific and Technical intelligence took place at the headquarters of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in Yasenevo. The Director of the SVR, Sergei Yevgenyevich Naryshkin, and the Minister of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation, Maksut Igorevich Shadayev, affixed the postmarks and autographs to the first-day covers. The event was attended by honorable guests, including close relatives of the intelligence officers, perpetuated on the stamps.

"Issuing a stamp is more than just putting a new postage into circulation. It's a good way to perpetuate important events in our country's history, the names of outstanding compatriots, and key achievements of the state's activities. And to share this with wide audience both in Russia and abroad. A stamp is a special source of information, a tiny document conveying the events of an era. Today we have the opportunity to launch into the wider postal and philatelic world a series of postage stamps dedicated to six legendary Soviet intelligence officers.
The cancellation of these stamps is a tribute to the memory and an act of deep respect to the people who, during the Great Patriotic War, risked their lives to obtain vital information for the country's military and political leadership, for our scientists, constructors and engineers creating the weapons of the Victory. The names of these people were not widely known for decades, but their achievements and contributions to the Great Victory cannot be overestimated", S.Y. Naryshkin emphasized.

In 2025 the postal stamps perpetuate heroes of intelligence:

Iosif Romualdovich Grigulevich
during the war, he organized an illegal reconnaissance and sabotage group in Latin America, which sank ships bound for Nazi Germany, disrupting its supply of strategic raw materials.

Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov
he worked with anti-fascists from the Red Orchestra, who provided information about the Third Reich's military preparations and the Hitler regime's plans regarding the USSR. On June 22, 1941, risking his life, he personally met with them in Berlin to deliver a new radio, ciphers, and money.

Victor Alexandrovich Lyagin
leader of the "Marshrutniki" ("Roving agents") reconnaissance and sabotage group, operating in occupied Nikolaev. He organized several large-scale sabotage operations and was captured by the Nazis in March 1943. Despite being tortured, he never betrayed the other participants to the enemy. He was executed on July 17 of that year. In 1944, he was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Nicolay Arkhipovich Prokopyuk
commander of reconnaissance and sabotage detachment "Okhotniki" ("Hunters"). During the war conducted over twenty battles with members of fascist punitive squads at the rear of German fascist occupants in the territory of Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In 1944, for the courage and heroism he had demonstrated, he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Nadezhda Viktorovna Troyan
female intelligence officer and partisan, participant of the operation aimed at eliminating Wilhelm Kube — fascist commissar and Hitler-appointed governor of Belarus; for that operation she and her companions-in-arms were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin
head of the Soviet foreign intelligence from 1939 to 1946. He provided the leadership of the country with reliable information about German command intentions, prospects of opening the Western front, plans of the USSR allies in anti-Hitler coalition in the post-war period. He made a major contribution into acquirement of atomic secrets by the Soviet Union.

The stamp, dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Scientific and Technical intelligence, features pictograms (airplane, satellite, ship, microchip, etc.) symbolizing several fields of scientific and technical intelligence. *"For 100 years, the Scientific and Technical intelligence has been advancing domestic science and high-tech industries. The stamp issued today allows us to perpetuate the achievements of those who have worked and continue to work in this challenging field. As a civilian department, we greatly value the contribution the Scientific and Technical intelligence makes to ensuring Russia's technological leadership"*, — noted M.I. Shadayev.

A special moment of the ceremony were the speeches of close relatives of the intelligence officers, to whom the Director of the Service and the head of the Minkomsvyaz presented souvenir sets of cancelled stamps.

The first postage stamp in the USSR featuring a legendary Soviet intelligence officer, Hero of the Soviet Union N.I. Kuznetsov, was issued in 1966. Subsequently, for the 50th anniversary of the INO — PGU (the First Main Directorate) and for the 25th anniversary of Victory Day in 1970, stamps featuring portraits of Heroes of the Soviet Union, partisan intelligence officers D.N. Medvedev and K.P. Orlovsky were issued. In 1990, USSR Post issued a block of five stamps, "Soviet Intelligence Officers" featuring Heroes of the Soviet Union S.A. Vaupshasov and I.D. Kudrya, as well as illegal intelligence officers R.I. Abel (W.G. Fisher), K.T. Molody, and Kim Philby. In 1998, Russian Post put into circulation a block of four stamps, "Intelligence Officers. Heroes of the Russian Federation", dedicated to L.R. Kvasnikov, A.A. Yatskov, and the Morris and Leontina Cohen couple. And on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the INO — PGU — SVR, a block of "Female Intelligence Officers" (Z.I. Voskresenskaya-Rybkina and Africa de las Heras) and a series of stamps honoring intelligence officers and Heroes of the Soviet Union and Russia V.B. Barkovsky, A.N. Botyan, G.A. Vartanyan, A.M. Kozlov, and A.S. Feklisov were created.

We are sure that the stamps released in 2025 are far from being the last, and the good tradition of perpetuating the memory of outstanding intelligence officers will be kept up.



Unbreakable friendship in the name of peace

In issue No. 2(11) of 2025, «Razvedchik» reported on the address by the Director of the SVR of Russia to the heads of veteran organizations of the CIS special services who met in Moscow. Sergey Yevgenievich Naryshkin called for efforts to be directed towards perpetuating the memory of the exploits of Soviet intelligence officers of various nationalities during the Great Patriotic War and strengthening military brotherhood. His words became a prologue to a series of events, and the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory became the leitmotif for the work of the SVR of Russia's veteran corps in 2025, including in contacts with colleagues from the Commonwealth countries. Here's how these intentions were translated into real deeds.

In early June, veterans of the SVR and FSB of Russia arrived in Almaty to participate in the "The Great Victory — Our Common Historical Memory" round table discussion, which brought together guests from Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, in addition to representatives from Kazakhstan and Russia. The event was preceded by a solemn ceremony of laying flowers at the Monument of Glory in the Park named after the 28 Panfilov Heroes — a symbol of the immortality of the exploits of soldiers who fell for the Soviet Motherland.

The round table meeting took place within the walls of the Academy of the National Security Committee (KNB) of Kazakhstan. The Head of the Academy, Major General Akhat Gabbasovich Mukashev, addressed the delegates with a welcoming speech. Announcing the screening of two documentaries about the events of the Great Patriotic War and the contribution of intelligence officers from the allied Soviet republics to the Victory, he emphasized the importance of preserving historical memory.

Round-table meeting. Almaty. June 2, 2025

Almaty. June 2, 2025

Next, the Chairman of the Council of Veterans of the SVR of Russia, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Mikhail Vitalievich Pogudin, presented his report. *"Our responsibility to the past and the future is to do everything to prevent a recurrence of the tragic events of World War II, to put up a reliable barrier against the revival of fascism"*, — he expressed the general idea that was heard in all the speeches. In addition, M.V. Pogudin proposed holding a scientific and practical conference in 2026 on the issue of the historical roots and ideology of modern fascism, and its influence on youth. The idea was unanimously supported by the participants of the round table.

The meeting concluded with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation between veteran organizations of CIS special services. The initiative was proposed by our colleagues from Kazakhstan. The document has become a

Signing the Memorandum. Almaty. June 2, 2025

M.V.Pogudin hands over a memorable gift to A.M.Razayev. Bishkek. August 27, 2025

strong basis for coordinating future cooperation.

At the end of June, a delegation from the Council of Veterans of the SVR of Russia, at the invitation of colleagues from the KGB of the Republic of Belarus, participated in events commemorating the 84th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, including a large-scale reconstruction of the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress. During those same summer days, an exhibition of paintings titled “The Invisible Front. Foreign Intelligence during the Great Patriotic War” with works by artists who are employees of the SVR of Russia, was brought from Moscow to the fraternal Belarusian land.

During the trip, the Service’s delegation held in-depth consultations with the leadership of the Belarusian veteran organization “Honour”. In particular, intermediate results of cooperation were summarized. For example, it was noted that schoolchildren from Belarus who won prizes in competitions on the topic of the Great Victory visited Moscow and, together with their peers from the Russian capital, visited the headquarters of the SVR of Russia, where they were presented with memorable gifts. It was decided to conduct similar work in cooperation with veterans of the KGB of Belarus annually, and representatives of other CIS countries were recommended to take into account the useful experience in their programs for the patriotic and moral education of youth.

The tour of the new building of the SCNS of the Kyrgyz Republic. Bishkek. August 27, 2025

At the end of August, veterans of the SVR and FSB of Russia, as well as their colleagues from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, took part in another round table — “Strengthening the Traditional Veteran Brotherhood — from History to the Future”, which took place in hospitable Bishkek. The delegates were received by the Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) of the Kyrgyz Republic, Major General Abdykadyr Mamatyusupovich Razayev. In his welcome address, he spoke in favor of further enhancing cooperation within the veteran organizations, as they are a “significant social force”. Then he led a tour of the newly constructed building of the SCNS of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Receiving the veterans’ delegation in the SCNS of the Kyrgyz Republic. Bishkek. August 27, 2025

The round table discussion, which took place in the suburbs of Cholpon-Ata, was opened by the Chairman of the Council of Veterans of the SCNS of the Kyrgyz Republic, Zamirbek Zhaparovich Cholponbaev. M.V. Pogudin and his deputy Boris Nikolaevich Voronov, spoke on behalf of the Russian delegation. The head of the Uzbekistan Veteran Corps, Gayrat Dadajanovich Dadajanov, announced the plans of the leadership of the State Security Service (SSS) of the Republic of Uzbekistan to hold a meeting of the CIS special services veterans next year in Tashkent, coinciding with the 35th anniversary of the proclamation of Uzbekistan's independence. M.V. Pogudin invited his veteran colleagues to participate in a scientific and practical conference in Moscow.

Another visible result of the work of the veteran movement in 2025 was the publication of the book “Shoulder to Shoulder”, dedicated to the contribution of intelligence officers from the Commonwealth countries to the Great Victory over the fascist invaders. It should be noted that this edition included previously unpublished archival materials, including those received from colleagues from the CIS. We are confident that the work to prevent the falsification of history, preserve military brotherhood, and educate the younger generation, will continue.

Legendary raid

(excerpts from a diary)

Text: Mikhail Filonenko, Soviet intelligence officer,
commander of the "Moscow" reconnaissance and sabotage detachment
Illustrations: Sergei Dorozhenko

1941

December 3.
Temperature minus 25-30°C. Snowstorm, north wind. In the morning, I had the detachment lined up: 50 Cheka soldiers. More than half of them had never seen a Nazi. Commissar Anatoly Ermolaev and I reminded them that the raid would be difficult and dangerous, and there was the option of refusing. No one broke ranks.
"If anyone is shy in front of their comrades," I said, "then after individual conversations there will be a full lineup. Those unsure of themselves need not line up."
An hour later, all the 50 lined up. I tried to dissuade 18-year-old nurse Tamara Malygina, who had volunteered for the unit. However, everyone here was a volunteer. Tamara was an excellent skier and was proficient with a machine gun and pistol. But it wasn't a woman's job to set up camp in the snowy depths of the forest, to endure the cold and hunger. Tamara firmly said, "I'm tough. You won't have to blush for me."
Three cars arrived, and we headed to Ostankino. There, we received skis and adjusted them for everyone. At 12 o'clock, we left for Aprelevka, and from there, to Rogachevo. Late in the evening, the unit passed the battle lines of Colonel P. Rotmistrov's tank division, crossed the front line, and disappeared into the snowy forests.
We walked all night. In the morning, a heavy snowfall began, and our tracks were obscured by a blizzard.

Day two. December 4.
Minus 25°. Heavy clouds, blizzard. In the morning, as the fires were being extinguished, Fyodor Safonov came running with two of his scouts: "A German convoy of ten carts is approaching. The Fritzes are bundled up from head to toe. I don't think they'll put up much resistance."
I made a decision: launch a sudden, swift attack. I ordered Sergeant Major Safonov and his capture team to take one or two officers prisoner and eliminate the rest. Before the Nazis could even raise their weapons, 12 of them were dead on the spot, and two officers were captured. The detachment, on the captured carts, advanced deeper into the forest.
Fourteen fascists were killed, including four officers and three non-commissioned officers. We captured 18 machine guns, 3 rifles, 4 pistols, 5,000 rounds of ammunition, 16 pocket watches, 10,000 rubles, 5 boxes of ammunition, 10 boxes of grenades, and a large amount of food. We suffered no casualties. There were no wounded or frostbitten soldiers.
We spent the night in the forest. We cleared the meter-thick snow to the ground, broke off pine branches, laid them on the ground, and covered them with a groundsheet. Five to ten people would lie down, huddled close together, covering themselves with a second groundsheet, and then with more branches and snow. After about 30 minutes, it became warm in this snowy "hut." But every hour, the sentries woke the people and made them turn over lest they get cold. The sentries were changed every hour, with two at each post. The approaches to the campsite were mined.

Day three. December 5.
Minus 22°C, 28-30°C at night. Cloudy, snowstorm, moderate wind. Together with the detachment's commissar and Komsomol organizer, we congratulated everyone on the Soviet Constitution Day and wished them a successful raid and the swift expulsion of the fascists from our land.
Near the village of Akhmatovo, F. Safonov, together with Mikhail Zadkov and Ivan Grachev, set out on a search. On the outskirts of the village, they quietly captured a cart carrying a non-commissioned officer. The prisoner provided good information: his company was resting, half the personnel were frostbitten and sick. He indicated the houses they were quartered in.
The detachment approached Akhmatovo suddenly, from three directions. We removed the sentries, cut the communication lines, and threw grenades into the houses where the fascists were quartered. The entire garrison was wiped out. We hoisted a red flag over the school and scattered leaflets: "The fascists will face retribution everywhere, and their days near Moscow are counted. Death to the German occupiers!" We collected documents and enemy weapons and left as quickly as we had arrived.
68 fascists were killed, including 10 officers. We captured 70 submachine guns and pistols, several thousand rounds of ammunition, food, and uniforms. We suffered no losses.

Day four. December 6.
Minus 23°C during the day, 28°C at night. Cloudy, quiet, snowfall. We were awakened by a powerful cannonade. Heavy guns and mortars pounded the fascist defenses, and then dozens of red-starred planes took off and began bombing the enemy.
Apparently, our counteroffensive had begun. The Nazis fled in panic, wearing only their shirts; some fell into the snow and froze to death.
All day, we observed the retreating troops and the regrouping of troops and equipment. Guarded by armored trains, fresh forces were brought in by the railway to shore up the emerging gap in the defenses.
At 10:30 PM, we mined the bridge and the railway. At 11:00 PM, the bridge exploded under an enemy train carrying soldiers and equipment. About 100 Nazis were destroyed along with the bridge, and 10 tanks, 21 guns, and three gasoline tanks were swept into the river. The guards at the bridge had been removed by Fedya Safonov and his strike group. Fedya Kuvshinov's pyrotechnicians had mined the bridge and its approaches. Brave guys!
We spent most of the night skiing away deep into the forest. And only in the morning, 30 kilometers from the site of the sabotage, did we make a long rest stop.

Day five. December 7.
Minus 18°, 22° at night. Quiet, light snowfall. Huge white caps of snow have formed on the pines and fir trees, many of them resembling fairytale knights. Today I let the entire detachment rest. We found food supplies from the Nazi supply train hidden in the forest and heated up some stew over a fire. According to the plan, we are to reconnoitre the city of Vereya and, if possible, paralyze troop movement across the Protva River: blow up the bridge and send a message to the local population that the Soviet power is a resilient thing: it is capable of defeating the Nazi hordes.

Day six. December 8.
Minus 15-18°C, snowfall, a blizzard in the afternoon, strong wind. Three scouts got frostbite on the tips of their noses. This is our first frostbite. At a rest stop, under the supervision of Tamara Malygina, the "trinity" scrubbed their cheeks and noses with snow. Tamara smeared them with ointment and once again gave everyone detailed instructions on how to protect themselves from frostbite.
The town of Vereya was swarming with fascists. The movement was odd: some columns were moving into the town, others out. I called Starshina (Sergeant Major) Safonov and gave the capture team the task of getting a "tongue," preferably an officer. Before a couple of hours had passed, Fedya brought two bound Nazi officers. One was wearing a Knight's Cross — an "Oberst," or colonel.

The prisoners said that Vereya contained the remnants of a routed infantry division, which had lost over 80% of its personnel and all its equipment in three days of fighting. Fresh units were arriving to replace the routed division and were trying to hold back the Russian advance. "Your damned winter has ruined all our plans! But spring will come, and we'll freely occupy Moscow and reach the Urals," the colonel declared with arrogance. I ordered Safonov to shoot the Nazis.
The entire detachment was put on alert. We had to cover our tracks quickly: search for those "prominent" fascists was sure to start immediately. We were on the road for over three hours. Walking through the forest was extremely difficult: waist-deep snow, skis kept slipping off, the bindings — semi-rigid — tearing. We had to resort to bandages, belts, and strings. We settled down for the night, mined the approaches and lit a fire. We developed a plan to disable the railway line. We were to urgently help our units beat the fascists head-on. Beat them mercilessly, cruelly, with hatred, so that they'd remember us for the rest of their lives and tell their children...

Day seven. December 9.
Minus 24-27°C. A snowstorm and a north wind. A scout group headed for the village of Afanasyevo. The barking of dogs and screams could be heard in the village. Safonov and his men quietly approached the furthest house and called the owner. The fascists had arrived a week ago: angry, beaten, frostbitten. They'd been drinking and partying day and night, raping women, killing men, and hanging captured partisans.
"How many Germans are there in the village?" asked Safonov.
"About three platoons. They're waiting for tanks and reinforcements," replied peasant Mikhail Savelyev. "And the officers are in that house over there, the one with the shutters, where the light is on. They close the shutters at night — they're afraid of the partisans — and they also post two guards outside the house. They're very scared! They were told that the partisans had wiped out everyone in one garrison."
Two drunken and bandaged Nazis emerged from the gate of a neighboring house and headed toward Savelyev's hut. The scouts in the entryway disarmed and restrained them. It turned out they were a non-commissioned officer and a corporal. An hour later, the "tongues" were brought to the detachment. They confirmed everything Savelyev had said.
There was no delay. The detachment was divided into five groups: three groups of ten men each would raid the village from three sides at once. The first group was led by Senior Lieutenant Kazankov, the second by the detachment commissar, Yermolayev, and the third by Starshina Kuvshinov. The cover group was commanded by Sergeant Zadkov, who had been instructed to monitor the progress of the battle and provide cover for the detachment as it would retreat toward Shustikovo. The scouts, naturally, went ahead of the rest, and I was with them.

It was decided to begin the operation at 11:40 p. m. and finish at 12:25 a. m. The password was "Moscow," the response was "Bayonet." The numerical pass was 17. Everyone was to wear camouflage suits — that'd be the main difference between friend and foe.
We approached the village silently. The scouts started with blowing up the house where the officers were staying, having first removed the sentries. The explosion was the signal to attack.
Something unimaginable started in the village. The residents quickly figured out what was happening: they jumped out of their houses with pitchforks and axes and finished off the fascists. The garrison was completely annihilated. The villagers begged to join our detachment. But we couldn't take them, so we advised them on how to organize a partisan detachment.
52 fascists were killed, including five officers. Over 100 weapons were distributed to the population. No casualties. Two suffered frostbite.

Day eight. December 10.
Minus 27-30°C, dropping to 45°C at night, light wind, frost-covered forest. We walked to Shustikovo that night. It was freezing. We posted guards and decided to rest and warm up in an empty guardhouse. After lunch and rest, we marched to Borisovo. We walked slowly. Guards were ahead and on either side. We encountered peasants hiding from the Nazis. They said that Nazis and policemen were committing atrocities in Borisovo.

Day nine. December 11.
Minus 26-29°C, snowfall, quiet. We moved all day in the direction of Dorokhovo-Mozhaisk. Germans were everywhere. There were so many of them that all the roads were blocked. Hundreds, thousands of dead and frozen.

Day ten. December 12.
Minus 28°C. On the road we encountered three fascist carts, they were carrying food and ammunition. We killed three fascists and one policeman. We detonated the ammunition and hid the food in the forest.

Day eleven. December 13.
Minus 23-25°C, light snowfall. We marched to Borodino. We encountered a car escorted by submachine gunners. Two well-thrown anti-tank grenades — and there was no one left to shoot

at. We took documents and weapons. From the car carrying the fascist colonel, we took not only documents but also a briefcase containing looted gold and silver items. We quickly changed route and headed for Khrabrovo.

Day twelve. December 14.
Minus 18-20°C, heavy snowfall. We marched to Gubino. We encountered a column of fascist tanks. They stopped at a gas station. We did not engage in combat and retreated in the direction of Yurlovo.

Day thirteen. December 15.
Minus 17°C, snowstorm, wind. Arrived in Vyselovo. The Germans had brought many wounded and frostbitten men to the village. We didn't attack them, as they were already incapacitated. We exited at Afanasievo. We destroyed the enemy's communication line — over three kilometers long. We set up an ambush and waited for the German signalmen. They arrived with guards: six submachine gunners. We killed eight Nazis, took documents and weapons. We headed for Vereya.

Day fourteen. December 16.
Minus 15°C, strong wind. A kilometer from Vereya, three policemen and a fourth one off to the side were pursuing an unknown man without a coat. They shot at him, but he continued to flee into the forest. The three policemen and the fourth, who turned out to be the village elder, were captured. We learnt that they were pursuing a partisan sentenced to death.

The Nazi henchmen were executed on the spot, and the partisan was given German clothing and sent into the forest. He begged to join our unit, but taking unknown people was strictly forbidden.

Day fifteen. December 17.
Minus 25-30°C, snowfall, moderate wind, blizzard. We reached Simbukhovo. We cut 300 meters of enemy communications cable.

Day sixteen. December 18.
Minus 24-27°C, light wind, blizzard. We arrived in Nazarievo. During the night, we blew up an ammunition depot and burned a gasoline storage facility. We walked all night to Tashirovo.

Day seventeen. December 19.
Minus 26-29°C, northeast wind, blizzard. We roamed the forest. A blizzard, even a small one, was a great help.
We encountered a German convoy of 50 carts. It was accompanied by three tanks and three armored personnel carriers. We didn't engage in combat — there was no opportunity.

Day 18. December 20.
Minus 30-33°C, moderate wind, snowstorm. We were freezing. In the Dorokhovo-Shalikovo area, we attempted to sabotage the railway. It didn't work out: we killed three Nazis, but reinforcements arrived. We retreated into the forest, mined the road behind us, and waited for pursuit. The Nazis soon tried to catch up with us, but they were blown up by the mines and abandoned the pursuit.
On the way to Petrishchevo, Fedya Safonov and his capture group obtained a "tongue," an officer from the headquarters of an infantry division. From him, we learned that our troops had liberated Volokolamsk and that the most elite Nazi armies near Moscow had been routed. He kept saying, "Hitler kaput! Hitler kaput!"
In Petrishchevo, we learnt of the execution of the partisan "Tanya" on November 29, 1941. We swore an oath to mercilessly avenge our young scout, and the blood of many thousands of innocent Soviet people. Everyone was eager to fight...

Day nineteen. December 21.
Minus 27-30°C, snowfall, blizzard. In the morning, everyone was chilled to the bone, but our hearts were filled with joy: today was Comrade Stalin's birthday. Misha Zadkov said, "We should drink to the health of the Supreme Commander..." I had to allow 200 grams of schnapps to warm up and as a sign of respect for our leader. We did not engage in combat.

Day twenty. December 22.
Minus 25-27°C. While crossing from Kolodkino to Petrishchevo, we encountered a fascist convoy in the forest. We attacked suddenly. Killed seven Nazis, captured two. Captured ten carts with food, ammunition, warm clothing, and footwear.

Day twenty-one. December 23.
Minus 18-21°C, snowstorm, wind. We crossed to Borisovo. Reconnoitered the area. Did not engage in combat.

Day twenty-two. December 24.
Minus 20-23°C, dropping to 25°C at night. While crossing to Vereya, we encountered a convoy of trucks carrying barrels of gasoline; they were on their way to refuel tanks and armored personnel carriers. We burned all eight tankers, including the Nazis. We suffered no losses. Distinguished in battle: Fyodor Safonov, Mikhail Zadkov, Ivan Grachev, Viktor Pravdin, Alexander Sosulkin, Pavel Markin, Bogdan Dubensky, Lev Bakhmetyev, and others. We put on a beautiful fireworks display in the forest!..

Day twenty-three. December 25.
Minus 21-24°C, light wind. We conducted reconnaissance of the area near Afanasyevo. Dug up the hidden food supplies captured from the Nazis two weeks earlier. Did not engage in combat.

Day twenty-four. December 26.
Minus 20-23°C, snowfall, light wind, blizzard. Did not engage in combat.

Day twenty-five. December 27.
Minus 21-24°C. Moved to Shustikovo. Killed three Nazis along the way.

Day twenty-six. December 28.
Minus 22-24°C, blizzard. Did not engage in combat.

Day twenty-seven. December 29.
Minus 21-23°C, strong wind. We burned two armored personnel carriers in the forest. Eleven fascists were with them — they resisted and were destroyed. Among us, there were no losses.

Answers to the Atomic Quiz:
1 D, 2 C, 3 A, 4 B, 5 B, 6 A, 7 C, 8 C

Day twenty-eight. December 30.
Minus 20-24°C, light snowfall, light wind. The Germans decided to wash and steam in a bath house on New Year's Eve. So we decided to turn up the heat. We blew up the bath house, and shot up the naked Germans who jumped out.

Day twenty-nine. December 31.
Minus 15-17°C, heavy snowfall, quiet. The commissar and I gathered the entire personnel and, after breakfast, summarized the results of "our" 1941. What had we accomplished as volunteers, communists, and Komsomol members, how had we brought Victory Day closer? We'd tallied everything. And we, too, had contributed to the defeat of the Nazi occupiers. But there were still difficult and dangerous kilometers ahead.

1942

Day thirty. January 1.
Minus 23-25°C, heavy snowfall in the afternoon. We've been raiding behind enemy lines for a month now. This morning, Commissar Anatoly Ermolaev and I congratulated the entire ranks on the New Year and new happy days! We wished them even greater success in defeating the Nazis, good health, and a victorious return to the mainland!
There were still no casualties in the unit. Half of our skis were broken, though, and our maneuverability had been reduced. Several men had frostbitten toes and fingers... We were taking measures to protect ourselves from the cold. We continued to avoid overnight stays in populated areas — we spent every night in our snowy "bed."

Day thirty-one. January 2.
Minus 21-24°C, dropping to 28°C at night. We remained in the Kolodkino and Kryukovo area all day, observing enemy troops and their movements. In the evening, we captured a "tongue." He reported that reinforcements in winter clothing had arrived and that command had given the order to go on the defensive. We moved toward Tashirovo.

Day thirty-two. January 3.
Minus 22°C, snowfall, light westerly wind. There were many fascists in Tashirovo. It was dangerous to approach. I sent out reconnaissance. An hour later, Starshina Safonov reported that the Germans had set up a checkpoint and were checking everyone entering and leaving the village.

We set course again for Kryukovo. Two scouts got frostbite on their toes; they had to scrub them with snow and bandage them. The men were very tired. The strain was terrible. The cold.

Day thirty-three. January 4.
Minus 18-20°C, strong wind. We had hidden food supplies near Kryukovo in December after defeating an enemy convoy. We had killed several horses and buried them in snow — that was our emergency reserve. The food we were carrying was running low. We found emergency supplies and made a hearty feast: horse meat, stew, bacon, and even some schnapps for warmth.

Day thirty-four. January 5.
Minus 16-23°C, heavy snowstorm. We arrived back at Vereya, reconnoitred the approaches, and captured two drunken Nazis. They revealed that an SS regiment had arrived in Vereya to fight the partisans. The commander of the "Center" group, Field Marshal von Bock, had also called in a punitive battalion of White Finns from Leningrad area to more effectively combat the partisans.

Day thirty-five. January 6.
Minus 20-23°C, light snowfall. We encountered two German carts loaded with cargo on the road to Afanasyevo. The Nazis resisted, we killed five soldiers and an officer. We headed for Vyshegorod.

Day thirty-six. January 7.
Minus 23-25°C, snowstorm. No combat operations. We found supplies of clothing, ammunition, explosives — that which needed replenishing.

Day thirty-seven. January 8.
Minus 25-27°C, snowstorm. We destroyed the enemy's telephone line and two carts. Five soldiers and two officers were killed in the ensuing firefight. We suffered no casualties.

Day thirty-eight. January 9.
Minus 26-29°C, snowfall. Six German soldiers and an officer patrolling the road were shot in an ambush.

Day thirty-nine. January 10.
Minus 22-25°C, snowstorm. We conducted reconnaissance. Replenished ammunition and food supplies. Approached Borisovo.

Day forty. January 11.
Minus 22-24°C, snowstorm, strong wind. We attacked an enemy convoy of 100 carts, killing 45 Nazis with submachine gun and rifle fire. Set fire to two ammunition wagons. We suffered no casualties.
For the first time during the entire raid, some Nazis managed to escape. We must expect pursuit.

Day forty-one. January 12.
Minus 21-24°C, snow, blizzard. We cut two spans of communication cables, and in another place, we destroyed a 600-meter communication line. We killed three German soldiers and one officer. We mined several sections of the road.
The work is becoming increasingly difficult. After the sabotage, we retreated into the forest. We mined the approaches to the camp and began our dinner. At that moment, there was an explosion — our mines had detonated.
Safonov and the others found two Nazi corpses; the rest had fled. So, they were following us. But for the moment, the Nazis were afraid to go deeper into the forest. We headed to Akhmatovo this evening. The march was difficult. 80% of the group's skis were broken. Tomorrow we would return to the mainland. There had been no casualties so far.

Day forty-two. January 13.
Minus 23-25°C, snowstorm. We rose early, preparing to cross the front line. I formed the detachment and briefly set the task — break out from behind enemy lines. Just then, an observer came running: the Germans were skiing through the forest.
I gave the command: "Ready for battle!" We decided to let them get within 50-60 meters and hit them with a targeted salvo of fire. We spotted the punitive forces: a detachment of White Finns and several Germans. More than ten of them were immediately blown up by mines planted the day before. A salvo of fire killed over 30 more. The rest fled.
Having quickly gathered our documents and weapons, we hastily retreated.
We hadn't gone even two kilometers when the Nazi punitive detachments began to catch up with us again. Another battle. We destroyed several dozen of the enemy. But it was clear: we had to abandon our cover and retreat, otherwise the entire detachment would perish and all the intelligence we'd gathered would be lost.
Detachment Commissar Anatoly Ermolaev, Starshina Fyodor Safonov, Starshina Fyodor Kuvshinov, and Senior Lieutenant Andrey Kazankov volunteered to provide cover. We parted near the village of Akhmatovo. I gave them all the machine- and submachine-gun ammunition, as well as grenades. I kept only two grenades and one magazine each for my submachine gun and pistol.
Everyone understood: covering us would mean facing certain death. The punitive forces outnumbered us tenfold. The trained White Finns, on skis, felt right at home in the forest, while our scouts were exhausted and without skis. The situation could not allow us even the briefest rest necessary to successfully beat the enemy again.
We retreated, and behind us we could hear short bursts of machine gun fire, the rattle submachine guns, and grenade explosions. I was wounded in the shoulder, the loss of blood was making me dizzy, but I had to gather my last strength, make a break for it, and lead the detachment out. The punitive forces rushed at the handful of our remaining comrades.

Day forty-three. January 14.
Minus 21-23°C, snowfall, blizzard, strong wind. We walked all day and almost all night. We were completely exhausted. We were out of food, and our ammunition was one grenade and 10-12 rounds each. I fell into a large hole in the forest, covered in snow. I wouldn't have gotten out on my own — I had no strength. Luckily, Misha Zadkov noticed. He unbuckled his submachine gun belt, tossed one end to me, and he and Vanya Grachev pulled me out. I might have been lying in a snowy grave, literally.
That night, we spotted fires in the forest. We looked at the map: this territory was occupied by the Nazis. We sent a group of three men to scout out who these people were. It turned out our units had already taken up defensive positions here.

Day forty-four. January 15.
Minus 20-23°C. At three in the morning, we were allowed to approach our troops' campfires, and then sent to division, army, and front headquarters.
Many senior military commanders at the front headquarters didn't believe such a raid was possible. But we had material evidence: we brought a duffel bag full of ID tags taken from dead Nazis, a bag of officers' and soldiers' documents, a bag of Soviet and German currency, about 300 metal and gold wristwatches, pocket watches, and other watches, and a duffel bag of gold and silver jewelry taken from the Nazi invaders. Only then did they believe us.
Our losses: four brave scouts were killed and four were wounded in the final battle. The following died a heroic death: detachment commissar Anatoly Ermolaev, detachment reconnaissance chief Andrei Kazankov, detachment deputy commander for military reconnaissance, Starshina Fyodor Safonov, and pyrotechnics platoon commander, Starshina Fyodor Kuvshinov.



The raid by the "Moscow" detachment proved to be the most successful of all similar operations carried out by OMSBON officers in the winter of 1941-1942. The detachment commander, senior lieutenant of state security and future illegal intelligence officer Mikhail Ivanovich Filonenko (pictured), personally reported its results to General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and received the Order of the Red Banner from him. All the aforementioned fallen detachment members were subsequently buried with military honors in Moscow next to Heroes of the Soviet Union V.V. Talalikhin and L.V. Dovator.

“Smolenskaya square”

The new collection of poems by the secretary of the Russian Writers Union — our friend and fellow soldier Anatoly Grigoryevich Pshenichny, who has given many years of his life to the service to the Motherland in intelligence and diplomacy structures, contains verses and songs dedicated to the staff of the Russian foreign institutions. We are glad to present you several works from the poet's new book that was specially published on the eve of the 105th anniversary of the foundation of SVR.

Traffic lights

I feel, friends, that my breast is empty,
The motor is stopping, and at the beginning of the way
A disturbing feeling does not leave me,
That something is about to happen.

White crows and black cats,
Pink wind in a non-Russian garden...
I will screw off the side window,
Sipping of strong speed on the run.

I would have flown between points and rivers,
But the traffic lights have cut my run:
A little man has gone from the green circle,
A man is standing in a fiery one.

Ah, the traffic lights are inflexible pointsmen.
I slam on the brake, raising dust.
My luminous Homeland, your circle is the green one,
The red circle is the nonnative land.

In the green circle — the rooks are returning,
Ice floes are spinning, sliding down the rivers.
My mother gets older, and my son grows,
And my friends remember me less and less.

And the traffic lights seem to be blocked on the red light.
Car horns are hustling me in the back.
And straight forward, through the dangerous crossroads,
I drive my obedient mechanical horse.

I don't respond for an alien country,
But the not alien one will remember for long:
The man has gone from the green circle,
The man is standing in a fiery one!

Air of Paris

Some may wonder, some may laugh,
And some may brighten as well:
Air in Paris — it, too, is on sale
In a can with a small thin ring.

We smile to overseas funny things:
Well, Paris, amuse us, can you?
But sometimes we also take away with us
A handful of our native soil.

If they made such a thing — not for sale,
But for those who don't count miles,
A small and light can with the air of the Motherland,
I would surely take it away.

For if I happen to be, dear friends,
In a deadly bad trouble somewhere,
I would pull out the ring, as the pin of a grenade,
To inhale my dear Russian air.

...Some may wonder, some may laugh,
And some may brighten as well:
Air in Paris — it, too, is on sale
In a can with a small thin ring...

Far away from the Homeland

To the Vartanyans and their fellow laborers

My Motherland has its own special features,
The enemies can't kill them – neither by a bullet, nor by a line.
Far away from the Motherland, on a small space of planet,
The fighters not seen are guarding her rest.

The fighters not seen have fastened their lives
Into an unthinkable knot of orders and tasks,
And only sometimes, in a port or at a station,
They slacken the step among troubles or luck.

They look at other people, hurrying to board,
Who will soon drop off at their native river,
And, maybe, they will wave at their backs furtively:
Greet the Motherland! Farewell, our fellow countrymen...

Alien addresses and well-turned legends,
Alien names in alien languages,
Alien coasts and alien documents,
And the Russian soul in a safe hiding place.

And how many moments have they left behind,
Seventeen or a hundred – who could count well!
But the Motherland waited for them and loved them –
With or without awards, as only a mother would wait.

***

I am not used to any foreign language.
No matter how hard I learned or tried,
Just as a horse at stones at full tilt,
I stumbled against foreign words.

And experts, aces were all very close...
But once again my heart turned icy cold,
When some of my native fellow countrymen
Could not find a right word in Russian...

My native speech! Far from the Homeland,
Where the word “Russia” carries a mark of sedition,
I reclined against, as if a pair of crutches,
On alien creaking verbs, so odd and weird.

And as I kept my last small box of matches
In a taiga winter hut frozen over in snow,
I kept my native Ural dialect speech
Among the alien crackling flow of words.

Thank you, my memory, my owl on guard,
That you didn't close your eyes on service,
That you didn't let my native words go out
And didn't let in alien words needlessly.

And although I haven't reached any higher rank,
Just suffered great terrestrial overloads,
But my native Russian language hasn't acquired
A ridiculous phrase: “How is it in Russian?”

Atomic quiz

1. **Who is considered the scientific and technical intelligence founder in the structure of the INO-PGU-SVR?**
A. *L. R. Kvasnikov*
B. *V. B. Barkovsky*
C. *P. M. Fitin*
D. *G. B. Ovakimian*

2. **Who was the first prominent Western scientist to conclude in 1942 that the Germans would not be able to create an atomic bomb?**
A. *Robert Oppenheimer*
B. *Albert Einstein*
C. *Klaus Fuchs*
D. *Edward Teller*

3. **In the spring of 1943, he was dispatched to Xinjiang in order to ensure the safety of Soviet geologists who were conducting research for uranium deposits in the region.**
A. *N.I. Eitingon*
B. *S.D. Fisher*
C. *I.A. Akhmerov*
D. *P.A.Sudoplatov*

4. **When was the first successful nuclear weapons test in the Soviet Union?**
A. *July 17, 1945*
B. *August 29, 1949*
C. *September 10, 1950*
D. *August 12, 1953*

5. **A Soviet deep-cover agent who, as part of Operation Enormous, gained the trust of the Robert Oppenheimer's family, the scientific director of the Manhattan Project.**
A. *L. Cohen*
B. *E.Y. Zarubina*
C. *A.F. Kamaeva*
D. *S.I. Krimker*

6. **What household product packaging did Leontine Cohen use to conceal the secret documents she obtained in Los Alamos?**
A. *Napkins*
B. *Shampoo*
C. *Toothpowder*
D. *Hard soap*

7. **Who is in the photo?**

A. *Robert Oppenheimer*
B. *Werner Heisenberg*
C. *I.S. Kurchatov*
D. *James Chadwick*

8. **The Soviet atomic bomb project was codenamed “Uranium”. What strategic military operation during the Great Patriotic War shared the same name?**
A. *Breaking the Siege of Leningrad*
B. *Offensive in Belarus*
C. *Counteroffensive at Stalingrad*
D. *Defense of Moscow*

Answers on page 106

Intelligence officer's library

In 2025, books describing life and work of Morris and Leontina Cohen, Yury Shevchenko and other intelligence officers were published. The books will be useful both to specialists and wide audience.

Drawing by
Vladimir Mochalov

"M" explains this lapse in memory by his temporary insanity, which occurred as a result of another quarrel with his wife.

Selected moments of operational correspondence

During the press conference, "N" intended to shed light on the circumstances of his unexpected disappearance, but just the day before he suddenly disappeared again.

"R" has parallel matrimonial intentions in regard of two of his young female acquaintances.

The object is capable of immoral acts due to the fact that the adrenaline accumulated in him makes him restless and is looking for a way out.

"S" compensates for the lack of education with great diligence and combative character.

True to his life principles, "K" every time gets married seriously and for long.

The president of one of the European countries mentioned above was expectedly standing, all glossy, next to the American guest.

As a result of uncoordinated actions, the operative was dropped at the wrong place, not properly picked up, following which he was lost, then found, but not at the agreed time nor at the proper location.

In the next issue:

Roskosmos Head Dmitry Bakanov:
“We must set big goals and far-reaching tasks for ourselves”

Moscow Kremlin Museums Director Yelena Gagarina:
“I have found my cosmic space in art”

Who owns the information owns the world
To the anniversary of the cryptography service

Turkey in the years of the World War II
Declassified documents from the archives of the SVR of Russia

svr.gov.ru